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Abstract 
Migrants of Turkish origin and their descendants constitute a rather heterogeneous group of persons in 
Europe with respect to their recent economic, political, cultural, ethnic and religious dispositions. In an 
attempt to challenge the stereotypical representation of these ‘Euro-Turks’ in their homeland and 
countries of settlement, extensive qualitative and quantitative research was carried out in Germany and 
France by the Centre for Migration Research during late 2003 and early 2004.  
One of the premises of the work is that Euro-Turks would provide both strong support and an 
impediment to Turkey’s EU membership. Thus the research has aimed at investigating whether Euro-
Turks living in Germany and France could become a driving force or vanguard for Turkey in the 
process of integration into the European Union. It identifies the social, political and cultural discourses 
of the Turkish diaspora concerning Turkish-EU relations. By gauging public opinion among the 
Turkish groups in Western Europe, it also seeks to determine whether these communities could 
provide new opportunities and prospects for the formation of a more open and democratic society in 
Turkey. 
At this stage, the research reveals that there are three major groups of Euro-Turks emerging in the 
migratory process: bridging groups (who are affiliated with both the homeland and ‘host-land’) 
breaching groups (who still have a strong orientation to the homeland) and assimilated groups. Based 
on a survey of the literature and structured interviews, this report reveals how Euro-Turks demonstrate 
the fact that Europeanness is not a prescribed identity, but an ongoing process of being and becoming.   
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Introduction 
European Union: A peace project for Turkey 
Despite being surrounded by the ethnic, religious and political predicaments of neighbouring 
countries, Turkey is going through one of the most stable periods in the history of the Republic. At the 
Helsinki summit (December 1999), the European heads of state and government offered Turkey the 
concrete prospect of full membership of the European Union for the first time, more than four decades 
after its application for association with the European Economic Community in July 1959. The 
decision made in Helsinki was in almost direct opposition to the decision made earlier at the 
Luxembourg summit of 1997. The Luxembourg decision was designed to crush Turkey’s hopes for 
membership of the EU. The response of the public in Turkey was remarkably immediate and harsh. 
Popular nationalism, minority nationalisms, Kemalism, religiosity, Occidentalism and Euroscepticism 
all reached their peak in the aftermath of the Luxembourg summit. Thanks to the December 1999 
Helsinki summit, this destructive atmosphere in Turkey did not last long. The EU prospects offered to 
Turkey in Helsinki have radically shaken the deep-rooted political establishment in the country, 
opening up new opportunities for various ethnic, religious, social and political groups. For instance, 
Kurds and Islamists in Turkey have become true advocates of the EU in a way that affirms the pillars 
of the political union as a peace project. The EU stands as a great incentive for several groups in 
Turkey to reinforce their willingness to coexist. What lies beneath this willingness to coexist no longer 
seems to be the retrospective past, full of ideological and political disagreements, but the prospective 
future, embracing differences in a democratic way. The EU seems to be the major catalyst at the 
moment in the acceleration of the process of peaceful coexistence in Turkey.  
“If, in December 2004, the European Council, on the basis of a report and recommendation from the 
Commission, decides that Turkey has fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria, the European Union 
will open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay” states the conclusions of the European 
Council, which met in Copenhagen in December 2002 (European Council, 2002). Yet both the 
political establishment and the public of each EU member state are aware of the fact that Turkey’s 
membership of the Union shall stimulate further the discussions of European identity and the limits of 
Europe. Recently, there have been heated public debates in several countries on Turkey’s membership 
of the Union, mostly disfavouring the membership of a large state such as Turkey with its 
overwhelmingly Muslim population and socio-economic conditions that are below the EU average. 
Some put forward the socio-economic disparities between Turkey and the EU, some underline the 
Islamic character of Turkey, some emphasise Turkey’s undemocratic and patrimonial political culture 
and some even raise the clash of civilisations in order to reject Turkey’s prospective membership. 
Nobody can deny the fact that it is a difficult task to include Turkey in the Union. Nevertheless, a 
more constructive discourse must be generated with regard to Turkey’s full membership in order to 
revitalise the fundamentals of the EU, which are known to be addressing ‘a peace project’. There is no 
doubt that a peace project requires a constructive rather than a destructive discourse. The discourse 
developed by the Independent Commission on Turkey is constructive and thus deserving of 
admiration.
1 
The decision of the 1999 Helsinki summit brought about a great stream of reforms. For instance, 
Turkey has achieved more reform in just over two years than in the whole of the previous decade. 
                                                 
1 The Independent Commission on Turkey was established in March 2004 with the support of the British Council 
and the Open Society Institute. The Commission is composed of Anthony Giddens, Marcelino Oreja Aguirre, 
Michel Rocard, Albert Rohan (Rapporteur), Martti Ahtisaari (Chairman), Kurt Biedenkopf, Emma Bonino, Hans 
van den Broek and Bronislaw Geremek. Their purpose is to examine the major challenges and opportunities 
connected with Turkey’s possible accession to the Union. They met regularly for intensive discussions, visited 
Turkey and analysed expertise from various sources. Close contact was maintained with European institutions. 
The Independent Commission’s work programme did not include issues under review by the European 
Commission for its forthcoming Progress Report on Turkey. For further details, see the report of the Independent 
Commission on Turkey, Brussels (September 2004). 2 | KAYA & KENTEL 
 
Several laws were immediately passed by the national parliament to fulfil the Copenhagen political 
criteria; strict anti-inflationist economic policies have been successfully enforced; institutional 
transparency and liberalism have been endorsed; both formal nationalism and minority nationalism 
have been precluded; and socio-economic disparities between regions have also been dealt with. But 
there is still a lot to do and implement. 
Despite all these reforms and goodwill, the public in EU countries remain unconvinced concerning 
prospective Turkish membership. The only feasible way to have a positive impact on European public 
opinion regarding Turkey’s entry into the Union is through the research and dissemination of objective 
and constructive data, which is devoid of prejudice and cliché. There is no doubt that the decisions of 
EU member states on Turkey’s prospective full membership will also be a decision about the future 
nature of the Union. The decision about Turkey is actually more complex than it seems. In making this 
decision the EU will essentially be choosing its own future path: a vote of ‘no to Turkey!’ will revive 
the conservative stream in the Union, which tends to define Europe and the EU as a Christian, holistic, 
static, essentialist, culturalist and civilised bloc, while a vote of ‘yes to Turkey!’ will wave the 
progressive flag in the EU, addressing the political, economic, syncretic, dynamic and post-national 
fabric of the Union. 
The leaders of the EU countries made a decision at the Amsterdam summit in December 2004 
concerning a starting date for accession negotiations. Yet there are still strong popular stereotypes 
among the publics of each member state however, which claim that Turkey does not politically, 
economically, socially or culturally fit into the EU. These stereotypes mostly spring from the 
perceptions of Euro-Turks by majority societies in the West. The stereotypical judgements concerning 
Euro-Turks often point out that Turks do not integrate into the European way of life; that Turks are 
radically Islamist, nationalist, culturalist and conservative; that Turks in Turkey see full membership 
as an opportunity to flee to the EU; and that Turks do not have a democratic political culture based on 
equality, human rights, free-market economy and participation. Conversely, the data gathered through 
the structured interviews, in-depth interviews and focus group discussions held in Germany and 
France reveal another picture, quite different from the one portrayed above.  
Aims of the research 
This research aims at investigating whether Euro-Turks living in Germany and France could provide a 
driving force or vanguard for Turkey in the process of integration into the European Union. The social, 
political and cultural discourses of Turkish diasporic subjects concerning Turkish-EU relations in 
these two European countries are mapped out. Migrants of Turkish origin and their descendants 
constitute a rather heterogeneous group of persons in Europe with respect to their recent economic, 
political, cultural, ethnic and religious dispositions. Thus, one of the premises of this work is that these 
separate groups would provide both strong support and an impediment to Turkey’s EU membership. 
Gauging public opinion among the Turkish diaspora groups in Western Europe may help us find out if 
these communities could provide Turkish society with new opportunities and prospects in the 
formation of a more open and democratic society in Turkey. Another premise of this work is that 
boundaries between Turkey and the diaspora are no longer that strict, but have become rather blurred. 
For instance, it has only lately been realised that the Islamic resurgence in the diaspora has resulted in 
the reinforcement of religious organisations in the homeland. The same process is also applicable to 
the Kurdish and Alevi revival in Turkey, because both social movements are to some extent 
constrained by the modern diasporic formations. Hence, these phenomena make it clear that diasporic 
formations may have a strong impact on homeland formations. 
The purpose of this study is to: 
•  develop an inventory of Euro-Turks to provide user groups with updated information concerning 
their discourses on Turkey’s entry into the EU; 
•  provide a snapshot of heterogeneous Euro-Turks; EURO-TURKS: A BRIDGE OR A BREACH BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE EU? | 3 
 
•  contribute to the dissolution of the stereotypical image of Euro-Turks in the minds of EU citizens 
and politicians in a way that may change negative public opinion concerning Turkey’s entry into 
the EU; 
•  create an incentive for those Euro-Turks of rural origin to contribute to the formation of a positive 
image of Western Europe among their fellows in Turkey; 
•  contribute to the growing body of knowledge on transnational communities and ethnic studies; 
•  understand the major parameters of transnational space developed by Euro-Turks; 
•  develop and refine the theoretical understanding of fluid cultures; 
•  develop an alternative perspective in researching minority cultures and cultural diversities; 
•  contribute to the development of a new project in the aftermath of the discontentment of the 
ideology of multiculturalism generated by the state vis-à-vis minorities; and 
•  contribute to the peaceful coexistence of culturally and ethnically diversified populations by 
revealing mutually produced stereotypes and proposing an intercultural way of life for the 
majority society and Euro-Turks. 
Rationale of the project 
There is a common belief in western European countries that migrants of Turkish origin and their 
children do not integrate into the social, political, economic or cultural life of their settlement 
countries. According to the same common belief, the political motivations of Turks in their countries 
of settlement are primarily shaped by their homeland. Recently, however, much academic work and 
many other indicators have come to reveal an alternative picture. Contemporary migrants of Turkish 
origin and their descendants in Western Europe can no longer be considered simply as temporary 
migrant communities who live with the ‘myth of return’ or passive victims of global capitalism who 
are alienated by the system and swept up in a destiny dominated by the capitalist West. Rather, they 
have become permanent settlers, active social agents and decision-makers. For instance, today’s 
German-Turks have little in common with the old ‘guest-worker’ stereotypes of the past. They are a 
recognised and highly active section of the population. Around 5,000 Turkish businesses in Berlin 
currently employ approximately 20,000 workers in 90 differing areas of activity. Only 30% of Berlin’s 
Turkish businesses now work in the restaurant and catering field, 37% are involved in trade and 18% 
in the services sector. They form a dynamic and flexible business sector that benefits the whole 
country. There is sufficient evidence that German-Turkish intellectuals who have recently appeared in 
the German public space have a great impact on the formation and articulation of these active roles 
and identities. Along with the worldwide emergence of the postcolonial literature and discourses, 
Turkish diasporic groups have also had the opportunity to express themselves in the German public 
space through their spokespersons and intelligentsia. This project refrains from perceiving Euro-Turks 
as passive, obedient, powerless or incompetent; rather it recognises their reflexivity, activity, 
subjectivity and significance. Hence, the researchers strongly believe that Euro-Turks should be 
recognised for such reflexive subjectivities.  
There is also a lack of awareness in both the homeland and ‘host-land’ concerning the characteristics 
of migrants and their children. It is still commonly believed in Turkey that migrants of Turkish origin 
and their descendants in the West are gurbetci,
2 with a strong orientation towards the homeland that 
will someday bring them home. On the other hand, they are also called ‘Almancı’, a term that depicts 
such individuals as being rich, eating pork, having a very comfortable life in the West, losing their 
Turkishness and becoming increasingly Germanised, Anglicised or Frenchified, etc. They are also 
stereotypically called ‘foreigner’ in their own countries of settlement. The common stereotypical 
labelling of ‘Turk’ in the West strongly indicates that Turks are conservative, religious, veiled, poor, 
                                                 
2 The term gurbetçi refers to someone in gurbet (diaspora), which is an Arabic word deriving from garaba, to go 
away, to depart, to be absent, to go to a foreign country, to emigrate, to be away from one’s homeland, to live as 
a foreigner in another country.  4 | KAYA & KENTEL 
 
nationalist, nostalgic for their homeland, non-integrative and violent. This research aims at revealing 
that Euro-Turks are highly diversified and have very little in common with the Almanci, guest-worker 
or foreigner stereotypes of the past. It uncovers invisible Euro-Turks and their families who also 
identify themselves as migrants of Turkish origin who somehow do not fit into the category of 
stereotypical Turks that are visible in the public space with their outer appearance and clothing styles. 
This research also seeks to understand whether Euro-Turks have developed Europeanness and certain 
commitments vis-à-vis the EU, as well as the sort of political culture they have generated in the West 
and the kind of incorporation strategies they have constructed vis-à-vis their countries of settlement. It 
additionally seeks to reveal what they think about some critical issues such as citizenship, 
democratisation, political participation, globalisation, human rights, equality, the rule of law, justice, 
religion, multiculturalism, interculturalism, coexistence and political institutions. These questions are 
all addressed in a way that enables us to compare their views on the homeland and host-land. This 
research is of particular importance at this conjuncture, characterised by intensive discussions in 
Turkey and abroad concerning the EU integration process, the EU Constitutional Treaty, the EU 
enlargement process, the Cyprus question, the secularism debate and religious fundamentalism. This 
conjuncture is also unique in the sense that there is a shift happening in the West from a 
multiculturalist discourse to an interculturalist discourse.  
A separate note is also needed on the contextual use of the terms ‘Euro-Turk’, ‘German-Turk’ and 
‘French-Turk’ in this work. Such identifications are used by neither the migrants of Turkish origin to 
identify themselves nor are they in the political or academic debate in Germany. We have chosen to 
use these terms with reference to our findings in both qualitative research and quantitative research. As 
was seen in the interim report, around 60% of the German-Turks identify themselves as 
European/Turkish or Turkish/European (Turkish/German or Turkish/French) and around 70% of the 
French-Turks define themselves as such. Thus, the notion of ‘European Turks’ can also be used 
instead of Euro-Turks. Furthermore, such a hyphenated identification also addresses the hybrid form 
of cultural identity in the world of the research. Hence, such terms are helpful to us for two reasons: 
they distance the researcher from essentialising transnational migrants and their descendants as 
‘Turkish’ and underline the trans-cultural character of these diasporic subjects. 
Another point to make with regard to the rationale of the project is to challenge the recent process of 
securitisation of migration in the West. ‘Security’ has become one of the most salient notions of recent 
times, especially since the events of 11 September 2001. The measures taken by states to fight against 
the sources of insecurity have turned out to be the main ideological tools for states to obtain the 
consent of their publics for policy-making and thus to sustain their sovereignty. The security discourse 
has actually become the most efficient instrument for states to govern their citizens and to maintain the 
survival of the state and governmentality in Foucaultian terms.
3 In other words, as Huysmans (1998, p. 
571) puts it, securitisation turns into a technique of government that retrieves the ordering force of the 
fear of violent death by a mythical replay of variations of the Hobbesian state of nature. Thus it 
becomes a political technique with a capacity to politically integrate a society by staging a credible 
existential threat in the form of an enemy that is fabricated by security agencies (such as the police) 
through categorising migration together with drug trafficking, human trafficking, international 
criminality and terrorism (Huysmans, 1998, p. 572). By stereotypically casting migration and 
emphasising its disrupting consequences, the media also play a role in the securitisation process of 
migration in the West.  
Security is no longer limited to the protection of national boundaries. Hence, the term ‘security’ at 
present has a broader meaning than that of the cold war era. The cold war meaning of security was 
linked to military and ideological threats. The focus here was on the security of the nation-state as an 
entity. Security used to be defined in political/military terms as the protection of the boundaries and 
                                                 
3 ‘Governmentality’ refers to the practices that characterise the form of supervision a state exercises over its 
subjects, their wealth, their misfortunes, their customs, their souls and their habits (Foucault, 1979). Foucault 
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integrity of the state and its values against the dangers of a hostile international arena (Doty, 2000, p. 
73). Yet the present use of the term goes beyond its conventional limits. Nowadays, security concerns 
are not only reduced to the protection of states against military threats, they are related to several 
different issues such as immigration, ethnic revival, religious revival (Islam), identity claims and 
sometimes supranational entities such as the EU. In other words, issues become security issues by 
virtue of a process of social construction, that is, securitisation (Doty, 2000, p. 73). The main rationale 
of the security discourse seems to have shifted from protecting the state to protecting society. Thus, 
the protection of society against any kind of ‘evil’ has become the pillar of the security discourse in a 
way that popularised the term ‘security’ in all spheres of life. Immigration resulting from poverty and 
anti-democratic regimes in the countries of origin has become one of the principal worries of Western 
countries. Immigration has been defined as a threat, not to the survival of the state, but to societal 
security. Ethnic or religious revival (or both), which comes out among some migrant groups as a 
reaction to poverty, unemployment, insecurity and institutional discrimination, seems to be decoded 
by the state as a challenge to societal security – a challenge that has to be immediately prevented. The 
goal of this research is to reveal whether ethnic/religious revival should be translated as the reason for 
continuing problems such as xenophobia, discrimination and conflict or as the outcome of these 
problems. 
Fieldwork and methodology 
The research has been carried out in various steps. In the first step, an extensive literature survey was 
conducted covering the related literature on Euro-Turks, including recently submitted MA and PhD 
dissertations. Although there is limited literature on French-Turks, the literature on German-Turks is 
extensive. In the course of the literature survey several sources by Turkish, German, French, German-
Turkish and French-Turkish scholars have been scrutinised. In the second stage of the research, focus 
group discussions and in-depth interviews were held. In September and October 2003, 13 focus group 
discussions were held in groups composed of eight or ten participants (Berlin, four; Köln, two; Essen, 
one; Munich, one; Paris, three; and Strasbourg, two).
4 In addition, 35 in-depth interviews were 
conducted in both countries. While the focus group discussions were held with a wide range of 
persons, the in-depth interviews were conducted with opinion leaders such as politicians, businessmen, 
academics, students and artists, whose thoughts may not have been clearly represented in the 
structured interviews.  
The third stage of the research involved conducting structured interviews – the questions for which 
were prepared by Ayhan Kaya and Ferhat Kentel, and later discussed with some colleagues, 
representatives of the Open Society Institute, Heinrich Böll and also with some related academics 
during the qualitative research period in Germany and France. The research team, with the assistance 
of the Veri Araştırma Data Processing Company, set up a quota sampling in both countries, paying 
particular attention to the density of population of Turkish origin in the urban space and rural space 
(Table I.1). The quota sampling covered the variables of age, gender, occupation and region in order to 
gather a representative picture of the Euro-Turks. 
Interviews resulted in the collection of 1,065 questionnaires in Germany and 600 in France by teams 
of local research companies, Gelszus GmbH (Hamburg) and Socioscan (Paris), in collaboration with 
Veri Araştırma. The selection of the interviewers and the methods of interview were supervised by 
Veri Araştırma in order to ensure that bilingual Turkish interviewers were being employed and 
interviews were properly conducted. Veri Araştırma also organised orientation programmes in both 
countries for the interviewers to equip them with some essential interviewing techniques and 
                                                 
4 The researchers are very sensitive to avoid calling the participants of the research as either ‘respondent’ or 
‘informant’. We believe that both terms are problematic as the former corresponds to the inherent power 
relations at the expense of the participants and in favour of the researcher, and the latter puts the participants in a 
role of leaking out information from their communities. The term ‘interlocutor’ is preferred to make it clear that 
the researchers take the participants as their equal partners. For a detailed analysis of this discussion, see 
Horowitz (1983), Adler et al. (1986) and Alasuutari (1995, pp. 52-56). 6 | KAYA & KENTEL 
 
information. The interview consisted of 90 questions. It has been reported that the average duration of 
the interviews was around 30 minutes. Interviewers were also given a German/French translation of 
the questions to be used in the event of any participant preferring to communicate in either language. 
With respect to gender and age, we attempted to obtain a representative selection of Euro-Turks. 
About 73% of the German-Turks were reported as having been born in Turkey and approximately 
27% in Germany. Among those born in Turkey, 70% originally came from rural areas and 30% came 
from cities.  
Table I.1 Sampling distribution 
Germany   Number of 
questionnaires 
France  Number of 
questionnaires 
Niedersachsen-Bremen 82  Ille  de  France  222 
Nordrhein–Westfalen 381  Centre  41 
Hessen 121  Rhone-Alpes  150 
Baden–Württemberg 233  Franche-Comté  32 
Bayern 184  Alsace  109 
Berlin 64  Lorraine  46 
Total 1065  Total  600 
 
The structured interviews were composed of five essential sections of questions: a) demographic 
information, b) orientation towards the homeland, c) orientation towards the host-land,
5 d) orientation 
towards the EU and e) identity-related issues. The questions were designed in such a way as to give us 
definite clues about the status of Euro-Turks, whether they constitute a bridge or a breach between 
Turkey and the EU, between the East and the West or between Islam and Christianity.  
                                                 
5 We are aware of the fact that the term ‘host-land’ is problematic as it connotes that migrants could never 
become permanent settlers and that they are always destined to remain as guests. Nevertheless, the term will be 
used as a categorical phrase. | 7 
Chapter 1 
The Migratory Process in Germany and France 
ermany and France have long histories of importing labour from other countries – especially 
Eastern and southern Europe, but also from other parts of the world – during periods of labour 
shortages. In spite of this fact, Germany has generally been viewed as a labour-exporting, 
rather than labour-importing, nation. In the late 1880s, for instance, a million Germans migrated 
overseas, mostly to the United States. By the beginning of World War I, there were over 3 million 
Germans overseas; in return, Germany had received 1 million foreign workers, mostly from Poland 
(Sassen, 1999, p. 52). In contrast, France suffered from persistent labour shortages and thus the French 
were considerably less inclined to emigrate than their German counterparts. Immigration played a far 
more important role in 19
th century France than emigration. The maintenance of a significant 
agricultural sector until well into the 20
th century ensured the possibility of a livelihood in the 
countryside and created a demand for immigrants (Sassen, 1999, p. 52). Since 1945, both countries 
have become major immigrant-receiving countries of continental Europe. Today, between 8 and 9% of 
the population in both countries is made up of immigrants. Muslims, who are predominantly Turks in 
Germany and Algerians in France, represent large numbers in both countries: 3% in Germany and 7% 
in France. 
The migratory process in Germany 
Migration into post-war Germany started as labour recruitment to mitigate shortages in specific 
industries. Between 1955 and 1968, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) concluded 
intergovernmental contracts with eight Mediterranean countries: first Italy (1955), then Spain and 
Greece (1960), Turkey (1961 and 1964), Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965) and 
Yugoslavia (1968). The German federal labour office (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit or BFA) set up 
recruitment offices in the countries concerned. Employers seeking workers had to apply to the BFA 
and pay a fee. The BFA then selected suitable workers, tested their work skills, gave them medical 
check-ups and screened police and political records.
1 Migrants were recruited at first for agriculture 
and construction, and later for all branches of industry, where they generally had low-skilled manual 
jobs (Castles & Kosack, 1973). Guest-worker programmes were designed to solve immediate labour 
shortages in Germany by recruiting workers on temporary, short-term residence and work permits 
(Castles et al., 1984). The Turkish population in the FRG rose from 6,700 in 1961 to 605,000 in 1973 
(Table 1.1). 
In the early stages of the migration, Turkish migrants were mainly men between the ages of 20 and 39, 
relatively skilled and educated in comparison to the average working population in Turkey, and from 
the economically more-developed regions of the country (Abadan-Unat, 1976, Abadan-Unat & 
Kemiksiz, 1986 and Martin, 1991). The proportion of rural migrants at this stage was just 17.2%. In 
the second half of the 1960s, recruitment primarily consisted of rural workers (Gökdere, 1978). Berlin 
was relatively late in recruiting Turkish workers. Since the textile and electronics sectors demanded 
cheap female labour, it was conversely women who first migrated to Berlin in 1964. Turkish workers 
who migrated to Berlin by 1973 were primarily from the eastern provinces and economically less-
developed regions of Turkey. As shown in Table 1.1, there has been a continual increase in the non-
German population through the post-war period. Since 1973, the composition of the Turkish migrant 
population has tended to become a more general population migration in the form of family 
reunification and political asylum rather than mainly labour migration. 
                                                 
1 The story of migration from the ‘developing’ countries to the FRG was successfully presented by John Berger 
et al. (1975) through photographs in the book A Seventh Man. The photographs taken during the journey from 
home to Germany partly express the difficulties that the immigrants experienced during the migration. The 
photos taken during the medical check-ups, for instance, prove how degrading the selection process of workers 
was as conducted by ‘experts’ of the recruiting country. 
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Table 1.1 Germany’s non-German population and Turkish minority 
Year Non-German  population  %  Turkish  minority  % 
1961     686,200  1.2         6,700  1.0 
1970  2,600,600  4.3     249,400  16.5 
1973  3,966,200  6.4     605,000  15.2 
1977  3,948,300  6.4     508,000  12.9 
1987 4,240,500  6.9  1,453,700  34.3 
1989 4,845,900  7.7  1,612,600  33.3 
1990
a 5,342,500  8.4  1,675,900  32.0 
1991
b 5,882,300  7.3  1,779,600  30.3 
1992 6,495,800  8.0  1,854,900  28.6 
1993 6,878,100  8.5  1,918,400  27.9 
1994 6,990,510  8.6  1,965,577  28.1 
1995 7,173,900  8.7  2,014,311  28.1 
1996 7,314,000  8.9  2,049,060  28.0 
1997 7,365,800  9.0  2,107,400  28.6 
1998 7,319,600  9.0  2,110,223  28.8 
1999 7,343,600  8.9  2,053,600  27.9 
2000 7,296,800  8.8  1,998.500  27.3 
2001 7,318,600  8.7  1,947,900  26.6 
2002 7,335,592  8.9  1,912,169  26.2 
2003 7,334,765  8.7  1,877,661  25.6 
Notes:   a) Data from 1961-90 for the ‘old Länder’.  
b) Data from 1991 for the ‘old’ and ‘new’ Länder. 
Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (2004). 
Despite the significant transformation and upward mobility they have undergone, German-Turks have 
been continually misrepresented both in Germany and Turkey. The labels attached to them include 
derogatory terms such as ‘in between’, ‘foreigner’, ‘German-like’ (Almancı), ‘degenerated’, 
‘conservative’, ‘radical’, ‘nationalist’ or ‘lost generations’. All these problem-oriented representations 
have acquired wide popularity in both countries. It seems that the popularity of these labels springs 
from a traditional notion of culture that is widely used in both countries – a point to which we shall 
return shortly. 
Turkish workers have generally been addressed in the official German discourse as ‘gastarbeiter’ 
(guest-worker), ‘ausländer’ (foreigner) or ‘mitbürger’ (co-citizen) – terms that underline their 
‘otherness’ and displacement (Kaya, 2001). They are officially defined in Turkey as either ‘gurbetçi’ 
or ‘Almanya’daki vatandaşlarımız’ (our citizens in Germany). German-Turks are stereotypically 
defined by their compatriots in Turkey as either ‘Almanyalı’ or ‘Almancı’. Both terms carry rather 
negative connotations in Turkey. Their spoken Turkish and the way they dress also contribute to the 
construction of an Almancı image in Turkey. “Here we are called yabancı (foreigner) and there in 
Turkey they call us Almancı” is a refrain one hears frequently, especially among the German-Turkish 
youth.  EURO-TURKS: A BRIDGE OR A BREACH BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE EU? | 9 
 
Towards a limited hyphenated citizenship: German-Turks 
The constitution of the FRG, the Basic Law (Grundgesetz), recognises two categories of rights: 
general and reserved. General rights apply to all individuals in the FRG and include freedom of 
expression, liberty of person and freedom of conscience (Arts. 2, 3, 4 and 5). Reserved rights are 
restricted to German citizens and include the right of peaceable assembly, freedom of movement, 
freedom of association and freedom of occupation (Arts. 8, 9, 11 and 12). The Basic Law does not 
prescribe how citizenship is recognised or conferred, but the criteria are based first and foremost on 
ethnic nationality. The rules governing the acquisition of citizenship are defined by Basic Law Art. 
116, the preamble to the Basic Law and the 1913 Imperial and State Citizenship Law (Reichs- und 
Staatsangehörig-keitsgesetz) and provide that citizenship is passed by descent from parent to child. 
Art. 116 of the Basic Law reads as follows: 
(1) A German within the meaning of this Basic Law, unless otherwise regulated by law, is a 
person who possesses German citizenship, or who has been received in the territory of the German 
Reich as of 31 December 1937 as a refugee or expellee of German stock or as the spouse or 
descendant of such a person.  
(2) Former German citizens who, between 30 January 1933 and 8 May 1945, were deprived of 
their citizenship on political, racial, or religious grounds, and their descendants, shall be granted 
citizenship on application. 
The Imperial Naturalisation Law of 1913 was designed to make the acquisition of German citizenship 
difficult for aliens out of fear that the Reich was being invaded by immigrants from the east, especially 
Poles and Jews. At the same time, the law sharply reduced the barriers to the repatriation of ethnic 
Germans (Aussiedler) from outside the Reich (Brubaker, 1992, pp. 114-19, Klusmeyer, 1993, p. 84 
and Marshall, 1992). 
The claim for naturalisation has always been difficult for non-EU foreigners in the FRG, and has 
required repudiation of citizenship of the country of origin. Non-EU foreigners have usually been 
denied the right to dual citizenship; even the children of migrants born and raised in Germany could 
not automatically receive the right of citizenship until January 2000.
2 Foreigners who are willing to 
renounce their previous citizenship can be naturalised only after they have lived in Germany for at 
least 15 years. In contrast, the Volksdeutschen (ethnic Germans defined by Art. 116 of the Basic Law) 
– primarily Poles and Russians who can prove German ancestry – have a constitutional right to 
naturalisation.  
The current German government, however, the so-called ‘Red-Green coalition’ of the Social 
Democrats and the Greens, recently established two mechanisms that endow migrants with the right to 
acquire citizenship for the first time. According to the new Ausländergesetz (1991) and the Gesetz zur 
Änderung Asylverfahrens, Ausländer- und staatsangehörig-keitsrechtlicher Vorschriften (1993), two 
groups of Ausländer have become legally entitled to naturalisation (paras. 85 and 86 of the 
Ausländergesetz). Para. 85 declares that foreigners between the ages of 16 and 23 who have been 
residents of Germany for more than eight years, attended a school in Germany for at least six years 
and who have not been convicted of serious offences have the right to be naturalised. In addition, para. 
86 states that those migrants who have been residents of Germany for at least 15 years and possess a 
residence permit have the right to naturalisation. The absence of a conviction for a serious criminal 
offence and the financial independence of the applicant are also crucial for the acquisition of 
citizenship according to this paragraph.  
Non-EU immigrants or resident aliens have mostly been given what T. H. Marshall (1992) defined as 
social and civil rights, but not political rights. The immigrants built a very real political presence in 
Germany, where their political participation in the system was not legally allowed. The legal barriers 
denying political participation provided the basis for the Turkish immigrants in Germany to organise 
                                                 
2 It was common for Turkish applicants to re-apply immediately after their German naturalisation for the Turkish 
citizenship they had temporarily lost. Turkey allows dual citizenship once the military service of the applicant 
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themselves politically along collective ethnic lines. As a response to the German insistence on the 
exclusionary  Ausländerstatus, Turkish migrant communities have tended to develop strong ethnic 
structures and maintain ethnic boundaries. Lack of political participation and representation in the 
receiving country made them direct their political activity towards their country of origin. In fact, this 
home-oriented participation has received encouragement from Turkey, which has set up networks of 
consular services and other official organisations (religious, educational and commercial). Homeland 
opposition parties and movements have also forged an organisational presence in Germany. 
The new law, in force since 1 January 2000, partially changes the principle of descent (jus sanguinis), 
which has so far been the country’s traditional basis for granting citizenship. Now it is possible to 
acquire German citizenship as a result of being born in Germany (jus soli). According to the new law, 
children who are born in Germany to foreign nationals will receive German citizenship when one of 
the respective child’s parents has resided lawfully in Germany for at least eight years and holds 
entitlement to residence or has held an unlimited residence permit for at least three years. Under the 
new law, such children acquire German citizenship at birth. The new law also created a transitional 
arrangement for children up to the age of 10, who were born in Germany before the Act to Amend the 
Nationality Law was enacted, according to which those children are entitled to automatic 
naturalisation on application. In most cases, they will also acquire their parents’ citizenship under the 
principle of descent. Such children will have to decide within five years of turning 18 – before their 
23
rd birthday – whether they want to retain their German citizenship. They must opt for one of their 
two nationalities.  
It is apparent that the number of foreigners applying for naturalisation has greatly increased since the 
introduction of the new citizenship law. Following the introduction of the new law, the number of 
naturalisations rose by around 30% in the year 2000 compared with 1999. According to the 
information provided by the Länder governments, 186,700 foreigners were granted German 
citizenship in the course of the year 2000, compared with 143,267 in 1999. Subsequently, a total of 
178,100 foreigners were naturalised in 2001. This is a decline of 8,600 or 4.6% from 2000. In contrast 
to the increase in the naturalisation of foreigners in general, the rate of naturalisation of Turks in 2000 
decreased by around 20% compared with 1999. This trend remained the same in 2001, decreasing by 
around 9% compared with 2000 (Table 1.2).  
Table 1.2 Naturalisation of German-Turkish population 
Year Number  of  naturalisations 
1972-79 2,219 
1980-89 10,361 
1990 2,034 
1991 3,529 
1992 7,377 
1993 12,915 
1994 19,590 
1995 31,578 
1996 46,294 
1997 42,240 
1998 59,664 
1999 103,900 
2000 82,800 
2001 75,600 
2002 64,631 
2003 56,244 
Total 625,981 
Source: Federal Statistical Office Germany, Weisbaden (2004). EURO-TURKS: A BRIDGE OR A BREACH BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE EU? | 11 
 
There are two essential points to raise about the data in the table. The first point is the decline in the 
number of persons of Turkish descent being naturalised between 2000 and 2001. In 2000 the new 
citizenship law came into effect. In general, naturalisation became easier. There was a rule that 
children of foreign descent up to 10 years of age could be naturalised right away, without any waiting 
period. Hence, the naturalisation rate was higher than in 2001. The second point is a more complex 
one and needs further inquiry. We shall touch on this point briefly as we have no substantial evidence 
to demonstrate our hypothesis. As may be seen in the table, there is a considerable increase in the rate 
of naturalisation in 1999 compared with 1998, and a significant decline in 2000 compared with the 
previous year (Kaya, forthcoming).
3 The general trend for foreigners to naturalise was upwards: from 
143,267 in 1999 to 186,000 in 2000. Yet German-Turks proved an exception, in contrast to Greeks or 
former Yugoslavs, although the new citizenship law was more liberal and inclusive (Table 1.3).  
Table 1.3 Naturalisation of foreigners between 1980 and 2003 
Year Greece  Italy Yugoslavia Croatia Poland  USSR Spain  Turkey  Hungary 
1980 376  1,010  3,475  – 3,303 4,138 217  399  1,868 
1981 281  972  3,131  – 4,206 3,583 181  534  1,895 
1982 235  1,084  3,201  – 7,807 3,243 211  580  1,669 
1983 350  1,134  3,117  – 7,182 2,446 261  853  1,570 
1984 264  946  3,334  – 5,988 1,704 323 1,053  1,432 
1985 246  797  2,815  – 5,925 1,146 191 1,310  1,200 
1986 173  597  2,721  – 7,251 945  171  1,492 1,105 
1987 199  551  2,364  – 9,439 1,111 135 1,184  1,203 
1988 191  618  2,119  – 13,958 4,810 155 1,243    1,157 
1989  179  548  2  076  – 24,882 13,557  108  1,713  1,556 
1990  158  437  2,082  – 32,340 33,339  103  2,034  1,532 
1991  194  679  2,832  – 27,646 55,620  107  3,529  1,178 
1992  285  1,947  1,947  269 20,248 84,660  168  7,377  1,425 
1993  301  1,154  1,988  2,196 15,435  105,801  224 12,915  1,663 
1994  341  1,417  4,374  3,695 11,943  164,296  185 19,590  1,902 
1995  428  1,281  3,623  2,695 10,174  214,927  189 31,578  1,305 
1996  493  1,297  2,967 2,391 7,872  194,849 152  46,294  1,027 
1997  418  1,187  2,341 1,914 5,763  179,601 172  42,240  911 
1998  427  1,156  2,881 2,373 5,151  170,381 141  59,664  652 
1999  375  1,185  3,608 1,648 2,865  89,372 152  103,900  537 
2000  1,413  1,036  9,776 3,316 1,604  11,358 190  82,800  561 
2001  1,402  1,048  12,000 3,931 1,774  12  254 183  75,600  593 
2002  –  –  – – – –  –  64,631  – 
2003  –  –  – – – –  –  56,244  – 
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2004). 
There may be several reasons for such a decline. It may be that German-Turks are already satisfied 
with ‘denizenship’
4 status, which gives them civil, social and cultural rights but not political rights. 
Another reason may be that German-Turks had expected a more democratic citizenship law to be put 
into effect without any limitation on dual citizenship. But perhaps their expectations diminished and 
they did not see any further benefit in acquiring German citizenship. A third possible reason may be 
                                                 
3 The main reason for the higher naturalisation rate of Turks in 1999 compared with the previous years is the 
shortening by law of the required duration of residence from 15 to 8 years. 
4 ‘Denizen’ literally refers to those who reside in a certain location. The term was introduced by Thomas 
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that Turks, who reside mostly in urban areas, preferred to ignore the new nationality law, which is a 
relatively more bureaucratic process in cities such as Berlin. This may have had a discouraging effect 
on the German-Turks in the process of naturalisation. A fourth justification may be that there is 
already a decline in the voting habits of German-Turks, who have not been given the right to vote in 
Turkish general elections. The right to vote in their residential areas is an issue of great importance for 
Turkish citizens living abroad.
5  
Last but not least, the explanation could be the processes of ‘globalisation from below’ (Brecher et al., 
1993), which set up the pillars of modern diasporic identity.
6 The broad networks of communication 
and transportation between Germany and Turkey play a crucial role in the formation and maintenance 
of a diasporic identity among transnational communities. The modern circuitry connects the diasporic 
subjects both to the homeland and to the rest of the world. This is the reason it becomes much easier 
for German-Turks to live on ‘both banks of the river’ at the same time. German-Turks exemplify a 
growing stream of what Brecher et al. (1993) has called globalisation from below. This constitutive 
entanglement has become a characteristic of modern diaspora networks. The expansion of economic, 
cultural and political networks between diaspora and homeland, for instance, points to this growing 
stream. In the context of the diasporic condition in general, ‘globalisation from below’ refers to the 
enhancement of the access of transnational migrants and their descendants to those social, cultural, 
political and economic mechanisms enabling them to transcend the exclusionary conditions imposed 
upon them by the German nation-state. To put it differently, diasporic identity symbolically enables 
diasporic subjects to overcome the limitations and oppression of the country of settlement. In this 
context, traditional national citizenship discourse loses its accuracy and legitimacy for contemporary 
diasporic subjects. Therefore, this obsolete rhetoric should be replaced by new forms of citizenship 
such as dual citizenship, multiple citizenship, post-national citizenship, transnational citizenship or 
diasporic citizenship. 
The question here is whether the new laws leave space for such progressive forms of citizenship in 
Germany. The new citizenship laws permit the descendants of Turkish migrants to acquire dual 
citizenship for at least a certain period of time. The present legal reforms enable German-born 
foreigners to go beyond their previously defined denizen status. They can thus enjoy political as well 
as civic, social, cultural and environmental rights. Hence, the present German citizenship laws have 
created a possibility for the introduction of a kind of limited ‘hyphenated’ citizenship for non-
European foreigners as well as for those of Turkish origin. The partial introduction of the principle of 
jus soli clearly indicates that the definition of Germanness is no longer limited to ethnic descent. It 
also suggests that ethnically non-German and non-European members of the FGR can be incorporated 
into the political sphere through civic channels. These legal changes mean, in a way, the 
transformation of the culturally defined nation-project towards a rather Habermassian ‘post-national 
society’ project, requiring the political recognition of newcomers (Habermas, 1999). In other words, 
the new laws partially distance us from the hegemony of once-essentialised ethnic identities such as 
‘German’, ‘Turkish’, ‘Kurdish’, ‘Iranian’, etc. They have the potential to open the way for the 
construction of hyphenated civic identities such as ‘German-Turkish’ (in the Turkish language it 
literally means a Turk from Germany – Almanyalı Türk), ‘German-Kurdish’ or ‘German-Iranian’. 
Yet, it should be pointed out that these hyphenated civic identities and citizenships are distinct from 
their equivalents in the American case. In the North American experience, when the hyphenated 
identities are spelled out, the emphasis is placed on the ethnic origin of individuals as in Irish-
American or Italian-American. The fact that the emphasis is on the ethnic origin does not mean that 
Americanness is undervalued. On the contrary, what is implicitly celebrated is the Americanness in 
which the particular ethnicities are embedded. Hence, the explicit celebration of ethnic origins 
implicitly celebrates Americanness. In contrast, in the German experience the emphasis is on the 
‘German’ component of the hyphenated identity. Therefore, it seems that the precondition of granting 
                                                 
5 For a detailed account of the discussions of the citizenship law in Germany, see Kaya (forthcoming). 
6 For wider discussion see Clifford (1992, 1994 and 1997), Hall (1991 and 1994), Gilroy (1987, 1993, 1994 and 
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a hyphenated identity such as ‘German-Turk’ in Germany is integration into the German way of life. 
In the US, on the other hand, the granting of the hyphenated identity is relatively less conditional since 
the US is by definition an immigrant nation. The usage of German hyphenated identities in both 
official and public discourses is an indication of the discursive shift in the perception of Germany as 
an immigration country by German authorities. This has actually been confirmed by changes in the 
citizenship laws as well as by the report prepared by the Independent Commission on Migration to 
Germany (2001).
7 Citizenship laws not only spring from legal concerns, they are also culturally 
formed. Thus, in what follows, we explore the cultural elements defining the nature of citizenship laws 
in Germany. In doing so, we also briefly touch on the changes in academic discourse or paradigm 
shift, in respect to research on German-Turks. The reason we outline the paradigm shift is to address 
the similarity of changes in both citizenship laws and related scientific research. 
The migratory process in France 
Like Germany, France experienced labour shortages in the aftermath of the World War II, in response 
to which it became an active recruiter of migrant workers from the mid-1950s to the early 1970s. But 
only part of post-war discussions about migration revolved around the need for labour; another part 
revolved around the need for population growth in the face of a declining birth rate. By unlinking 
residence permits from work permits the government opened the door to jobseekers who had not yet 
been hired and to families. This encouraged immigrants to view themselves as permanent settlers 
rather than labour sojourners (Kivisto, 2002, p. 172). Although no ethnic quotas were laid down, the 
French government sought as far as possible to encourage European rather than African or Asian 
immigrants. Algerians, Portuguese, Moroccans, Italians, Spanish, Tunisians and Turks followed each 
other in terms of recruitment order and numbers. First, French nationals living in Algeria, commonly 
known as pieds-noirs, fled to France, being followed later by the harkis, Algerians who had fought on 
the side of the French during the Algerian independence struggle. After the French defeat, many of 
these French allies were executed by the Algerian nationalists, but many managed to flee. Shortly after 
Algeria won independence, both states signed a recruitment agreement, resulting in a concentration of 
Algerians in Paris, Lyon and Marseille. Spaniards, Italians, Moroccans, Tunisians and Turks followed 
the Algerians in relatively smaller numbers.  
France signed a recruitment treaty with Turkey in 1966. The first workers coming to France were 
actually some of those who had applied to the Turkish employment office (İş ve İşçi Bulma Kurumu) 
in order to go to Germany (Kastoryano, 1986, p. 165 and Fırat, 2003, p. 76). As the German labour 
market was saturated at that point by the Turkish labour force, some of the Turkish applicants were 
given the opportunity to go to France. This stage of migration from Turkey is called anonymous 
migration. The next stage of migration from Turkey to France is called nominal migration, when 
workers were recruited upon calls from the private sector (Strasburger, 1995). Nominal migration was 
rather more popular in France compared with Germany and it led to the rise of chain migration. This 
form of migration inevitably resulted in the intensification of migrants from certain ethnic and 
geographical origins (Table 1.4).  
While the recruitment process in France was terminated by the conservative government of Valéry 
Giscard d’Estaing in 1974, migration from Turkey lingered on by means of family reunification and 
the illegal overstay of tourists coming into the country. Migration still continues in the form of 
marriages with partners from Turkey and asylum-seeking in the country. The conservative government 
also wanted to reduce the number of foreigners in the nation through a campaign of voluntary 
repatriation involving monetary inducements to leave. Between April 1977 and November 1981, 
France gave an allowance of 10,000 francs to unemployed immigrants who agreed to return for good 
to their home country with their family. Although it was primarily directed at non-EU nations, very 
few third-world immigrants took up the offer. It was the Spanish and Portuguese who accepted the 
                                                 
7 The Independent Commission on Migration to Germany was chaired by Rita Süssmuth, MP; the report 
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offer to go back to their countries, in which democratic regimes were back in place. The result of these 
measures taken together was that for the last quarter of the 20
th century, foreign population numbers 
remained steady (Kivisto, 2002). Germany may have drawn some lessons from the French experience. 
Between 30 October 1983 and 30 June 1984 unemployed immigrants in Germany were encouraged to 
return to their countries with their families by 30 September 1984. Although 300,000 persons left 
Germany, the German government decided not to conduct such an operation again owing to its 
overwhelming financial cost (Kaya, 2001). 
Table 1.4 National origins of the Muslim population 
Country of origin  Population 
Algeria 1,550,000 
Morocco 1,000,000 
Tunisia 350,000 
Black Africa  250,000 
Turkey 341,000 
Converts 40,000 
Asylum applicants/illegal  350,000 
Asians 100,000 
Other 100,000 
Total 4,181,000 
Note: These figures are widely seen as undercounting the number of illegal immigrants. 
Source: Best estimates of an interior ministry source in “l’Islam dans la République”,  
Haut Conseil à l’intégration, November, 2000, p. 26. 
Acquisition of citizenship and the rise of anti-immigrant 
nationalist discourse in France 
Since the French Revolution, France has historically defined citizenship in political rather than ethno-
cultural terms and invited all foreigners and ‘friends of liberty’, to join the French state. The decree of 
26 August 1792 granted French citizenship to foreigners who by their writings or acts had defended 
liberty and the principles of the revolution. Alongside the principle of jus sanguinis attributing 
automatic citizenship to those born in France to French parents, the revolutionaries attributed specific 
conditions to the principle of jus soli that guaranteed attachment and loyalty to France. The dominance 
of the principle of jus soli has remained the same since the Revolution. While the 1851 citizenship law 
gave French citizenship to third-generation immigrants, the 1889 citizenship legislation automatically 
attributed French citizenship to second-generation immigrants (Brubaker, 1992, pp. 85-86). The 1889 
law, with small modifications, still exists today. 
French citizenship law contains two provisions embodying the principle of jus soli: Art. 23, attributing 
citizenship at birth to third-generation immigrants and Art. 44, attributing citizenship at age 18 to 
second-generation immigrants born in France and resident there since aged 13, provided they have not 
opted out of French citizenship during the preceding year and they have not been convicted of certain 
crimes. French citizenship law also permits dual citizenship. But lately French citizenship law has 
been criticised lately by nationalists for turning foreigners into French citizens on paper without 
making sure that they were ‘French at heart’ (Français de coeur). Nationalist critiques of the jus soli 
principle have become even stronger since the early 1990s, after so-called ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ 
has escalated in the West. 
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The French saw themselves as an assimilationist nation, but they were unprepared for the presence of 
large numbers of people of colour and large numbers of Muslims. Alec Hargreaves (1995, pp. 26-27) 
summarised the situation in the following passage: 
The seeming invisibility of past generations of immigrants and of those who are today descended 
from them is often regarded as proof of the success with which they have been incorporated into 
French society. Immigrants who have settled in France during the post-war period and more 
particularly those who have come to the fore during the past twenty years, are often felt to threaten 
this tradition. It is widely claimed that people of third-world origins are much harder to ‘integrate’ 
than Europeans. Far from disappearing without a trace, they have actually increased in visibility at 
a time when successive governments have been claiming that immigration is at an end…the fear is 
that immigration is leading remorselessly to the formation of permanently distinct minorities 
within French society. 
For a century France has defined second-generation immigrants as citizens. This practice was 
uncontested until recently. In the mid-1980s, however, jus soli came under sharp attack from the far 
right. ‘Etre Français, cela mérite’ [to be French, you have to deserve it] was proclaimed by Jean-
Marie Le Pen’s National Front. Under pressure from the National Front, the centre-right parties took 
up the theme during the 1986 legislative campaign, proposing in their joint platform to denounce 
‘automatic’ acquisitions of French citizenship. Second-generation immigrants would no longer 
become French jus soli, they would have to request French nationality, which would have to be 
accepted by the state. The new government of President Jacques Chirac proposed to limit the jus soli 
principle as far as immigrants were concerned. Yet the proposal provoked strong opposition and was 
eventually withdrawn from the legislative agenda. A commission of enquiry was set up, which put 
forward the idea of extending rather than further restricting access to French citizenship (Brubaker, 
1992, p. 138). The Commission’s report formed the basis for Law No. 93.933, which has been in force 
since 22 July 1993. The most important reform introduced the notion of consent by stating that 
“persons born in France of foreign parents can acquire French citizenship between the ages of 16 and 
21, by declaration if the five years residence requirement and the non-convictions required are 
satisfied”. Persons who have expressly declined French citizenship during the year preceding their 
majority and persons who have been convicted of certain crimes are excluded from this provision.  
In France, naturalisation is secondary to the acquisition of citizenship. In contrast to the declaration, 
the naturalisation procedure is discretionary, i.e. subject to the control and approval of the 
administration. The naturalisation procedure in France requires five years of permanent residence, 
majority, linguistic competence, assimilation into the French community, and good morals and 
customs – meaning no prison sentences of more than six months or offences or crimes against state 
security. Unlike many other countries, France does not require candidates for naturalisation to 
renounce their original citizenship. The requirements for naturalisation are founded on a presumption 
of assimilation, attachment and loyalty of foreigners settled in France. Thus the administration usually 
rejects requests for naturalisation by foreigners whose family members live abroad (Table 1.5). 
Sociologist Michéle Tribalat (1996) did a comparative field study among Algerian, Moroccan, 
Spanish, Portuguese, Southeast Asian and Turkish migrants in France.
8 Her conclusion was quite 
striking in pointing out that Turks proved an exception. According to her, French-Turkish migrants 
were the most resistant to integration or assimilation. French-Turks prefer not to speak French at home 
despite being quite competent in the language; they set up parallel communities to the majority society 
in their own ethnic enclaves; they more oriented to religiosity compared with other Muslim 
communities; they prefer not to engage in intermarriage with the French; and they are less interested in 
education. These were some of the conclusions of Tribalat (2002). Tribalat’s holistic conclusions 
deriving from a quantitative work have been strongly criticised by scholars (Fırat, 2003). 
 
                                                 
8 This research was undertaken in 1992 by the Institut National d’Études Démographiques with the assistance of 
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Table 1.5 Naturalisation in France 
 
The French republican ideal has recently come under attack on several fronts. Some changes in French 
public life are challenging the conventional assumption that ‘the French Republic is one and 
indivisible’. The Territorial Laws for New Caledonia and French Polynesia and the granting of 
legislative powers to the Corsican Assembly have already shown that the French Republic is still 
‘one’, but no longer ‘indivisible’. Yet the explicit discrimination in public experienced and expressed 
by Muslims (especially Algerians) confronts the national education apparatus aimed at reproducing the 
French citizen and thus the homogenous French nation. As Tribalat (2003) put it “what is the point in 
working hard for success at school if you are going to be discriminated against?”
9 She reports that the 
presence of discrimination raises the problem of coherence between republican principles and the 
reality of French society. Until recently, it was taboo in France to talk about discrimination because of 
the threat it poses to republicanism (Tribalat, 2003, p. 135). Pierre Sadran’s (2003, p. 53) words 
express very clearly the current legitimacy crisis in the French republican ideology:  
Contrary to the ‘Astérix’ village of incapable Gauls, the French have become less receptive to the 
myth of exceptionalism. First, because the nation-state has been destabilized from above and 
below: by the dynamic of decentralization and that of European Integration. Second, because 
French universalism has had to lower its ambitions and be content to embody one particular 
version of the universal ideal…Finally, because the French model of social integration based on 
the republican school does not work in the same way as in the past. Distinctive cultures have 
become legitimate in a France which showed in the World Cup of 1998 that it felt more at home 
with a Black-Blanc-Beur team (Blacks-Whites-French of North African origin) that with the blue, 
white and red of the national flag. 
It is certain that the myth of republicanism in France is being threatened on several fronts. There is a 
paradoxical situation in the country: on the one hand, the French state is changing through 
decentralisation and European integration; on the other hand, the social and political culture of the 
country is still shaped by the myth of a unitary and republican state. As far as migration policies are 
concerned, it seems that migrants are still subject to the idea of universalism, which actually requires 
assimilation into the conventional political values of the French nation. Assimilationist integration, to 
which migrant groups are subject, is likely to result in the rise of a politics of identity and culture 
among the migrants. The politics of identity is expected to reinforce ethnic, cultural and linguistic 
boundaries between the majority and minorities. 
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Towards European citizenship? 
One of the questions often articulated when a revision of citizenship is raised is ‘What about our 
national identity?’ In fact, citizenship and nation are two overlapping institutions. National identity, 
like all other identities, is dynamic and should not be prescribed. Identity, be it national, individual, 
political, communal or ethnic, is shaped by the acts of recognition, lack of recognition or 
misrecognition by others (Taylor, 1994, p. 25). The genesis of the human mind develops in a 
dialogical sense, not monological. One can construct his/her identity only if he/she is able to 
experience the other’s reactions to his/her attitudes and behaviour. Thus, it is impossible to build an 
identity without a dialogue with the ‘other’. If a nation prescribes a holistic notion of culture, then it 
would be remarkably difficult for a newcomer group to incorporate itself into the existing social 
system without major resistance by the majority society. Prescribing, or in other words essentialising, 
the nation may inevitably lead the members of a nation not to recognise newcomers whom they 
consider to be culturally distinct. Not recognising newcomers may result in the construction of radical 
and centrifugal identities, and thus conflict. As Kymlicka and Norman stated, “immigrant groups that 
feel alienated from the larger national identity are likely to be alienated from the political arena as 
well” (2000, p. 39). Recently, ethnicity, culture and religion have come to constitute the most concrete 
referential points for EU citizens to stigmatise the ‘other’, be it migrants, asylum-seekers, Muslims, 
Arabs, Turks or the Romany. Islamophobia has become one of the main challenges faced by Euro-
Turks. This has even become the decisive point in France, where public opinion relates Turkey’s EU 
membership to the growing Islamic challenge in the West. 
Traditional citizenship rhetoric is inclined to aggravate the advance of the interests of the dominant 
national group at the expense of migrants. Hence, it is unlikely that the classical understanding of 
citizenship can resolve issues of coexistence of ‘culturally discrete’ entities. In order to avoid potential 
conflict and alienation, there is an essential task to be undertaken: citizenship laws should not be based 
on prescribed cultural, religious, linguistic or ethnic qualities. This linkage between citizenship and a 
predefined national identity has actually brought about numerous examples of interethnic conflict and 
violence around the globe.  
The idea of the nation-state originating from the holistic notion of culture is essentially rooted in a 
name, a common ancestry, a set of common historical memories and myths, a national anthem, a 
common territory for which the forefathers died, a national economy and a set of common legal rights 
and duties (Smith, 1986). Accordingly, foreigners such as guest-workers, asylum-seekers or refugees 
who have immigrated to the West in large numbers during the post-war era have been generally 
excluded from civil, social, political and cultural rights. The model of national citizenship, which is 
linked to territorialized notions of cultural belonging and primordial loyalty, has been dominant during 
the period of massive migration since the turn of the 20
th century. The recent experience of 
transnational migrant workers, however, reflects “a time when national citizenship is losing ground to 
a more universal model of membership, anchored in deterritorialized notions of persons’ rights” 
(Soysal, 1994, p. 3, emphasis added). 
The introduction of EU citizenship is a remarkable example where citizenship and nation have been in 
some way disentangled. One of the most important challenges here is that a cardinal tie of citizenship 
to a predefined national identity is under dispute. Art. 8(e) of the Maastricht Treaty refers to the 
dynamic and evolutionary nature of citizenship rights.
10 The Maastricht Treaty inserted a new section 
into the amended Treaty of Rome (“Citizenship of the Union”), Art. 8. The article declares that “every 
person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union”. Moreover, it adds 
that “Citizens of the Union shall also enjoy the rights conferred by this Treaty and shall be subject to 
the duties imposed thereby”. The term ‘Community citizenship’ actually became a debated issue after 
a letter by Felipe Gonzales, the former Spanish premier, to the Office of the European Council, 
                                                 
10 For further details see the European Union Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union (the 
Maastricht Treaty), Official Journal C 325, 24 December 2002. 
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proposing that citizenship should be made one of the three pillars of European political union (the 
other two being the European monetary union and a common foreign and security policy).  
Although the Maastricht Treaty’s notion of EU citizenship originates from the understanding of 
‘dynamic’ and ‘evolutionary’ rights, which are not prescribed and thus subject to change, some of the 
earlier problems remain. These criticisms concentrate on the debates around the political inclusion of 
extracommunitari from non-EU countries such as Turkish migrants in Germany. As Chris Shore 
(2000, pp. 66-86) rightly observes, there are four major difficulties. First, the EU concept of 
citizenship focuses exclusively on rights without outlining a set of corresponding duties. Second, the 
Treaty provides a legal basis for granting voting rights to citizens from any member state, regardless 
of his/her residence. Nevertheless, the extracommunitari residents from EU countries such as the 
Euro-Turks are not granted such rights. Third, the very idea of a ‘Community national’ is problematic: 
that is, one can be a Union citizen only by virtue of being a citizen of a member state. Hence, the 
status of EU citizenship is subordinate to the framework of the nation-state. This is again particularly 
relevant in the context of German-Turks. Finally, there are also criticisms arguing that EU citizenship 
is raising the prospect of a more exclusionist ‘fortress Europe’, discriminating against non-EU 
nationals. 
Then again, one should bear in mind that the drafters of the Maastricht Treaty expected that EU 
citizenship would be developmental, expanding beyond civil and economic rights to include political 
and social rights. This perspective is clearly indicated in Art. 8(e) of the Maastricht Treaty with the 
emphasis on the dynamic and evolutionary nature of citizenship rights. In a way, Art. 8(e) provides the 
basis on which one could be optimistic in the sense that the Treaty shortly may embody more inclusive 
principles for non-EU citizens residing in the EU. Germany’s recent efforts, along with the 
institutionalisation of EU citizenship and the introduction of the new citizenship law during the Red-
Green coalition government, testifies to the rupture of the previously established linkage between 
citizenship and prescribed national identity.  
Citizenship has historically been linked to participation. Yet there is a decline in conventional political 
participation in developed liberal democracies (Hoffman, 2004). The decline seems to be even more 
drastic among the populations of migrant origin. The question of participation is related to the problem 
of enhancing involvement in governmental mechanisms – local, regional, national and in the case of 
the EU supra-national. Formal citizenship does not necessarily provide migrants and their children 
with the essential foundation from which they can politically participate in the public life of their 
country of settlement. Even if one receives formal citizenship rights he/she can still be marked as an 
‘immigrant’. Though France has a more deep-rooted tradition of naturalisation compared with 
Germany, there is a great discrepancy between the level of naturalisation of the migrants of Turkish 
origin dwelling in France and their political, cultural and economic participation in French public life. 
This research underlines that there are significant limitations in France with respect to the political 
participation of French-Turks in a way that contradicts the ‘egalitarian’ republican myth. Germany, 
however, has set up another example, which is more successful in terms of German-Turks’ political 
and cultural participation in the public space. The following chapters reveal that the difference 
between German-Turks’ and French-Turks’ level of political participation partly springs from two 
competing ideologies, which have recently been implemented by the two countries vis-à-vis migrants: 
French assimilationism and German communitarianism (Grillo, 1998, p. 181). Both qualitative and 
quantitative data indicate that communitarianism brings about more political participation among the 
German-Turks. | 19 
Chapter 2 
Profile of the Sample 
ver 2.5 million German-Turks live in Germany and more than 300,000 French-Turks live in 
France. The total population of Euro-Turks dwelling in the EU countries is around 4 million. 
The sample was determined by the researchers to reflect a representative picture in terms of 
age, gender, occupation and region. The gender distribution of the structured interviews reflects the 
researchers’ aim of equal gender representation (Figure 2.1). 
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The age distribution of the structured interviews also reflects the researchers’ aim of equal age 
representation (Figure 2.2).  
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The sampling distribution reflects a representative picture in terms of the density of the Euro-Turk 
population numbers from region to region (Table 2.1). In Germany, a greater proportion of 
interviewing was done in Nordrhein-Westfalen (35%) and in France in Ille de France (37%). It was 
possible for the interviewers to conduct the structured interviews in one of the three languages 
(Turkish, German and French) in accordance with the wishes of the interviewee (Figure 2.3). The 
number of interviewees who preferred to use the language of the ‘host-land’ differed remarkably in 
each country (20% in Germany and 32% in France). This gives us an idea about the competence of 
Euro-Turks in written Turkish. Combining the quantitative data with the qualitative data it could be 
argued that French-Turks are less competent in Turkish than German-Turks, although they have a 
shorter migrancy period. Another essential point to make here is that French-Turks prefer to use 
Turkish within the family, although the young are very competent in French and the French tradition is 
very assimilationist in that respect. Yet the act of speaking Turkish is not perceived as so resistant in 
the German-Turkish families. The difference here could be the resistance developed by the French-
Turks against the French ideal of assimilation, in a way that places a barrier between the public space 
and private space in terms of using the French language (Tribalat, 2002).  
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Table 2.1 Sampling distribution 
Germany   Number of questionnaires  France  Number of 
questionnaires 
Niedersachsen-Bremen  82  Ille de France   222 
Nordrhein–Westfalen 381  Centre    41 
Hessen 121  Rhone-Alpes    150 
Baden–Württemberg 233  Franche-Comté    32 
Bayern 184  Alsace    109 
Berlin 64  Lorraine    46 
Total 1065  600  Total 
Figure 2.3 Language of the structured interviews 
0
20
40
60
80
100
Germany %  France %  
Turkish
German/French
 
More than one-fourth of German-Turks were born in Germany and 18% of the French-Turks were 
born in France (Figure 2.4).  
Figure 2.4 Where were you born? 
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A great number of the French-Turks (35%) are of urban origin in Turkey, while a lower percentage of 
German-Turks (26%) have this background (Figure 2.5). German-Turks born in Turkey are 
predominantly of rural origin (68%). The data indicate that German-Turks are overwhelmingly 
uprooted peasants who have been turned into proletarians.
1  
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Figure 2.5 Where were you born in Turkey? 
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Figure 2.6 shows that chain migration has been the main form of migration among the German-Turks, 
while it has been less the case with the French-Turks. But it should also be noted here that there are 
remarkable differences between the migration patterns of German-Turks and French-Turks. French-
Turks often speak of the fact that they came to France because they could not make it to Germany. 
When Turkish migration to France started, Germany had already gone a long way down the road with 
regard to stimulating migration to Germany through recruiting Turkish workers. Several of the French-
Turks have even stated that they were planning to go on to Germany after spending a few years in 
France.  
Migration to Germany has always been regulated by the German state, while the French state has 
delegated it to individual companies willing to recruit foreign labour. Thus, individual companies 
prompted those first migrants to recommend their fellow countrymen to come to France. French-Turks 
originating from the same region in Turkey tend to concentrate in particular places in France (Fırat, 
2003, p. 76 and Heckmann & Unbehaun, 1999, p. 82). Such a background makes it more practical for 
the French-Turks to carry on their traditional solidarity networks for a longer period of time in 
comparison with the German-Turks. 
Parents form the highest percentage among relatives preceding the interviewees (Figure 2.6). The 
number of German-Turks whose grandparents migrated is higher than those of French-Turks. This is 
an indication of the rising number of third/fourth generation descendants in Germany. There are also 
similar signs in France (Figure 2.7).  
 
Figure 2.6 Is there anybody in your family who preceded your coming here? 
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Figure 2.7 Who was the first migrant in your family? 
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The majority of German-Turks reported that they came to Germany for the purpose of family 
unification (marriage or family reunification, 44%) (Figure 2.8). And those who came to Germany to 
work corresponded to about 21%. Those born in Germany constitute 26% of German-Turks. On the 
other hand, 30% of French-Turks came to France to work, while around 49% of those reported that 
their main motivation in coming to France was either family reunification (22%) or marriage (27%). 
Figure 2.8 What is your reason for coming to Germany/France? 
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The number of married persons among those interviewed is similar in both countries, as revealed in 
Figure 2.9. As the German-Turks are relatively younger, the number of those who are single in 
Germany is higher than in France. Although cohabitation is rarely seen in either country, a slightly 
higher percentage of French-Turks experience it compared with German-Turks.  
Figure 2.9 Marital status? 
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Today, those who see their children marry French/German men or women are very rare. Most of the 
individuals interviewed are married to persons of Turkish origin (Figure 2.10). Approximately 6% of 
Euro-Turks are married to persons of either French or German origin. Intermarriage is known to be 
one of the indicators of amalgamation and recently this has been on the rise among Euro-Turks. To 
make some comparisons in the French context, however, among Algerian men in France who live with 
a partner or spouse, half of them share their life with French women; the proportion among young 
persons of Portuguese origin is around 59%. As expected, unions with native French men are more 
difficult and rare amongst young Algerian women (24% as compared with 47% of young Portuguese 
women) (Tribalat, 2002). 
Figure 2.10 Is your partner Turkish? 
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German-Turks are likely to have fewer children than French-Turks. While the percentage of the 
German-Turks who have at most three children is 47%, it drops to 44% in France (Figure 2.11).  
Figure 2.11 Do you have children? 
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Generally, the households in both countries are composed of four members. It is also notable that the 
number of single persons in France (9.8%) is almost double that in Germany (5.6%) (Figure 2.12). 
Figure 2.12 How many persons are there in the household? 
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Euro-Turks do not seem to be integrated into the housing market, with 83% living in rented 
accommodation and only 13.6% owning their own homes (Figure 2.13). About 72% of German-Turks 
live in houses ranging between 50m
2 and 100m
2, as do around 62% of French-Turks (Figure 2.14). 
Nevertheless, 67% own property in Turkey (87% own apartments, 11% own summer cottages and 
46% own fields) (Figures 2.15 and 2.16). There may be several explanations for this. It may be that it 
is more reasonable to make such investments in Turkey as Germans in general are also increasingly 
doing the same. As Bianca Kaiser (2001) stated in her latest work, there are more than 20,000 German 
properties registered in Turkey. Thus, investments made by Euro-Turks in Turkey do not necessarily 
spring from their ‘unquestionable’ orientation to the homeland; it may also be a rational form of 
investment as with Germans in general. 
Figure 2.13 Do you own the home you live in? 
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Figure 2.14 How many m
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Figure 2.15 Do you own property in Turkey? 
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Figure 2.16 If yes, then what kind of property do you have? 
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Automobile ownership among the French-Turks (69%) is higher than among German-Turks (61%) 
(Figure 2.17). As discussed later in chapter 3, French-Turks generally seem to be more prosperous 
compared with the German-Turks. 
Figure 2.17 Do you have a car? 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Germany %  France % 
No
Yes
 
The high ratio of the German-Turks visiting Turkey at least once a year (66%) confirms one of the 
previous findings that German-Turks have a greater sense of attachment to Turkey (Figure 2.18). This 
ratio is lower among French-Turks (46%). The difference may also result from the fact that Germany 
is better connected to Turkey in terms of transportation facilities.  
Figure 2.18 How often do you go to Turkey? 
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Almost all Euro-Turks are likely to go to Turkey in order to visit their relatives and hometowns (94% 
German-Turks and 87% French-Turks) (Figure 2.19). Around 47% of the German-Turks and 56% of 
the French-Turks also visit holiday resorts. 
Figure 2.19 What is the purpose of your visits to Turkey? 
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This finding is a great indication of the volume and dynamics of transnational space between/beyond 
Turkey and Germany/France. Yet the transnational space between/beyond Turkey and Germany is 
much greater than that between Turkey and France.
2 Euro-Turks often remain actively involved in 
their homeland by maintaining kinship and friendship ties, but also by remaining involved politically, 
economically and culturally in the larger homeland society. For Euro-Turks, transnationalism is aided 
by geographic proximity, making frequent trips home feasible. They have also become ‘global 
villagers’ by taking advantage of communication and transportation technologies to forge 
transnational identities. 
 
 
                                                 
2 The volume of transportation, trade, communication, politics and academic studies between Turkey and 
Germany indicates that the transnational space between the two countries is highly developed and efficient 
compared with the one between Turkey and France. | 27 
Chapter 3 
Euro-Turks and Social Classes 
oth qualitative and quantitative data show that Euro-Turks are no longer solely manual workers 
employed in low-skilled jobs, lacking any agency to represent them in the public space. On the 
contrary, they have many politicians, artists, artisans, businessmen, poets, novelists, 
bureaucrats, journalists, singers and teachers representing them in one way or another. Most Euro-
Turks no longer need the tutelage of their German/French mentors to represent them; they are being 
represented by their own indigenous intellectuals. This development has, of course, something to do 
with the fact that Turks are upwardly mobile in social terms and now have a large number of middle-
class people in the communities. 
There is also a parallel phenomenon to this development in the rising numbers of unemployed people 
who are not affiliated with any formal job. A number of these persons have the right to benefit from 
the welfare system by receiving their unemployment benefit from the state, but, an increasing number 
cannot avail of state aid as they were not in a position to contribute to the welfare system due to their 
chronic unemployment status. Unemployment is of course an outcome of the global recession. Those 
unemployed Euro-Turks, whom one easily comes across in places such as Kreuzberg (Berlin), 
Keupstrasse (Köln) and Villier le Bel (Paris),
1 are in general against Turkey’s candidature to the EU. 
Euro-Turks dwelling in those segregated ethnic enclaves are truly disadvantaged. The world not only 
continues to be segregated for them, but in some cases there is evidence of greater levels of 
segregation than in the past, leading some researchers to refer to this as “hypersegregation” (Massey & 
Denton, 1993). Inner-city Turks in such neighbourhoods attend segregated schools, worship in their 
own mosques, shop in segregated stores, generate their niche economies and so forth. The exodus of 
the Turkish middle-class from inner cities to new neighbourhoods has left behind only the poorest of 
the poor in communities increasingly disconnected from the larger urban economy and bereft of the 
institutional support that once helped ghetto dwellers survive in a hostile world. These are 
communities hard hit by deindustrialisation, where residents are forced to cope with the consequences 
of what happens to neighbourhoods when work disappears (Kivisto, 2002). The most appropriate term 
for describing the worldview of these hyper-segregated people is ‘nihilism’. 
Unemployed Euro-Turks (22% in Germany and 11% in France) tend to express their distrust of both 
the Turkish and German/French states and the view that the states are capable of providing them with 
better opportunities to survive. Their damaged solidarity with the homeland and ‘host-land’ was 
previously replaced by orientation to alternative formations such as community associations, religious 
organisations (predominantly Milli Görüş and Alevi  Cemevis), fellowship organisations, culture, 
ethnicity and mosques. Although the history of ethnic/cultural/religious associations in Germany goes 
back to the 1960s, it was only in 1980s that the Mitterand government enacted a number of measures 
that moved in a more pluralistic direction. Among these was a relaxation of the Law of 1901 
governing clubs and societies, one consequence of which was the emergence of large number of 
ethnically and culturally specific associations. Many mosques were then founded in France (Grillo, 
1998, p. 185). Nevertheless, the crises and corruption faced by the religious organisations and the 
failure of the other ethnic- or religious-based associations to meet demand have resulted in the decline 
of such formations. The outcome of this process is that some individuals have fallen into the belief that 
there is nothing else but themselves to believe in. This is what we call the ‘proleterianisation’ process, 
resulting in the rise of nihilist tendencies in a way that belittles the value of politics. 
The lives of Euro-Turks (especially German-Turks) of lower social status have been complicated by 
deindustrialisation and the arrival of new immigrants (Übersiedler and Aussiedlers)
2 since the early 
                                                 
1 The common denominator of these districts that we observed in our own qualitative field research is that they 
are all ethnically Turkish enclaves. These districts are just some of the examples of such enclaves. 
2 Übersiedler refers to East Germans who migrated to the Federal Republic of Germany during the cold war; 
Aussiedler are ethnic Germans who repatriated from Eastern Europe in the aftermath of the cold war period. 
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1990s. The decline in manufacturing has prevented many Euro-Turks from engaging in the upward 
mobility available to unskilled workers in the past. Figure 3.1 indicates that French-Turks are 
generally speaking better off than German-Turks. While 21% of German-Turks earn less than €1000 
month, this ratio is around 15% for French-Turks. 
Figure 3.1 Monthly income of the household? 
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The majority of interviewees are regularly paid workers (Figure 3.2). This ratio is larger in France 
(36%) compared with Germany (32%). The second largest group is housewives (25% of French-Turks 
and 23% of German-Turks). The unemployment rate among German-Turks is around 22% and among 
French-Turks is around 7%. The high unemployment rate among the German-Turks does not 
necessarily mean that Germany has a much greater unemployment problem than France. It may also 
be that Germany has a better welfare state system that provides the unemployed with better 
unemployment benefits. The qualitative research has also indicated that German-Turks are inclined to 
benefit from the existing welfare system, sometimes even to an abusive extent. The number of self-
employed and temporarily working persons among French-Turks (11% and 8% respectively) is higher 
than among German-Turks (4% and 2%).  
Figure 3.2 Present job status? 
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Figures 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 indicate that German-Turks view their prosperity as in decline. While French-
Turks are generally happy with their recent economic and social conditions, German-Turks complain 
more about their recent status. Although both groups agree on their relative prosperity compared with 
their parents, the ratio of interviewees addressing their rising status in the last ten years is 44% among 
German-Turks and 66% among French-Turks. This may be the result of the impact of the euro, which 
began circulating in 2002.  EURO-TURKS: A BRIDGE OR A BREACH BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE EU? | 29 
 
Figure 3.3 How do you find your economic and social conditions compared to those of your parents? 
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Figure 3.4 How do you find your recent economic and social conditions compared to the last decade? 
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Figure 3.5 Socio-economic status: Occupational status I 
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The striking numbers in Figure 3.5 are the unemployment rates: 22% in Germany and 8% in France. 
The unemployment rate among German-Turks is almost double that among Germans generally (11%). 
French-Turks are predominantly blue-collar workers, while German-Turks are rather more diversified. 
The data indicate that German-Turks are economically more integrated than French-Turks. 
The notable feature in Figure 3.6 is the difference between the secondary school graduates (35% in 
Germany and 18% in France). This actually refers to the problematic nature of the German educational 
system, which does not generate upward mobility among students. The German educational system, 30 | KAYA & KENTEL 
 
labelled by the latest Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) research
3 as the most 
inefficient among European countries, does actually reproduce the status quo in terms of the existing 
class structure. The figures in Turkey are quite different from those in Germany and France. The rate 
of illiteracy among Turks in Turkey was around 13% in 1996.  
Figure 3.6 Socio-economic status: Educational status II 
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Nevertheless, the common denominator in the two countries’ education systems is that neither really 
provides the migrants and their children with a platform whereby they may, on graduation, turn their 
cultural capital into economic capital. Thus both countries are discriminating against migrant families 
in the labour market. It is also claimed by Tribalat (2002) that the rate of illiteracy is much higher 
among Moroccan and Algerian communities. The fact that Muslims cannot socially advance in public 
life leads to the emergence of strong mental constructs in the country that identify social, economic 
and educational problems with ‘backward cultures’. Such mental constructs make an inclusive 
education for citizenship extremely difficult to achieve. The sociologist François Dubet observes that:  
Relationships in schools, like relationships in society as a whole, are increasingly radicalised. 
Individuals are perceived as having an ‘ethnic’ identity and stigmatized. To put it simply, whereas 
previously schools would have described children as working class, now they describe them as 
immigrant children. Whereas children were before diagnosed as having problems because their 
fathers were poor, now they diagnose children as having problems because their fathers are 
‘immigrants’, even if the child is of the third generation. Whereas they identify the behaviour of 
boys as ‘aggressive’, now the behaviour is described as ‘ethnic’ (cited in Starkey, 2003, p. 120).  
The racialisation of discourse on social immobility and educational failure goes parallel with the fact 
that there are not any ethnic minority councillors in France today. A combination of stigmatisation and 
lack of role models may make it more difficult for ethnic minority pupils in France to identify with a 
                                                 
3 Coordinated by the OECD, PISA 2002 is a collaborative effort among the governments of 28 OECD and 4 
non-member countries. The first results, published in December 2001, provided an indicator of the outcome of 
initial education that is officially recognised across the developed world. Crucially, the survey will be repeated 
every three years, allowing countries to monitor progress regularly. In 2003, all 30 OECD countries were to take 
part, while at least 13 more non-members, from China to Chile, were to join the survey. What do the PISA 
results show? Finnish students did particularly well in reading, and Japanese and Koreans excelled in 
mathematics and science. Australia, Austria, Canada, New Zealand, Sweden and the UK were significantly 
above average for all three types of literacy. Those consistently below average included two relatively affluent 
economies, Germany and Italy, as well as others with below-average national income such as Greece, Mexico, 
Poland and Portugal. The US performed bang in the middle. These averages mask important variations in 
performance within each country. Since most educational systems have been particularly trying to improve the 
performance of the lowest achievers, the amount of variation in achievement is important. Germany was one of 
the countries with the greatest inequalities in reading literacy, with poorly performing students dragging down 
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republican discourse that cannot provide them with any material capital (Starkey, 2003, p. 120). 
France is lately facing a significant challenge in raising citizens loyal to the republican values of 
liberté, egalité and fraternité. Citizenship education through the national education system has always 
been intended to help integrate a diverse population into a single national culture defined as 
‘republican’. Universal and liberal values have always come before cultural, ethnic and religious 
dispositions. This presents a static and assimilationist view of French society into which pupils have to 
fit. A dynamic view would suggest opportunities to help shape society, in which individuals could be 
more reflexive and active social agents.  
Figure 3.7 Socio-economic status distribution 
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Concerning overall prosperity, the data in Figure 3.7 indicate that French-Turks are better off in 
comparison with their German counterparts. As shown, 52% of German-Turks and 41% of French-
Turks are reported as being in the lower middle class and below. | 32 
Chapter 4 
Homeland vs. ‘Host-land’ 
he data in this chapter indicate that Euro-Turks present quite a different picture from the ways 
in which they are perceived by both Turks in Turkey and the receiving societies. Euro-Turks no 
longer essentialise their homeland as a final destination of return and they no longer fit into the 
stereotypical image developed by the receiving societies. They integrate into the political, cultural and 
economic spheres of life in both countries, especially in Germany. Hence, both Turkish and 
German/French societies need to reconsider their perspectives on Euro-Turks. 
Perceptions of Turkey 
Euro-Turks’ orientation to Turkey in various spheres of life is shaped by several factors such as 
religiosity, ethnicity, gender, social status, length of stay abroad and social capital. It is stereotypically 
believed in both Turkey and Germany/France that Euro-Turks are tremendously concerned with the 
political, social, economic and cultural affairs of their homeland, and that they are not engaged in the 
domestic life of their countries of settlement. The data in this chapter shows that such assumptions are 
actually stereotypes, and Euro-Turks, far from being blinkered and romantic, have in fact quite 
realistic and rational perceptions about Turkey. 
The number of Euro-Turks who are not interested in politics in Turkey is surprisingly high (42% of 
German-Turks and 50% of French-Turks) (Figure 4.1). This number actually contradicts the 
stereotype that German-Turks are still oriented to homeland politics and not at all interested in the 
domestic politics of Germany. On the contrary, there are plenty of German-Turks and French-Turks 
who reported an interest in German, French, EU politics and world politics.  
Figure 4.1 To what extent are you interested in politics in Turkey? 
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As Figure 4.2 indicates, most Euro-Turks affiliate themselves with the Justice and Development Party 
(AKP) (32% in Germany and 35% in France). The 10% of Euro-Turks who support the Felicity Party 
(Saadet Partisi or SP) in Germany seems to be an indication of the power of the communal tendencies 
among German-Turks. The data show that support for the Republican People’s Party (CHP) remains 
relatively low in both countries. Support for the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), however, is also 
remarkable in both countries (8%). On the other hand, what is also remarkable is the high percentage 
of people who do not affiliate with any political party in Turkey, which amounts to 30% in Germany 
and 33% in France.  
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Figure 4.2 With which political party in Turkey are you affiliated? 
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The high percentage of German-Turks (25%) who voted in Turkish general elections after settling in 
Germany is partly a result of the fact that political mobilisation among German-Turks is higher than 
among French-Turks (8%) (Figure 4.3). As is known, Milli Görüş (the National View Association) 
especially mobilised many of the Turkish electorate to vote in several elections in Turkey. Milli Görüş 
in France is not as organised as it is in Germany. 
Figure 4.3 Have you voted in general elections in Turkey at all since settling in Germany/France? 
0
20
40
60
80
100
Germany %   France %  
Yes
No
 
The smaller percentage of those German-Turks voting in the latest elections in Turkey may be a result 
of the fact that affiliation with radical religious formations such as Milli Görüş and Islamic capital has 
recently decreased. The other reason may be that orientation towards Turkish politics is gradually 
fading (Figure 4.4). 
Figure 4.4 Did you vote in the November 2002 elections in Turkey? 
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For German-Turks, democracy and human rights pose the greatest challenge for Turkey (23%); while 
it is corruption, nepotism and bribery for the French-Turks (22%). What is also remarkable is the 
difference between German-Turks and French-Turks with respect to their views on the ‘pressure on 
religiosity in the name of laicism’: 12% of German-Turks placed this problem in third position, while 
only 7% of French-Turks placed it in fifth position (Figure 4.5).  
Figure 4.5 What is the greatest problem in Turkey (multi-response)? 
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The institution Euro-Turks trust most in Turkey is the government (AKP) (33% of German-Turks and 
28% of French-Turks) (Figure 4.6) with its Islamic democratic vision. After that, religious institutions 
in Turkey attract 20% of German-Turks and 10% of French-Turks. The army takes third place among 
German-Turks with 14% and second place among French-Turks with 24%. There may be many 
reasons for the AKP’s success. Our qualitative research indicates that the priorities of the party make it 
popular among Euro-Turks: its emphasis on employment, progress, values, justice and the EU.  
Figure 4.6 Which institution in Turkey do you trust most (multi-response)? 
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The institution most distrusted is the media (by 29% in Germany and 22% in France), followed by 
health care and social security institutions (11% in Germany and 23% in France) (Figure 4.7). The 
army takes third place in Germany (9%), while it is the police in France (10%). It would be interesting 
to compare these findings with the results of similar surveys in Turkey and other EU countries. EURO-TURKS: A BRIDGE OR A BREACH BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE EU? | 35 
 
Surveys in Turkey indicate that the Turkish public finds the army as one of the most reliable 
institutions, believed to be providing stability, authority and hierarchy in a relatively unstable country. 
Similar findings could also be seen in the 2003 Eurobarometer Survey held in 15 EU countries, in 
which the army is seen as one of the most reliable institutions. Euro-Turks, however, seem to find the 
new government in Turkey as the most reliable institution, representing change and progress. 
Figure 4.7 Which institution in Turkey do you trust least (multi-response)? 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Germany % France %
Government
Religious institutions
Presidency
Army
Health and social security institutions
Media
 
As Figure 4.8 reveals, around the same number of people believe that Turkey has recently become 
better compared with previous years (62% of German-Turks and 65% of French-Turks), and both 
German-Turks and French-Turks are predominantly optimistic about Turkey’s future (Figure 4.9). A 
similar trend is also visible in public polls held in Turkey. Although Euro-Turks are not so optimistic 
about their future in their countries of settlement, they have a firm belief that Turkey has better future 
prospects. This is an important point to keep in mind. 
Figure 4.8 Do you think Turkey has become better or worse compared with previous years? 
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Figure 4.9 Are you optimistic or pessimistic about Turkey’s future? 
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Perceptions of Germany/France 
Turkish migrants and their children in the West are officially defined in Turkey as either ‘gurbetçi’ or 
‘yurtdışındaki vatandaslarimiz’ (our citizens abroad). Euro-Turks are stereotypically defined by 
Turkish people in Turkey as either ‘Almanyalı or ‘Almancı’ (German-like). Both terms carry rather 
negative connotations in Turkey. The major Turkish stereotypes about Euro-Turks are those of their 
being rich, eating pork, having a very comfortable life in Germany/France, losing their Turkishness 
and becoming more and more German/French.
1 Recently, Euro-Turks have complained about the 
paternalist approach of the Turkish state towards them. They no longer want to be perceived as being 
passive, obedient, subject to support or as cash machines making foreign currency for the homeland. 
Constituting around 4 million inhabitants in the West, they would rather be more active in Turkish-EU 
relations and supportive of Turkey in adapting to new EU regimes. 
The number of German-Turks who either have EU citizenship or are planning to apply is around 59% 
in Germany (representing around 1.5 million people from a total of 2.5 million German-Turks) and 
74% in France (Figure 4.10). These high numbers indicate that Euro-Turks are open to integration and 
political participation. The latest statistics indicate that the number of German-Turks naturalised has 
increased almost twofold since the year 2000, when the new citizenship law was put into force. The 
number of German-Turks having German citizenship was around 350,000 in 2000, which has risen to 
more than 700,000. The uptake from the new German citizenship law actually signifies that migrants 
can be quite receptive and incorporating vis-à-vis democratic and inclusive political and legal changes.  
Figure 4.10 Do you have German/French citizenship? 
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Around 60% of Euro-Turks are not interested in the domestic politics of their countries of settlement. 
Some 20 to 25% are reported as having an interest (Figure 4.11). 
Figure 4.11 To what extent are you interested in politics in Germany/France? 
0
10
20
30
40
50
Germany % France %
Not at all
Not really
So-so
As much as I can
Very much so
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Figure 4.12 indicates that German-Turks have recently become more affiliated with left-wing political 
parties such as the Social Democrats (27%) and the Greens (8.5%). The same trend is also visible 
among French-Turks (28% with the Social Democrats and 5% with the Greens). It should be 
mentioned here that in the early stages of the migratory process, Euro-Turks were more oriented 
towards conservative parties, owing to their scepticism of left-wing parties back in the homeland. This 
recent shift also implies that Euro-Turks are becoming more involved and reflexive in the daily 
politics of their countries of settlement in a way that shows they are actually very well integrated. 
Nevertheless, there are still great numbers of people who are not really engaged in domestic politics. 
The qualitative research also shows that German-Turks, for instance, are very reflexive to the latest 
manoeuvres of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), which tries to use Turkey’s candidature as an 
election campaign instrument to attract the nationalist vote. Furthermore, the CDU is not considered a 
European entity as it reduces Europeanness to cultural and religious homogeneity in an essentialist 
way. What is also quite striking for both countries is that almost the same percentage of Euro-Turks 
are not affiliated with any German or French political party (around 53% in each country). Yet cross-
tabulation clearly points out that there is a growing tendency among the younger generations towards 
political integration and also that the indifference to domestic politics is a highly common 
phenomenon among those of lower social status.  
Figure 4.12 With which political party in Germany/France are you more affiliated? 
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Second- and third-generation Euro-Turks overwhelmingly tend to support social democratic political 
parties, as indicated in Table 4.1. Green parties also attract the younger generations. But it seems that 
the younger generations of German-Turks are more interested in the domestic politics of their country 
of settlement than their French counterparts. This trend again demonstrates the fact that German-Turks 
are more politically integrated than French-Turks.  
Table 4.1 With which political party in Germany/France are you more affiliated? Birthplace? 
(cross-tabulation) (%) 
Birthplace   
Turkey Germany France 
Liberal parties  2.8 4.1  0.9 
Conservative parties  2.3 3.1  0 
Social democratic parties  25.1 32.9  26.6 
Greens and environmentalist parties  8.0 9.0  3.7 
Radical right and nationalist  1.1 0.3  0.9 
Radical left and communist parties  1.7 0.7  0.9 
In equal distance to all  1.1 0.3  0.9 
None of the above  54.6 46.4  63.3 
Total 100 100  100 
The data in Table 4.2 indicate that Euro-Turks of middle and higher classes are inclined to support 
left-wing political parties. Those of lower social status, however, appear to be less interested in 
German/French domestic politics. 38 | KAYA & KENTEL 
 
Table 4.2 With which political party in Germany/France are you more affiliated? Social status? 
(cross-tabulation)(%) 
Social status     
  Highest Upper Upper 
middle 
Middle Lower 
middle 
Low Lowest  Total 
Liberal parties  14.2  7.0 5.6 3.0 2.2 1.1  1.0  3.1 
Conservative parties  3.2  4.5 3.0 3.6 1.6 1.3  1.0  2.4 
Social democratic 
parties 
36.1  35.0 29.4 29.2 27.1 20.9  20.4  27.1 
Greens and 
environmentalist 
parties 
17.4 17.4 9.9 8.8 6.8 5.9  3.3  8.2 
Radical right and 
nationalist parties 
0 2.0 1.8 1.3 0.5 0.5  0  0.9 
Radical left and 
communist parties 
0.6 2.8 2.8 1.2 1.6 .0  2.3  1.5 
Equally distant from all  3.2  3.1 7.5 4.9 3.2 3.6  3.1  4.2 
None of the above  25.2  28.3 40.0 48.0 56.9 66.7  68.9  52.5 
Total 100  100 100 100 100 100  100  100 
 
A majority of German-Turks are not affiliated with any ethnic or religious association (61%). There 
may, of course, be several reasons for this. One likely reason is that over the last decade such 
organisations have failed to ameliorate existing problems. Recent revelations concerning incidences of 
corruption in religious organisations and tariqats have also had a great impact on the proportion of 
membership. Instead, Euro-Turks are a) becoming more affiliated with political parties (41%, which is 
a relatively high figure); b) becoming more self-centred; and c) becoming more involved in their own 
extended family networks. The latter is always the missing link in evaluating individualisation 
processes in Turkish communities.  
Both groups appreciate the social security and health institutions (20% of German-Turks and 30% of 
French-Turks) (Figure 4.13). What is also striking is the sharp difference between German-Turks and 
French-Turks in terms of their appreciation of Turkish official institutions such as embassies and 
consulates (10% of German-Turks and 20% of French-Turks). It may also be seen below how 
German-Turks dislike such institutions (26%) (Figure 4.14). Again, levels of appreciation of mosques 
among German-Turks indicate their religiosity and communitarianism  
Figure 4.13 Which institution do you trust most in Germany/France? 
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German-Turks primarily distrust Turkish official institutions such as embassies and consulates, 
whereas French-Turks dislike the media most (18%) (Figure 4.14). EURO-TURKS: A BRIDGE OR A BREACH BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE EU? | 39 
 
Figure 4.14 Which institution do you trust least in Germany/France? 
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The most important problem faced by German-Turks is reported as a contradiction in moral values 
(26%), whereas French-Turks report that their incompetence in French language is their primary 
concern (18%) (Figure 4.15). The lack of French language skills among French-Turks actually seems 
to contradict the myth of the assimilationist republican model in France. 
Figure 4.15 What is the primary problem you face in Germany/France? 
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Discrimination and racism seem to be the second most important problem faced by Euro-Turks in both 
countries (Figure 4.16). 
Figure 4.16 What is the second greatest problem you face in Germany/France? 
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While there is a great deal of pessimism among German-Turks about the future of Germany, there is 
optimism among French-Turks on the future of France (Figure 4.17). This is directly related to 
economic limitations, deindustrialisation, unemployment and inflation in Germany.  
Figure 4.17 Are you optimistic or pessimistic about the future of Germany/France? 
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The results of the Eurobarometer autumn 2003 public opinion surveys held in 15 EU countries also 
indicate that the predictions of Euro-Turks on the future of their countries of settlement are in parallel 
with those of the majority societies. As the Eurobarometer results shown in Tables 4.3 through 4.6 
reveal, German society is more pessimistic than French society about the future performance of their 
country in terms of economic, financial and employment indicators. 
Table 4.3 Expectations for the year 2004: Country's employment situation (%) 
  Worse Same Better 
France 53  23  18 
Germany 62  22 10 
Source: Eurobarometer (2003). 
Table 4.4 Expectations for the year 2004: Country's economic situation (%) 
  Worse Same Better 
France 52  26  17 
Germany 57  25 13 
Source: Eurobarometer (2003). 
Table 4.5 Expectations for the year 2004: Household financial situation (%) 
  Worse Same Better 
France 22  46  28 
Germany 34  50 11 
Source: Eurobarometer (2003). 
Table 4.6 Expectations for the year 2004: Personal job situation (%) 
  Worse Same Better 
France 10  55  25 
Germany 14  63 12 
Source: Eurobarometer (2003). 
Around 39% of German-Turks and 29% of French-Turks are involved in various associations (Figure 
4.18). The types of organisations they are involved in are shown in Figure 4.19. While in Germany 
religious associations are most preferred (45%, which is 17% of the total), the figure for French-Turks EURO-TURKS: A BRIDGE OR A BREACH BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE EU? | 41 
 
involved in religious organisations is only 16%. Cultural centres are most preferred in France (31%). 
Membership of a labour union is also remarkably high in both countries (12%). It is notable however 
that political party membership among German-Turks (9%) is much higher than among French-Turks.  
Figure 4.18 Is there any organisation of which you are a member or in which you are involved? 
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Figure 4.19 What kind of organisations are you involved in or are you a member of? 
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The cross-tabulation in Table 4.7 shows that those born in France (27%) have fewer tendencies to be 
engaged in any kind of association. Conversely, 39% of those born in Germany are more involved in 
associations and civil society organisations. 
Table 4.7 What kind of organisation are you involved in or are you a member of? Place of birth? 
(cross-tabulation) (%) 
Place of Birth?  Membership 
Turkey Germany France 
Total 
 No  62.2 61.3 73.4  62.2 
 Yes  37.8 38.7 26.6  37.8 
Total 100 100 100  100 
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Images in comparison: Homeland and ‘host-land’ 
The data below reveal that Euro-Turks no longer essentialise their homeland as a place of eventual 
return. Instead, both Turkey and Germany/France have various advantages and disadvantages for 
them. When asked, they are quite objective in stating which place is better in terms of various factors 
such as human rights, democracy, education, tolerance, values and job opportunities. 
Approximately 49% of German-Turks affiliate more with Turkey, 22% with Germany and 27% with 
both countries (Figure 4.20). On the other hand, 36% of the French-Turks affiliate more with Turkey, 
25% with France and 36% with both countries. The reasons behind German-Turks’ low affiliation 
with Germany may be manifold, but the economic crisis seems to be one of the main reasons. 
Affiliation with the homeland, on the other hand, may result from either structural outsiderism as in 
the German case or assimilationist integration as in the French case. Both outsiderism and assimilation 
may lead to the construction of communal networks having defensive, nationalist, religious, laicist, 
Kemalist or even Kurdish undertones. 
Figure 4.20 To which do you feel more affiliated, Germany/France or Turkey? 
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The percentage of those who affiliate equally with both countries is remarkably high: 27% in Germany 
and 36% in France. These groups seem to form the bridge between Turkey and the European Union as 
they have constructed more reflexive, active, transnational, post-national, universalist and 
cosmopolitan identities. These groups generally come from those born in Germany/France. On the 
other hand, those who have assimilated amount to 22% in Germany and 25% in France. The data 
indicate that Turks no longer essentialise their homeland and they actually challenge the gurbetçi 
discourse common among the Turks in Turkey. They are no longer gurbetçi; they have already 
become active social agents in their new countries. They have actually accommodated themselves in 
the transnational space bridging the two countries, homeland and host-land. 
Table 4.8 indicates that Euro-Turks of second and third generations are either equally affiliated with 
both countries or more affiliated with their country of settlement. Hence, the younger generations are 
more integrated into Germany/France than the older generations. The fact that the younger generations 
are equally affiliated with both homeland and the receiving country highlights the premise of this 
research. The younger generations form a bridge between Turkey and the EU. It is striking to see that 
less than 25% of young generations in both countries are reported to be more affiliated with Turkey. 
Table 4.8 To which do you feel more affiliated, Germany/France or Turkey? 
Birthplace? (cross-tabulation) (%) 
Birthplace   
   Turkey Germany France 
Turkey 55.5 25.0 22.9 
Germany/France 17.7 35.2 30.3 
Equal affiliation to both  24.2 37.0 43.1 
Equal detachment from both  2.5 2.7 3.7 
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Table 4.9 shows that middle- and upper-class Euro-Turks are either more affiliated with 
Germany/France or equally affiliated with their homeland and the country of settlement, whereas the 
lower classes are reported as being more affiliated with Turkey. 
Table 4.9 To which do you feel more affiliated, Germany/France or Turkey? Social status? 
(cross-tabulation) (%) 
Social status     
Highest Upper Upper 
Middle 
Middle Lower 
Middle 
Low Lowest  Total 
Turkey 34.0  34.2 45.3 42.6 47.2 54.1  65.7  47.2 
Germany/France 29.5  21.8 19.5 22.9 25.6 21.0  14.3  22.3 
Equal affiliation to both  35.9  39.5 32.8 32.1 24.2 22.8  16.7  27.8 
Equal detachment from 
both 
0.6 4.5 2.4 2.4 3.0 2.0 3.3  2.7 
Total 100  100 100 100 100 100  100  100 
 
The interviewees were asked to compare the homeland and the host-land in terms of 14 different 
topics (the order of the answers are in line with the highest scores addressing Germany). The findings 
in Table 4.10 indicate that Euro-Turks generally favour their host-lands as far as the health care and 
social security system, respecting rules, pursuing rights, democracy and human rights, job 
opportunities, the judiciary system, valuing human capital, equal treatment, attitudes of the police and 
a comfortable life are concerned. Turkey is reported as having great defects in these areas. In terms of 
respecting cultures and religions, however, Germany’s liberal multicultural structure is more 
appreciated than the republican and laicist structure of both Turkey and France.  
Table 4.10 Which country is better? (%) 
German-Turks French-Turks   
Turkey Germany  Turkey  France 
Health care and social security systems  1.3  96.0  0.5  96.3 
Respecting rules  3.5  88.2  10.3  70.0 
Pursuit of rights  1.8  87.1  3.2  80.5 
Democracy and human rights  2.6  86.4  4.0  78.5 
Job opportunities  3.3  77.4  2.5  85.0 
Educational system  7.4  77.3  9.2  72.2 
Efficiency of the judiciary system  2.5  77.3  4.8  61.5 
Valuing human capital  7.4  74.8  6.7  77.8 
Equal treatment for all  3.6  71.8  7.0  61.3 
Attitudes of police  6.0  66.3  10.2  51.0 
Comfortable and easy life  28.3  51.6  24.7  49.0 
Respecting cultures and religions  25.6  48.5  34.0  34.3 
Mutual tolerance  42.9 37.2 41.5  33.5 
Moral social values  56.0  19.9  43.0  33.5 
Source: Own data (see Annex). 
There are only two areas of life remaining where Turkey has an advantage compared with the other 
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freedom, gender relations, warmth, hospitality, frankness and respect for the elderly come to the fore. 
The point to emphasise here is the big difference between Germany and France with regard to moral 
social values. Germany is reported to be more problematic in terms of moral concerns compared with 
France. The emphasis on cultural differences seems to be one of the factors giving rise to the 
emergence of the community support networks in both Germany and France. This doesn’t mean of 
course that cultural differences are the only reason for closed community formations. Exclusionary, 
formal state practices in Germany until the late 1980s and assimilationist republican policies in France 
have brought about similar consequences in terms of the creation of ethnic enclaves and closed 
diasporic groups. Recent policy changes in Germany with respect to more democratic and inclusive 
citizenship laws seem to have created a shift in the attitudes of German-Turks towards integration and 
interaction with the majority society. Furthermore, integrationist republican policies are lately being 
reported by the French-Turks as leading to assimilation and loss of differences. Another explanation 
for the remarkable difference between German-Turks and French-Turks with regard to the ways in 
which they problematise the depreciation of moral values in their countries of settlement is the high 
level of poverty and unemployment, which prompts people to invest more in culture, religion, 
ethnicity, the past, and norms and values. 
Policies of citizenship: Integration/assimilation 
German and French forms of statecraft are significantly different when compared. The French form of 
statecraft springs from the Enlightenment tradition, based on the material civilisational idea, which 
sought to impose Western universalist ideals on remote lands. This tradition was colonial in the sense 
that it was determined to constitute a homogenous and monolithical world political culture based on 
Western values: namely fraternity, liberty and equality. The German form of statecraft comes from the 
anti-Enlightenment idea of Aufklärung, which rather emphasised the romantic culture idea of 
perceiving all cultures as equal to each other. Thus, the two alternative models of statecraft are 
different from each other: on the one hand, there is the French civilisationist project tracing its roots 
back to Enlightenment philosophers such as J.-J. Rousseau and C.L. Montesquieu; and on the other, 
there is the German culturalist project tracing its roots back to J.G. Herder. This differentiation is a 
great aid in understanding and comparing the nationhood, citizenship, immigration, integration and 
assimilation regimes of both countries. Roger Brubaker’s work entitled Citizenship and Nationhood in 
France and Germany (1992) is based very much on such a differentiation: 
If the French understanding of nationhood has been state-centred and assimilationist, the German 
understanding has been Volk-centred and differentialist. Since national feeling developed before 
the nation-state, the German idea of the nation was not originally political, nor was it linked to the 
abstract idea of citizenship. This prepolitical German nation, this nation in search of a state, was 
conceived not as the bearer of universal political values, but as an organic cultural, linguistic, or 
racial community – as an irreducibly particular Volksgemeinschaft. On this understanding, 
nationhood is an ethnocultural, not a political fact (Brubaker, 1992, p. 1).  
Comparisons between the two countries’ understandings of nationhood go back to the early 19
th 
century. They were first formulated by German intellectuals who sought to distance themselves from 
the allegedly shallow rationalism and cosmopolitanism of the Enlightenment and the French 
Revolution through a historicist celebration of cultural pluralism (Brubaker, 1992). Brubaker also 
states that French and German traditions of citizenship and nationhood may be stigmatised by 
conceptual dualities such as universalism and particularism, cosmopolitanism and ethnocentrism, 
Enlightenment rationalism and romantic irrationalism, assimilationist and differentialist, civilisational 
and cultural, political and ethnocultural. When it comes to migrants, Brubaker praises the French 
politics of citizenship owing to its universalist and inclusive nature, which easily moulds migrants into 
citizens. He implicitly condemns German politics of citizenship as it has a particularist and exclusive 
nature making settlers, but not citizens, of migrants.  
But things have changed dramatically since Brubaker wrote his ground-breaking piece. Those 
countries that were known to have inclusive, democratic and universalist incorporation regimes vis-à-
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Holland are some examples that have adopted a restrictive citizenship regime and giving up the jus 
soli principle in granting citizenship to migrants. On the other hand, Germany, known as 
differentialist, particularist, culturalist, ethno-nationalist and exclusive in terms of citizenship policies, 
has become more democratic and inclusive since the year 2000. The data gathered in this research 
indicates that Brubaker’s statements concerning the citizenship regimes of the two countries no longer 
pertain to the reality of the situation.  
Dominant discourses of multiculturalism, cultural diversity and pluralism in Germany have recently 
led German-Turks to represent themselves with their own cultural identities in the public space. Such 
popular discourses, reinforced by the Social Democratic and Green policies, have also resulted in the 
political, economic and cultural integration of German-Turks into all spheres of life. The numbers of 
parliamentarians of Turkish origin in local and national parliament as well as at the EU level indicate 
that German-Turks integrate politically into their host-society. Further, the visibility of German-Turks 
in the cultural sphere also demonstrates that Turks integrate culturally and the rising amount of 
investment in the domestic economy by the German-Turks is proof that Turks are able to integrate 
economically as well.  
These facts actually contradict the stereotypical belief in Germany that Turks do not integrate. On the 
contrary, Turks are integrated throughout German political, economic and cultural ways of life. This 
may be a result of the culturally differentialist features of incorporation policies in Germany or of the 
existence of the large Turkish population in the country. It is likely, however, that it is the Social 
Democrat-Green coalition government (in power since 1998) that has had the greatest impact in 
democratising immigration and integration policies in a way that has changed Germany from a 
segregationist country into an integrationist country.  
The French form of the republican ideal of integration is said to resemble assimilation: a citizenship 
model to assimilate those arriving into the French civilisational project through language, laicism, 
modernism, state-centrism, Western-centric universalism and rationalism. While cultural diversity is 
usually undermined, citizenship is underlined. Thus, politically defined citizenship has always had a 
primary place over culture-specific nationality. The dominance of citizenship over nationality, of 
political over ethnocultural conceptions of nationhood, is perhaps best expressed in J.L. Tallien’s 
remark in the spring of 1975: “the only foreigners in France are bad citizens” (cited in Azimi, 1988, p. 
702). Moreover, civilisational discourse has always been implicitly embedded in the French republican 
model. Integration refers to the acculturation of foreigners. Acculturation in this respect means 
Franco-conformity. According to Tribalat (2002), the major weakness of the ‘French melting pot’ 
resides in its difficulty in producing professional and social mobility, a phenomenon that involves the 
whole of society, but which is more difficult for populations of foreign origin. One should not forget 
that around 80% of young people with immigrant roots aged between 20 and 29 are children of 
workers, i.e. almost twice that of young native French. 
Gordon (1964, p. 71) identifies seven types of assimilation/integration: 
1)  cultural or behavioural assimilation (acculturation); 
2)  structural assimilation, which involves entrance into organisations and institutions of the host 
society at the primary group level; 
3)  marital assimilation (amalgamation); 
4)  identity assimilation (creation of a sense of people-hood at a societal level); 
5)  attitude receptional assimilation (absence of prejudice); 
6)  behavioural receptional assimilation (absence of discrimination); and 
7)  civic assimilation (generating a shared identity of citizenship). 
According to Gordon, structural assimilation is the most essential of all. Once it occurs, all others 
inevitably follow. Table 4.11 displays the form of assimilation/integration in France and Germany as 
far as Euro-Turks are concerned. 
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Table 4.11 Form of assimilation/integration in both countries 
  Germany France 
Cultural or behavioural assimilation  –  X 
Structural assimilation  X  – 
Marital assimilation  –  – 
Identity assimilation  X  X 
Attitude receptional assimilation  –  – 
Behavioural receptional assimilation  –  X 
Civic assimilation  X  X 
Source: Own data (see Annex). 
‘Unity-in-diversity’ or ‘unity-over-diversity’? 
Recently, several political philosophers have tried to provide some conceptual and philosophical tools 
in order to lay out a framework around the discussions on diversity. Will Kymlicka (1995), a liberal-
communitarian, has attempted in his work to combine ideas of liberal democratic principles as a 
foundation for a cohesive societal structure (unity) with recognition of communitarian rights for 
cultural minorities (diversity) within the multinational state (unity-in-diversity). Kymlicka claims that 
collective rights for minority groups do not contradict a liberal notion of politics – indeed they are 
pivotal for enabling individual freedoms for the members of the minority group in question 
(Kymlicka, 1995, p. 46).  
On the other hand, Brian Barry, a republican, warns the reader about the cleavages springing from a 
multiculturalist approach, since respect for diversity threatens the unity necessary for promoting equal 
distribution among citizens. This issue is not wholly an economic one, but also one of distributing 
equal rights. Barry (2001) points out the negative consequences of Kymlicka's emphasis on ‘group 
rights’ when it comes to sectarian religious groups. He argues that these could never be granted group-
specific rights, if the (liberal) state is to remain true to its ideal of impartiality and neutrality (Barry, 
2001, p. 165). Barry’s priorities lie in the rule of the majority with respect for individual rights over 
the principles of group-centred multiculturalism, a position that can be described as a kind of unity-
over-diversity. 
The positions stated above (liberal-communitarian and republican) are the political stances most 
debated with regard to the management of cultural diversities in the context of nation-states. There is 
not, however, sufficient discussion concerning the management of cultural, ethnic, national, religious 
or civilisational diversity within the European Union. Recently, some attempts have been made within 
the European Commission at creating possible scenarios for the future. These scenarios have lately 
emerged with the circulation of such notions in public as unity-in-diversity, a Europe of regions, 
cultural diversity, diversity and European Union citizenship. It should also be stated here that the 
Commission seems to favour a Kymlickan unity-in-diversity position in order to manage all sorts of 
diversities. On the other hand, the data actually indicate that the contemporary German model of 
integration formulated by the Red-Green coalition government complies with the discourse of unity-
in-diversity, and that the French model is more in line with the homogenising discourse of unity-over-
diversity. 
Habitats of meaning for Euro-Turks 
It is a common belief that Euro-Turks do not have enough interest in the media of their countries of 
settlement and that they are rather involved in the Turkish media. Yet our research presents a different 
picture. Euro-Turks, generally speaking, are quite attentive to the media of their new destinations and 
widely follow German/French television channels and newspapers. Our data show that 45% of 
German-Turks watch German television channels every day, while 55.5% of French-Turks do the 
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this amount is 17% for French-Turks. It is also important to point out that approximately 54% of 
German-Turks and 35% of French-Turks frequently use the Internet. More than half of German-Turks 
seem to be engaged in Internet activity while less than one-third of French-Turks are. It should also be 
pointed out that almost 25% of German-Turks report that they use the Internet almost every day, while 
only 14% of the French-Turks are reported to have access to it on a daily basis (see the related data at 
the end of the Annex). 
The development of telecommunication technology has made possible the reception of almost all 
Turkish television channels and newspapers in European Union countries. Turkish media in Berlin 
have achieved a remarkable cultural hegemony throughout the Turkish diaspora. To understand this, 
one has to examine the rising interest of the Turkish media industry among the Turkish population 
living in both countries as well as in several others. The major Turkish television channels all have 
their own European units that create special programmes for Turks living in Europe. TRT 
International (a state channel) was the first of these channels. The other channels are Euro Show, Euro 
Star, Euro D, Euro ATV, TGRT, Kanal 7 and Lig TV. With the exception of TRT Int., all of these 
television channels may be received through satellite antennas. Further, TRT International is already 
available on cable.  
The programme spectra of all these channels differ greatly. The state channel TRT International tends 
to mainly give equal weight to entertainment, education, movies and news. Since it is a state-owned 
enterprise, it tries to promote the ‘indispensable unity of the Turkish nation’ by arranging, for instance, 
fundraising campaigns for the Turkish armed forces fighting in the south eastern region of Turkey. 
There are also many programmes concentrating on the problems of Euro-Turks. This channel is 
widely received in Turkey. Thus, in a way, it also informs the Turkish audience about the lives of 
Euro-Turks, mainly German-Turks, while connecting modern diasporic Turkish communities to the 
homeland.  
Television channels such as Euro Show, Euro D and Euro Star are private, broadcasting secular-based 
programmes. The majority of the programmes are composed of old Turkish movies, American movies, 
comedy programmes, dramas, Turkish and European pop charts, sports programmes, ‘reality’ shows 
and news. On the other hand, TGRT and Kanal 7 are religious-based channels. Besides the actual 
programmes, these channels give priority to dramas and movies with religious themes. Traditional 
Turkish folk music programmes are also prominent in the programming of these two channels. Satel is 
another channel broadcasting the Turkish and European pop charts. It is the favourite channel of 
Turkish youngsters who have a satellite connection. Lig TV is a pay channel, broadcasting the Turkish 
premier league football matches. 
Most of the major Turkish newspapers are also circulated in Germany and France. Journals such as 
Hürriyet, Milliyet, Sabah, Cumhuriyet and Evrensel are some of the Turkish papers that are printed in 
Germany. Also available are many other sports and tabloid-style papers from Turkey. Although the 
content of the papers is extremely limited in terms of news about the homeland, they offer a wide 
range of news about Turkish diasporic communities in Europe. 
The Turkish media partly shape the ‘habitats of meaning’ of the Euro-Turks.
2 They attempt to provide 
a stream of programmes considered as suitable to the habitats of meaning of the diasporic subject. For 
instance, German-Turks are perceived by the Turkish media industry as a group of people who resist 
cultural change. This perception is the main rationale behind the selection of movies and dramas in 
their programming. A great number of the movies on each channel are old Turkish films that were 
produced in the late 1960s and 1970s.
3 The broadcasting of these films, which touch upon some of the 
                                                 
2 The notion of ‘habitats of meaning’ belongs to Ulf Hannerz (1996). Hannerz has developed the notion in 
relation to the co-existence of local and global habitats at once. TV and print media have an important impact on 
the formation of our habitats of meaning. Just as some people may share much the same habitats of meaning in 
the global ecumene, others may have rather distinct and localised habitats of meaning. 
3 The Turkish film industry produced a vast number of films until the early 1980s, prior to the hegemony of the 
American film industry over the world market.  48 | KAYA & KENTEL 
 
traditional issues in Turkish culture such as Anatolian feudalism, blood feuds, migration (gurbet), ill-
starred romance and poverty, reinforces the reification of culture within the Turkish diaspora.  
As Foucault noted, such films attempt to “re-programme popular memory” and to recover “lost, 
unheard memories” that had been denied or buried by the dominant representations of the past 
experienced in the diaspora (quoted in Morley & Robins, 1993, p. 10). Hence, identity is also a 
question of memory and memories of home in particular (Morley & Robins, 1993, p. 10). Before the 
private television channels began operating, it was the video industry that provided the Turkish 
community outside of Turkey with the opportunity to view these films.
4  
The Turkish media seems to contribute to the reproduction of traditions, values and discourses brought 
from the homeland at the beginning of the migration process, as the programmes have been produced 
mostly by those who do not have an insight into the current conditions of Euro-Turks. Recently, 
however, there have been some new initiatives by local Euro-Turks to run private television channels 
and radio stations. Some of these include Aypa TV, TD1 and Radio Metropol in Berlin, which are 
operated by local Euro-Turks who are better equipped to understand the social, political and economic 
context of their communities.
5  
 
                                                 
4 J. Knight (1986) states that 80% of German-Turks used to watch Turkish videos daily. 
5 For a more detailed account of the various local television channels run by the German-Turks, see Kosnick 
(2004). | 49 
Chapter 5 
Europe and the European Union 
Alternative projects of Europe: A holistic Europe or a syncretic Europe? 
There are at least two definitions of Europe and the European Union. The first is that proposed by the 
conservatives, which defines Europeanness as a static, retrospective, holistic,
1 essentialist and 
culturally prescribed entity. The second is that proposed by the Social Democrats, liberals, socialists 
and Greens, which emphasises the understanding that ‘Europe’ is a fluid, ongoing, dynamic, 
prospective, syncretic and non-essentialist process of becoming. While the first definition highlights a 
cultural project, the latter definition welcomes a political project embracing cultural and religious 
differences, including Islam. This must be one of the explanations why the inclusive and responsible 
acts of the Social Democrats and Greens in Germany and France are well received by German-Turks.  
Accordingly, the conservative holistic idea aims at building a culturally prescribed Europe based on 
Christian mythology, shared meanings and values, historical myths and memories, the ancient Greek 
and Roman legacy, homogeneity and heterophobia. A holistic Europe does not intend to include any 
other culture or religion outside this European/Christian legacy. Hence, neither Turkey nor Islam has a 
place in this project. That is why Angela Merkel (CDU leader in Germany) and Valéry Giscard 
d’Estaing (President of the EU Convention) and several other leaders in the wider Union (Poland and 
Slovakia) both implicitly and explicitly advocate including an article in the EU Constitutional Treaty 
regarding the Christian roots of the Union. On the other hand, the progressive syncretic idea proposes 
a politically dynamic Europe based on cultural diversity, dialogue, heterogeneity and xenophilia as 
illustrated in Table 5.1 below. The advocates of a syncretic Europe promote co-existence with Turkey 
and Islam and underline that the EU is, by origin, a peace project. German foreign minister Joschka 
Fischer, former French Prime Minister Michel Rocard and German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder are 
some of the leaders emphasising the secular character of the EU. Surprisingly enough, the cultural EU 
project complies with the latest republican idea of unity-over-diversity in a way that denies 
heterogeneity and opposes the potential of the project as a peace project. Nevertheless, the political 
EU project goes along with the idea of unity-in-diversity, aiming at constructing a meta-European 
identity embracing cultural and religious differences. Hence, the perspectives of the Euro-Turks on the 
EU should be assessed in line with these two antithetical paradigms on Europe. The data indicate that 
the Euro-Turks’ views foster the progressive ideal of a political Europe embracing diversity.  
Table 5.1 Alternate projects for Europe and their characteristics 
Syncretic Europe   Holistic Europe  
Dynamic Static 
Secular Religious 
Societal Communal 
Post-national Multinational 
Economic Economic 
Political Cultural 
Syncretic culture  Holistic culture 
Post-civilisational Civilisational 
Prospective towards the future  Retrospective 
Non-essentialist Essentialist 
Xenophile Xenophobic 
Political geography  Physical geography 
                                                 
1 In anthropological terms, there are two principal notions of culture. The first one is the holistic notion of culture 
and the second is the syncretic notion of culture. The former considers culture a highly integrated and grasped 
static ‘whole’. This is the dominant paradigm of classical modernity, of which territoriality and totality are the 
main characteristics. The latter notion is the one that is most obviously affected by increasing interconnectedness 
in space. This syncretic notion of culture has been proposed by contemporary scholars to demonstrate the fact 
that cultures emerge through mixing beyond the political and geographical territories (Kaya, 2001, p. 33).  50 | KAYA & KENTEL 
 
Euro-Turks’ perspectives on the EU 
Focus group discussions, in-depth interviews and structured interviews show that Euro-Turks are in 
favour of Turkey’s participation in the EU, although there are also a remarkable number of people 
who are against it.  
While around 48% of German-Turks and 64% of French-Turks regard the EU as an economic 
integration, 21% of German-Turks and 11% of French-Turks regard it as a Christian club (Figure 5.1).  
Figure 5.1 What does the European Union mean to you? 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Germany % France % 
An economic integration
A common cultural policy
A democracy project
A Christian club
Exploitation, imperialism
A political and military superpower
A bureaucratic community detached from public
The results of the 2003 Eurobarometer public opinion surveys also indicate that both Germans and the 
French give priority to economic and financial aspects in defining the meaning of the EU (Table 5.2). 
It is apparent that the euro has the greatest impact on both communities in one way or another, with 
the second most influential characteristic being freedom of movement. 
Table 5.2 The three most common replies as to what the EU means personally to EU citizens (%) 
Germany   France   
The euro   56  The euro   57 
Freedom of movement  51  Freedom of movement   52 
Peace   46  Cultural diversity   39 
Source: Eurobarometer (2003). 
Generally speaking, Euro-Turks are positive about the EU (Figure 5.2). Approximately 32% of 
German-Turks and 54% of French-Turks are in favour of the EU idea; around 28% of German-Turks 
and 17% of French-Turks are not in favour. Notably, 29% of German-Turks and 23% of French-Turks 
have mixed feelings about it. Those German-Turks who are negative about the EU are likely to think 
that the EU has gained a lot from Germany’s prosperity (in other words from their prosperity). On the 
other hand, those French-Turks who are positive about the EU are likely to think that the EU has given 
them more prosperity. This observation is also confirmed by the fact that 6% of German-Turks are 
supportive of the euro, while 25% of French-Turks support it. 
Figure 5.2 To what extent you are either positive or negative about the EU? 
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The results of the Eurobarometer 2003 survey correlate with our findings about Euro-Turks (Table 
5.3). Both communities have a rather positive image of the EU. It is interesting to note, however, that 
French-Turks (16%) are less negative about the EU than the French (21%) and German-Turks (28%) 
are more negative than the Germans (16%). 
Table 5.3 Image of the European Union (%)  
  Fairly to very negative  Neutral  Fairly to very positive 
France 21  31  45 
Germany 16  38  39 
Source: Eurobarometer (2003). 
The general trend is that Euro-Turks are in favour of Turkey’s entry into the Union (Figure 5.3); 
however, this tendency is clearer in France (57%) than in Germany (31%).  
Figure 5.3 To what extent do you support Turkey’s membership of the EU? 
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Eurobarometer results indicate that Germany and France are among the nations that least favour 
enlargement in general (Table 5.4). Germans are more in favour of enlargement compared with the 
French. 
Table 5.4 Enlargement: For or against? (%) 
Enlargement For Against 
Germany 38   42 
France 34 55 
Source: Eurobarometer (2003). 
 
The interviewees were asked what the EU meant to them and given various items to comment upon 
(Figure 5.4). Both German-Turks and French-Turks gave similar answers to the following questions: 
•  Turkey’s entrance into the EU does not really result in a division in the country (53% of German-
Turks and 58% of French-Turks);  
•  it would not result in the end of independence (52% of German-Turks and 58% of French-Turks);  
•  membership would bring more democracy to Turkey (63% of German-Turks and 67% of French-
Turks);  
•  membership would improve the implementation of human rights (70% of German-Turks and 79% 
of French-Turks); and finally,  
•  Turkey’s membership would result in migration flows from Turkey to European Union member 
states (71% of German-Turks and 69% of French-Turks).  52 | KAYA & KENTEL 
 
On the other hand, there is a big discrepancy between German-Turks and French-Turks when they 
were asked to respond to the following questions about the impact of Turkey’s prospective 
membership in the EU:  
•  membership will cause moral breakdown in Turkey (52% of German-Turks and 36% of French-
Turks);  
•  membership will bring about the exploitation of Turkey (52% of German-Turks and 34% of 
French-Turks); and  
•  membership will increase job opportunities (61% of German-Turks and 83% of French-Turks).  
These figures reveal that French-Turks seem to be more in favour of Turkey’s membership in 
European Union and that they have fewer cultural, moral or communal concerns about it than German-
Turks.  
 
Figure 5.4 What does Turkey’s EU membership mean to you? 
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Figure 5.5 and Table 5.5 compare the views of Euro-Turks and Turks on the assumption that full 
membership of the European Union may result in division within Turkey. Some 54% of Euro-Turks 
clearly indicate their disagreement with such an assumption, compared with only 28% of Turks do 
likewise. 
Figure 5.5 Will the EU divide Turkey? 
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Table 5.5 Will full membership to the EU cause division in Turkey? (%) 
 Turkey 
Yes 19 
No 28 
Neutral 39 
No response  14 
Total 100 
Source: Yilmaz (2004). 
With regard to the attitude of Euro-Turks to the euro, the results of the Eurobarometer surveys also 
correlate with the results of our research. The attitude of German-Turks is identical to that of Germans, 
and the French-Turks’ attitude is also identical to that of the French. Hence, the orientation of Euro-
Turks to the euro is parallel with their country-fellows (Figure 5.6 and Table 5.6). 
Figure 5.6 To what extent you are positive or negative about the euro? 
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Table 5.6 The euro: For or against? (%) 
Euro? For Against 
Germany 60   33 
France 68 28 
Source: Eurobarometer (2003). 
Figures 5.7 and 5.8 also indicate the perceptions of the interlocutors about the positive and negative 
effects Euro-Turks have on the host-land. While a great proportion of people in Germany feel that 
Turks represent cultural richness and a labour force, a relatively lower proportion believe that Turks 
have a negative impact because of their disregard for rules, closed community formations and distinct 
values. The interviewees commonly believe that Euro-Turks primarily provide European countries 
with a labour force, followed by contributions such as “cultural richness”, “job opportunities” and 
“familial and moral values”.  
What is remarkably different between German-Turks and French-Turks is that German-Turks place 
emphasis on symbolic contributions such as culture (53%) and moral values (32%) and the French-
Turks give priority to material contributions such as the labour force (73%) and job opportunities 
(42%). The percentage of those who believe that Turks make no contribution is relatively low (4 to 
5%).  
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Figure 5.7 What kind of positive influences do the Turks have on the host society (multi-response)? 
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Figure 5.8 What kind of negative influences do the Turks have on the host society (multi-response)? 
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Comparing the two figures above, we see that Euro-Turks believe their positive influence is greater 
than their negative influence. Approximately 32% of French-Turks and 25% of German-Turks believe 
that Turks have no negative impact on the host societies. Some 36% of German-Turks state that Turks 
generally do not obey rules and 25% believe that Turks misuse the social security system. Misuse of 
the social security system was one of the most debated issues by the young generation of German-
Turks in the in-depth interviews and focus group discussions. In parallel with the misuse of the social 
security system, 24% of German-Turks reported that Turks are inclined to be lazy. On the other hand, 
the lack of ability to adapt to local values (33%) and the tendency to construct ethnic enclaves (33%) 
are the issues raised most by French-Turks in explaining the negative impact of the Turks. The ways in 
which different issues have been phrased by German-Turks and French-Turks are also subject to the 
separate incorporation regimes applied by Germany and France vis-à-vis the migrants. The issue of 
constructing ethnic enclaves and communities raised by the French-Turks seems to be strongly linked 
to the sensitivity of the republican state tradition about homogeneity and difference-blindness. In 
contemporary Germany, however, the liberal democratic regime’s recognition of differences means 
that ethnic and cultural enclaves are not problematised to the extent they are in France.  
Apparently, Euro-Turks have gained much credit in terms of developing a democratic political culture 
that highlights human rights, democratisation, participation and reflexivity, the rule of law, rights, 
equality and trust. What is different in this picture compared with the picture in Turkey is that they 
have generated a rights-specific rather than a duty-specific political culture. Answers given to 
questions comparing rights, educational systems, police, democracy, human rights, social security 
systems, job opportunities, legal systems, respect for rules and regulations, human capital value, 
equality, freedom of faith and cultural dialogue indicate that Germany and France are considered 
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Germany/France and Turkey, clearly reveal deep-rooted democratic institutions and a high level of 
democracy in Germany/France. Yet Turkey comes to the fore positively when interviewees were 
asked questions about mutual tolerance and moral values.  
EU membership and migration prospects for Turks 
One of the most commonly expressed concerns regarding Turkey’s membership of the Union is the 
possibility of huge migration from Turkey to EU countries. Nevertheless, our qualitative and 
quantitative research reveals a contrasting picture. In the first place, the interlocutors we interviewed 
in the in-depth interviews, focus group discussions and structured interviews stated that they would 
not recommend that Turks in Turkey migrate to EU countries if Turkey were to enter the Union 
(79%). The reasons cited were the difficulties they face in the EU: rising unemployment, 
homesickness, low wages, disciplined working conditions, lack of tolerance and depreciation of moral 
values (Figure 5.9). Nevertheless, there is a strong belief among the interlocutors that huge migration 
from Turkey to EU countries would occur, echoing a commonly held belief in the EU. Hence, the 
experiences of Euro-Turks should be clearly communicated to Turks in Turkey. On the other hand, 
previous experience from the integration of Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece to the Union did not 
result in great flows of migration. In these cases, even reverse migration occurred.  
Figure 5.9 Would you recommend immigrating to Germany/France to those in Turkey?  
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It seems that the same kind of reverse migration could occur in the Turkish case. Around 30% of 
Euro-Turks reported that they would consider returning to Turkey if it were to join the Union (Figure 
5.10). This is an important challenge to the stereotypical judgment mentioned above. Furthermore, 
Euro-Turks do not recommend other Turks to migrate to the West (80% of German-Turks and 61% of 
French-Turks). 
Figure 5.10 Would you consider returning to Turkey if it joins the EU? 
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The data in Table 5.7 indicates that German-Turks born in Germany do not recommend immigrating 
to Germany to those living in Turkey if Turkey were to join the European Union. French-Turks born 
in France, however, hold the opposite view. It would appear that the younger generations of French-
Turks are rather more satisfied with the present situation in France than the German-Turks in 
Germany. 
Table 5.7 Would you recommend immigrating to Germany/France 
to those in Turkey? Birthplace? (cross-tabulation) (%) 
Birthplace    
   Turkey Germany France Total 
I would  21.7 21.8 55.0 22.3 
I wouldn’t  78.2 78.2 43.1 77.6 
It depends  0.2 0 1.8 0.2 
Total 100 100 100 100 
 
The data in Table 5.8 imply that Euro-Turks of every social status do not really recommend migration 
to EU member states to those in Turkey if it were to join the European Union. 
Table 5.8 Would you recommend immigrating to Germany/France to those in Turkey?  
Social status? (cross-tabulation) (%) 
Social status     
Highest  Upper    Upper-
  middle 
Middle    Lower-
  middle 
  Low  Lowest    Total 
I would  31.6  30.7  22.0 22.3 20.4 22.7 19.2  22.3 
I wouldn’t  67.1  69.0  77.7 77.6 79.5 77.1 80.8  77.6 
It depends  1.3  0.3  0.3 0.1 0.1 0.2 0  0.2 
Total 100  100  100 100 100 100 100  100 
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Chapter 6 
Building New Identities 
‘European’: A constant process of being and becoming 
Both the qualitative and quantitative data gathered in our research point to the fact that a concrete 
understanding of being European does not exist among the Euro-Turks. Further, the same observation 
may be made with regard to the receiving societies. There is no doubt that a deep-rooted sense of 
being European does not exist either among the majority of the public and actually an identity is 
ideologically being gradually constructed by the political elite of the European Union through 
education, European citizenship, and common history and future. The EU has clearly displayed a 
stronger political unity since the publication of the Tindemans Report on the European Union 1975 
(Leo Tindemans was Belgian Prime Minister at that time), which was submitted to the European 
Council at the end of December 1975. The report prompted member states to form a unified political 
entity with its own flag, anthem, myths, memories, peoples, regions, and rights and duties granted to 
citizens of the Union.
1 
The definition of a European is also dependent on class differences among the Euro-Turks. When 
members of the working class are asked about the term, their definitions usually accord with the 
dominant discourse in Turkey. These definitions include notions such as values, democracy, equality, 
human rights and modernisation in creating the main framework of ‘Europeanness’. Thus, being 
‘European’ addresses a teleological project that emphasises constant progress towards a target to be 
reached.  
On the other hand, some of the Euro-Turks among the middle classes state that they are not concerned 
with being defined as European, since they are already experiencing such an identity without the need 
to reach any prospective target. Those who engage in such a discourse are third- or fourth-generation 
youth (or both), mostly born in the country of settlement. Actually, the first and second generation 
among the middle-classes reproduce the dominant discourse in Turkey. But, the third- and fourth-
generation youngsters have developed a cosmopolitan identity that underlines differences, diversity 
and citizenship.  
A separate note is needed here to briefly summarise various discourses developed by the Euro-Turks 
in a retrospective way. Those first-generation migrants in the 1960s and 1970s developed a discourse 
revolving around economic issues. The second generation in the 1980s generated an ideological and 
political discourse originating from issues related to the homeland. Finally, third-generation Euro-
Turks have, since the 1990s, developed a culture-specific discourse – which stresses intercultural 
dialogue, symbolic and cultural capital, diversity, tolerance and multiculturalism. 
A final distinction between the middle class and the working class with regard to the definition of a 
European is that the middle class in general equates the attributes of being European with science, 
scientific thought, reason, trust, rules and rights. The working class associates it with qualities such as 
justice, law and equality.  
The data shown in Figure 6.1 reveals that Euro-Turks themselves confirm their hyphenated identities 
(Euro-Turks), amounting to 60% in Germany and 70% in France. Around 60% of German-Turks 
define themselves as either Turkish-European (50%) or European-Turkish (10%). Among the Euro-
Turks in France this ratio is 59% (Turkish-European) and 10% (European-Turkish). On the other hand, 
37% of German-Turks and 24% of French-Turks define themselves as ‘Turkish’. These findings differ 
from the survey findings discussed by H. Yılmaz (Bosphorus University) in his recent work entitled 
Euroscepticism in Turkey (2004).  
 
 
                                                 
1 For a detailed account of the Tindemans report, see Tindemans (1975); see also Maas (2004). 58 | KAYA & KENTEL 
 
Figure 6.1 Which identifications suit you most? 
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Table 6.1 indicates that young Euro-Turks primarily identify themselves with hyphenated identities 
such as European-Turkish or Turkish-European (75% in Germany and 85% in France). 
Table 6.1 Which identification suits you most? Birthplace? (cross-tabulation) (%) 
Birthplace    
   Turkey Germany  France  Total 
Only  Turkish  39.9 24.3 13.8  35.5 
First Turkish and then European  48.2  57.5  60.6  50.7 
First European and then Turkish   7.7  13.5  22.9  9.4 
Only  European  3.5 4.5 0.9  3.7 
No  reply  0.4 0.3 0.9  0.4 
None of the above  0.1  0  0.9  0.1 
Total    100 100 100  100 
 
The data in Table 6.2 show that Euro-Turks of higher social status stick to the hyphenated identities 
underlining the European element. On the other hand, those of lower social status underline their 
Turkishness. 
Table 6.2 Which identification suits you most? Social status? (cross-tabulation)(%) 
Social status   
      Highest     Upper    Upper-
   middle 
   Middle   Lower-
  middle 
   Low    Lowest  Total
Only Turkish  17.9  17.3 25.5 32.1 36.0 42.6  63.6  35.5 
First Turkish and 
then European 
59.6 63.1 58.0 52.8 51.9 42.8  32.9  50.7 
First European and 
then Turkish  
14.7 17.3 10.9 9.6 10.1 7.9  1.4 9.5 
Only European  7.1  1.7 4.9 4.6 1.9 6.1  2.1  3.8 
No reply  0  0 0.1 0.9 0.1 0.6  0  0.4 
None of the above  0.6  0.3 0.5 0 0 0  0  0.1 
Total 100  100 100 100 100 100  100  100 
 
Table 6.3 is comprised of the results of three different pieces of research undertaken in 2003 and 2004. 
The research on Euroscepticism in Turkey done by H. Yılmaz (2004) indicates that 54% of Turks in 
Turkey identify themselves as only Turkish, 30% as first Turkish-European, 5% as European-Turkish 
and 4% as European. Eurobarometer surveys imply that 38% of Germans and 35% of the French EURO-TURKS: A BRIDGE OR A BREACH BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE EU? | 59 
 
identify themselves with their nationality, while around 60% of both Germans and the French identify 
themselves with hyphenated identities such as German- or French-European or European-German or -
French. Euro-Turks do not differ from their fellows in terms of their hyphenated identities underlining 
the European element. 
Table 6.3 European and national identity  
Identity  Nationality  First nationality and 
then European 
First European and 
then nationality 
Only European 
Germans
a 38  45  10  4 
German-Turks
c 37  50  9  4 
Turks
b 54 30  5  4 
France
a 35 50  9  3 
French-Turks
c 24  59  11  4 
Sources: a) Eurobarometer (2003); b) Yilmaz (2004); c) own data. 
The sum of those defining themselves as German citizens, German-Turks, world citizens and EU 
citizens is actually quite high (27%) (Figure 6.2). This goes up to 47% among the French-Turks. The 
difference between those defining themselves as either German-Turks or French-Turks is worth 
mentioning here. Some 7% define themselves as German-Turks and 18% define themselves as French-
Turks. This is probably because of the definitions of a German or a French person. While being 
German is considered to be an ethnic nomination, being French is defined as a civic nomination that 
allows the inclusion of outsiders. Among the French-Turks civic identities are more emphasised (36% 
as Turkish citizens). This is around 24% for German-Turks. Figure 6.2 shows again that such 
definitions are subject to the dominant regimes of definitions by the majority constraints. 
Figure 6.2 Which one of the identities below defines you most (multi-response)? 
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Euro-Islam: Symbolic religiosity 
Islamic diasporic groups in the West, alienated by the system and swept up in a destiny dominated by 
the capitalist West, no longer invent local futures; what is different about them is that they remain tied 
to their traditional pasts, religions and ethnicities. Remaking or recovering the past serves at least a 
dual purpose for the diasporic communities. First, it is a way of coping with the conditions of the 
present without being very critical of the status quo. Second, it also helps to recuperate a sense of self 
not dependent on criteria handed down by others – the diasporic subjects can claim the past as their 
own. Hence, their growing affiliation with Islam, culture, authenticity, ethnicity, nationalism and 60 | KAYA & KENTEL 
 
tradition provides Euro-Turks or Euro-Muslims with the opportunity to establish solidarity networks. 
Such networks are bulwarks against the major clusters of modernity such as capitalism, industrialism, 
racism, surveillance, egoism, loneliness, insecurity, structural outsiderism and militarism. 
Accordingly, the Islamic revival emerges as a symptom – the outcome of certain processes of 
structural outsiderism.  
Islam is, by and large, considered and represented as a threat to the European way of life in the West. 
It is frequently believed that Islamic fundamentalism is the source of the xenophobic, racist and 
violent attitudes present. On the contrary, one of the main premises of this research is that religious 
resurgence is a symptom of illnesses brought about by various structural constraints such as 
unemployment, racism, xenophobia, exclusion and sometimes assimilation. If so, then in order to 
tackle such constraints, discourse on culture, identity, religion, ethnicity, traditions and the past 
becomes essential for minorities in general and migrant groups in particular. This is actually a form of 
politics generated by outsider groups.  
According to Alistair MacIntyre (1971) there are two forms of politics: the politics of those within and 
the politics of those excluded. Those within tend to employ legitimate political institutions (such as 
parliament, political parties and the media) in pursuing their goals and those excluded use culture, 
ethnicity, religion and tradition to pursue their aims. It should be noted here that MacIntyre does not 
place culture in the private space; culture is rather inherently located in the public space. Thus, the 
quest for identity, authenticity and religiosity should not be reduced to an attempt to essentialise the 
so-called ‘purity’. It is a form of politics generated by subordinated subjects. 
The intervention of Herbert Gans (1979) on the rise of symbolic ethnicity and religiosity is quite 
explanatory in this regard. According to Gans, symbolic ethnicity and religiosity are available to those 
who want to sporadically feel ethnic or religious, without being forced to act ethnically or religiously. 
The stress on ethnicity and religion is usually something adopted from parental culture as a part of 
negotiation with the majority society. The way the Euro-Turks employ ethnicity and religion as a 
source of identity is quite removed from being essentialist. This is a form of what Gans (1979, p. 6) 
calls ‘symbolic ethnicity’ or symbolic religiosity:  
[A]s the functions of ethnic cultures and groups diminish and identity becomes the primary way of 
being ethnic [and religious], ethnicity [and religiosity] take on an expressive rather than 
instrumental function in people’s lives, becoming more of a leisure-time activity and losing its 
relevance, say, to earning a living or regulating family life. Expressive behaviour can take many 
forms, but often involves the use of symbols – the symbols as signs rather than myths. Ethnic 
symbols are frequently individual cultural practices that are taken from the older ethnic culture; 
they are abstracted from that culture and pulled out of its original mooring, so to speak to become 
stand-ins for it. 
Recently, some Islamic-oriented movements (such as the Cojepiennes based in Strasbourg), have 
shown a determination to adapt to the Western way of life with their own identities. Such modern 
interpretations of Islam prove that Islam does not actually pose a threat to Western values; its main 
concern is actually to incorporate itself into the mainstream. 
Furthermore, Euro-Turks have raised concerns about so many elderly persons passing away last 
summer owing to the extraordinary heat that prevailed in both countries. Their common argument 
about the mortalities is that contemporary Western societies lack some essential values such as 
solidarity, respect for the elderly, family and warmth. They make it clear that Euro-Turks still maintain 
such values, which contributes to their difference vis-à-vis the majority societies in Germany and 
France.  
Both German-Turks and French-Turks define themselves with similar religious affiliations (Figure 
6.3). The fact that almost 6% of French-Turks define themselves as atheist is quite remarkable 
compared with German-Turks (less than 1%). Thus it seems that German-Turks have stronger 
religious affiliations. 
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Figure 6.3 Which of those below identifies you most in terms of your religious affiliation? 
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German-Turks generally define themselves as religious (33%), as patriots (22%), nationalists (17%), 
democrats (17%) and conservatives (17%). On the other hand, the French-Turks use the following 
identifications: nationalists (27%), Kemalists (21%), religious (21%), laicists (19%) and patriots 
(19%) (Figure 6.4). This shows that French-Turks are rather republican and unitarist, while German-
Turks are communitarian. 
Figure 6.4 How do you define yourself with regard to the identifications below (multi-
response)? 
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Approximately 7.5% of German-Turks and 10% of French-Turks define themselves as quite religious, 
a similar pattern to Turks in Turkey (89% of German-Turks and 80% of French-Turks are reported to 
be relatively faithful) (Figure 6.5). Some 2.4% of German-Turks and 10% of French-Turks seem to be 
either atheist or agnostic. 
Figure 6.5 How do you define yourself with regard to the following statements about your faith? 
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The cross-tabulation in Table 6.4 displays the correlation between birthplace and faith and indicates 
that religiosity is still dominant among German-Turks. Religious mobility is quite understandable in a 
country such as Germany, where religion is still a strong source of identification among the German 
people. Furthermore, German-Turks are primarily defined by their Islamic identity by the majority 
society. On the other hand, the secular and republican characteristics of French-Turks are prioritised 
by the French. Religiosity among the Euro-Turks is not an essentialised one, but a symbolic one. 
Symbolic religiosity is available to those who sporadically want to feel religious, without being forced 
to act religiously. As previously noted, the stress on religion is usually something adopted from 
parental culture as part of negotiation with the majority society. The manner in which Euro-Turks, 
especially German-Turks, employ religion as a source of identity is quite distant from being 
essentialist.  
Table 6.4 How do you define yourself with regard to the following statements about your faith? 
Birthplace? (cross-tabulation) (%) 
Birthplace    
   Turkey Germany France  Total 
Quite a religious person, fulfilling all the 
requirements of my faith  
9.3 2.8 5.5  7.7 
Someone trying to fulfil religious 
requirements  
53.5 51.9 57.8  53.0 
Faithful, but not fulfilling the religious 
requirements  
33.3 40.5 28.4  35.2 
Someone who doesn’t really believe in 
faith  
2.1 4.1 3.8  2.6 
Someone who does not have faith   1.8  0.7  2.9  1.5 
Total 100  100  100  100 
 
The cross-tabulation displaying the correlation between social status and faith indicates that religiosity 
increases among Euro-Turks of lower social status (Table 6.5). 
Table 6.5 How do you define yourself with the following statements regarding your faith? Social 
status? (cross-tabulation) (%) 
Social status     
   Highest Upper  Upper- 
middle 
Middle Lower- 
middle 
Low Lowest  Total 
Quite a religious person 
fulfilling all the 
requirements of my faith  
7.1 5.9 6.9 7.0 6.5  9.2  13.8  7.7 
Someone trying to fulfil 
religious requirements  
51.9 42.0 45.4 55.3 54.9  55.2 53.1  53.0 
Faithful, but not fulfilling 
religious requirements  
28.2 45.7 38.5 33.6 35.5  33.8 32.6  35.2 
Someone who doesn’t 
really believe in faith  
10.9 2.0 5.2 2.5 2.7  1.2 0.2  2.6 
Someone who does not 
have faith  
1.9 4.2 3.8 1.6 0.4  0.7 0.4  1.4 
Total  100 100 100 100 100  100 100  100 
 
French-Turks (72%) are much more secular than German-Turks (43%) (Figure 6.6). L’affaire du 
foulard [the headscarf controversy], however, vividly illustrated that the republican ideal does not 
necessarily support diversity. The French administration maintained that insofar as state-sponsored 
education is ‘secular’, schools could not allow religious expressions that might be construed as acts of EURO-TURKS: A BRIDGE OR A BREACH BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE EU? | 63 
 
promoting a particular religious belief. In 1994, this view became official governmental policy when 
the Minister of Education, Francois Bayrou, issued a blanket ban on headscarves. The clash of 
civilisations evident in this dispute made it apparent that the republican French civilisational project 
was not ready for multiculturalism, and was rather ontologically assimilationist (Kivisto, 2002 and 
Wieviorka, 1995). Multiculturalism is not generally regarded positively – citizenship means full 
membership of the French Republic and migrants are expected to become fully integrated/assimilated. 
Then it makes no sense to speak of minorities, since all are equally French according to official 
discourse (Schuster & Solomos, 2002, p. 47). 
Figure 6.6 Do you think religious and world affairs should be separate from each other? 
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The same question as in Figure 6.6 was posed in Turkey in a general survey in February 2000. Around 
73% of Turks reported their orientation as towards secularism, while 20% proclaimed a non-secular 
world view (Table 6.6). 
Table 6.6 Religious and world affairs should be separate from each other.  
Overall  Turkey 
  Count % 
Yes, they should be separate  2,302  73.3 
No, they cannot be separate    645  20.6 
No response  191  6.1 
Total 3,138  100 
Source: Public Survey in Turkey (February 2000), SAM. 
Religion vs. secularism: A safe haven on earth! 
Secularism has been a great concern of many nation-states since the absolutist tradition of the state 
became dominant in Europe in the 16
th century. Secularism is predominantly believed to be a modern 
invention vis-à-vis the divine authority. Nevertheless, there are claims opposing such a belief. John 
Gray, in his article “The Myth of Secularism”, asserts that liberal humanism, thus secularism, is “very 
obviously a religion – a shoddy derivative of Christian faith notably more irrational than the original 
article, and in recent times more harmful” (Gray, 2002, p. 69). Gray goes on to further argue that “the 
secular realm is a Christian invention. The biblical root of the secular state is the passage in the New 
Testament where Jesus urges his disciples to ‘give to God what is God’s and to Caesar what belongs to 
Caesar’” (Gray, 2002). Coming from the stoic tradition, Saint Augustine refined this thought in his 
book On the City of God in the 5
th century, in which he clearly differentiated between the city of God 
and the city of earth. This early Christian commandment is the ultimate origin of the liberal attempt to 
separate religion from politics. Hence, Gray believes that secularism is a neo-Christian cult. 64 | KAYA & KENTEL 
 
Secular societies usually believe that they have left religion behind and distanced politics from 
religion. This belief is again doubtful because what they have actually done is substitute one set of 
myths for another. The secular world view is simply the Christian view of the world with God left out 
and embroidered with science, liberalism, positivism, humanism, Darwinism and rationality. 
Contemporary modern societies are constantly exposed to such myths. ‘All men are created equal’ and 
‘everyone possesses human rights’ are just two of the proclamations of democratic liberalism. Such 
popular liberal declarations do not differ from verses in the Bible. By the same token, ‘freedom,’ 
‘democracy,’ ‘secularism,’ ‘liberalism,’ ‘multiculturalism’ and ‘diversity’ are the kinds of words 
constantly repeated like a mantra. The process of endless repetition of such words in the ideoscape has 
a religious connotation. Secularism is one of those words. Hence, it does not have to contradict 
religious faith; rather it overlaps with religion.  
The term secularism was coined around 1852 to describe an ideology organised to counter religious 
loyalties. The secularist ideology of the 19
th century should be analysed in line with other constitutive 
categories of the same age. These categories were defined in various terms by social scientists such as 
Auguste Comte, Ferdinand Tönnies, Ludwig Feurbach, Karl Marx, Herbert Spencer, Emile Durkheim, 
Marcel Mauss and Max Weber. In various combinations, these intellectuals envisaged a form of 
modern society centred on secular ideals, especially science, knowledge and human self-regulation, 
but not on religion. Thus, both secularism and religion suggest an alternative kind of society. While 
the former implies ‘turning towards this world’ and underlines temporality, the latter implies ‘extreme 
other-worldliness’ where the supernatural is given too much priority. At first glance, secularism and 
religion may seem to propose two radically distinct projections. Using a Durkheimian paradigm may 
break up this Cartesian binarism. Durkheim once remarked that what constitutes society is bound to be 
considered sacred. Hence, secularism is, in a way, constrained by what it aims at challenging, i.e. 
religion. Thus, aiming at another form of society vis-à-vis the religious one, secularism also turns out 
to be sacred. By the same token, secular political practices replacing religious ones are not construed 
anew, but rather subject to temporal realities made up by the same public who were previously 
governed by religious ideology. This is why secular political practices often simulate religious ones. 
The term ‘secularism’ designates the temporal world or the temporal aspect of reality. Secularism, in a 
way, suggests invading the realm of the sacred, the mystical and the religious. Thus, secularist 
ideology aims at constructing an autonomous subject, who is self-ruled and liberated from the grip of 
obscurantism. As phrased above, secularism implies turning towards this world but not the other 
world. What if there is no world of justice, equality, respect, love and fraternity in sight? Then people 
prefer turning towards the other world where they expect to find happiness. These two antithetical 
positions can also be expounded under the headings of ‘autonomy’ and ‘heteronomy’. 
The modern individual is subject to the major clusters of modernity such as capitalism, industrialism, 
racism, surveillance, egoism, loneliness, insecurity, structural outsiderism and militarism. It seems that 
these obstacles may be overcome through some solidarity networks. These solidarity networks may 
lead to two antithetical formations: autonomy and heteronomy. On the one hand, religious, ethnic and 
traditional community structures supply migrants with the necessary equipment to struggle against the 
destabilising effects of these challenges, in other words, to have a safe haven on earth. Such solidarity 
networks serve as a platform for migrants whereby they may perform a politics of identity, which 
corresponds to what Ulrich Beck (1992) calls ‘sub-politics’ or what Anthony Giddens (1994, pp. 14-
15) calls ‘life politics’. This provides migrants with a kind of politics through which they may 
emancipate themselves from the arbitrary hold of capitalism, poverty and material deprivation. Such 
politics of identity corresponds to a shield, which encourages migrants to develop their autonomy. The 
solidarity network formation may also be conceived of as a survival strategy for migrants against 
feelings of insecurity and loneliness. Thus, while the community formation, on the one hand, 
embodies the autonomous self, it also gives rise to what Zigmunt Bauman calls heteronomy in a way 
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Multiculturalism and interculturalism 
Multiculturalism became one of the most popular discourses in the West in the last quarter of the 20
th 
century. The ideology of multiculturalism aims at providing minority cultures with some platforms 
whereby they may express their identities through music, festivals, exhibitions, conferences, etc. Yet 
multiculturalism has lately been criticised by many scholars (Kaya, 2001, Russon, 1995, Radtke, 1994 
and Rosaldo, 1995). In fact, the representation of a wide variety of non-Western cultures in the form of 
music, plastic arts and seminars is nothing but the reconfirmation of the categorisation of ‘the West 
and the rest’. The representation of the cultural forms of those ‘exotic others’ in multicultural venues 
broadens the differences between the so-called ‘distinct cultures’. The ideology of multiculturalism 
tends to compartmentalise cultures. It also assumes that cultures are internally consistent, unified and 
structured wholes attached to ethnic groups. Essentialising the idea of culture as the property of an 
ethnic group, multiculturalism risks reifying cultures as separate entities by overemphasising their 
mutual ties and distinction; it also risks overemphasising the internal homogeneity of cultures in terms 
that potentially legitimise repressive demands for communal conformity. 
Constructed multiculturalism permits supposedly ‘distinct cultures’ to be expressed on some public 
platforms. The multiculturalist meta-narrative might, at first glance, seem to be a ‘friend’ as stated by 
J. Russon (1995, p. 524). In a way, these multicultural platforms hone the process of ‘othering the 
other’ in the imagery of self – in other words lead to a form of ethnic ‘exotification’. He explains that: 
Now, it is fairly common gesture, in the name of pluralism, to insist that we treat others as others, 
and accept their ways as, perhaps, ‘interesting’, ‘private’ to them, and especially not the same as 
ours. [T]his exotification which ‘tolerates the other’ is another product of the alienating gaze of the 
reflective ego, and it fails in two important ways. First, it makes the other a kind of lesser entity 
open to our patronising support, despite our complete rejection of its value as analysing other than 
the cute contingencies of someone else’s culture; thus there is an inherent power relation here in 
which the other is made subordinate to our benevolence and superior reason. Second, it fails to 
acknowledge that, just as our programme of tolerance has implications for the other – it contains 
that other in its view – so too does the ethnicity of the other contain us. Our so-called ‘democratic’ 
and pluralistic ideal is as much an ethnic expression as that of the other is an ethnicity. 
Russon’s remarks on ‘tolerance’ remind us of the way in which public and private spheres are highly 
differentiated by the ideology of multiculturalism. This ideology, as John Rex (1986) has described, 
involves nurturing commonality (shared laws, open economy and equal access to state provisions) in 
the former and ensuring freedom (maintenance of ethnic minority traditions) in the latter. Russon first 
prompts us to think that multiculturalism tends to promote the confinement of cultures in their own 
private spheres with a limited interaction with other cultures. The differentiation between public and 
private spheres has always contributed to the reinforcement of the dominant class or group’s 
hegemony over the subaltern groups. Cultures that hardly interact with other cultures tend to become a 
static heritage. Thus, Russon draws our attention to the point that the official discourse of 
multiculturalism contributes to the reification of culture by the minority communities. Second, he 
underlines the issue of power relations between the dominant culture and the others. This is the 
clientalist side of the policy of multiculturalism – a point to which we shall return shortly. Clientelism 
tends to petrify the existing social conditions without making any change in the power relations 
between ‘master’ and ‘disciple’.  
What Russon attempts to criticise in the notion of ‘tolerance’ is also raised by R. Rosaldo (1989, pp. 
198-204) in a slightly different way. Researching the correlation between culture and power, Rosaldo 
rightly claims that power and culture have a negative correlation. In saying so, he refers to the 
examples of the Philippines and Mexico. In these two countries, for instance, full citizens are those 
who have power and lack culture, whereas the most culturally endowed minorities, such as the 
Negritos and Indians, lack full citizenship and power respectively. Thus, having power corresponds to 
being post-cultural and vice versa: “the more power one has, the less culture one enjoys, and the more 
culture one has, the less power one yields. If they [minorities] have an explicit monopoly on authentic 
culture, we [the majority] have an unspoken one on institutional power” (1989, p. 202). Rosaldo takes 
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of the ‘self’. Thus, the policy of multiculturalism attempts to dissolve the self in the minority. 
Dissolution of the self is also related to the celebration of difference by minorities, as the notion of 
difference makes culture particularly visible to outside observers. Thus, not only multiculturalist 
policies, but also minorities themselves contribute to the process of dissolution of the self as well as 
institutional power within the minority. 
Lately, the discourse of ‘interculturalism’ has replaced that of multiculturalism. Interculturalism 
actually requires interaction and exchange between cultures, and it does not imprison cultures in their 
so-called ‘distinct’ spheres. Interculturalism seeks to challenge racism, xenophobia, heterophobia, 
nationalism and ethnocentrism. Hence, we have also tried to understand the ways in which Euro-Turks 
are oriented to both discourses. Our results demonstrate that Euro-Turks are indeed oriented to both. 
But they affirm interculturalism (87%) more than they do multiculturalism (66%).  
Euro-Turks predominantly argue that they are mostly in favour of a multiculturalist setting (65% of 
German-Turks and 79% of French-Turks). As is known, however, recently multicultural policies have 
been severely criticised in the West. The ideology of multiculturalism tends to compartmentalise 
cultures. It also assumes that cultures are internally consistent, unified and structured wholes attached 
to ethnic groups. Essentialising the idea of culture as the property of an ethnic group, multiculturalism 
risks reifying cultures as separate entities by overemphasising their mutual ties and distinction; it also 
risks overemphasising the internal homogeneity of cultures in terms that potentially legitimise 
repressive demands for communal conformity. This is why interculturalism discourse seems to replace 
multiculturalism. Figure 6.7 indicates that Euro-Turks are inherently in favour of intercultural dialogue 
(86% of German-Turks and 90% of French-Turks). This majority view is parallel to what the 
progressive political elite are trying to construct in the West. Thus, it is clear that Euro-Turks neither 
want to pose a challenge to European societies nor want to see European societies as challenges. 
Figure 6.8 indicates that Euro-Turks are ready to invest in their similarities with the majority societies 
more than in their differences. 
Figure 6.7 Nobody should adapt to others; everyone should have his/her way 
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Figure 6.8 Both groups should interact with each other to find similarities 
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The competence of Euro-Turks in foreign languages also differs in the two countries (Figure 6.9). A 
great number of German-Turks are reported as having English as their second foreign language (36%). 
This number is only 24% in France. Furthermore, this figure seems to demonstrate that German-Turks 
are relatively more open to the outside world compared with French-Turks, despite their 
communitarian affiliations. This highlights the need to redefine the concept of communitarianism, 
which does not necessarily refer to the closure of communities. 
Figure 6.9 What is your second spoken language? 
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‘Imported’ brides and bridegrooms from Turkey 
One significant issue among Euro-Turks is the increasing number of marriages with partners from 
Turkey. Lately, there has been a growing tendency for some Euro-Turkish families to favour marrying 
their children to partners brought from Turkey. Such partners are known as ‘imported’ brides or 
bridegrooms. These marriages are usually arranged marriages preferred by conservative families. 
Brides from Turkey are chosen as they are believed to be more culturally pure and thus capable of 
raising better-educated children. On the other hand, bridegrooms are usually chosen from among those 
candidates who fit into the occupational prospects of the extended family in question. Marriage, for 
such families, seems to be associated with a traditional meaning: as a purely economic institution or as 
a child-bearing institution. Figures 6.10 and 6.11 indicate that German-Turks (21%) are more against 
arranged marriages from Turkey than French-Turks (17%). There may be several explanations for this, 
one of which may be that German-Turks are more self-sufficient, with their own community settings 
going back almost 50 years. Meanwhile, French-Turks still prefer to be culturally inspired by Turkey. 
Figure 6.10 Are you in favour of or against arranged marriages for Turkish  
men with partners from Turkey? 
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Figure 6.11 Are you in favour of or against arranged marriages for Turkish 
women with partners from Turkey? 
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Marrying someone from Turkey certainly points to the willingness of migrant families to remain in 
touch with Turkey as well to the protection of cultural values such as honour. Honour is not only an 
individual value, but also something social and communal. Cultural values such as honour become a 
source of distinction and difference in a remote land where the diasporic individual encounters the 
other. Honour and resistance to intermarriage could also mean a counterattack on assimilation, 
especially in France. Marrying someone from Turkey not only functions as a tool for keeping culture 
intact, but also as a tool for sustaining immigration (Bozarslan, 1996). On the other hand, imported 
brides and grooms may also provide the migrants with the opportunity to generate strong families in 
which one of the spouses is likely to have a dependence on the other because of a lack of competence 
in the language and culture of the majority society. Claire Autant and Véronique Manry (1998, p. 73) 
claim that French-Turkish women are reluctant when their parents decide to marry them to a man from 
Turkey, even though marrying him could provide them with some advantages, such as the husband 
becoming dependent on the bride owing to a lack of competence in French and the loosening of 
parental authority from both sides. Gaby Strasburger (2004) has also claimed that the issue of parental 
suppression is relevant to a certain degree among Euro-Turks; apart from exceptional cases of 
suppression, young people decide mainly of their free will to marry someone from their country of 
origin. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
his research has unearthed a number of findings, some of which are listed below. Euro-Turks 
have constructed reflexive identities in a way that contributes to the redefinition of being 
European, German and French. This report espouses that Euro-Turks have individually and 
collectively, through new forms of communitarianism, constructed their identities in interaction with 
the majority societies where they live.  
The research, at this stage, also reveals that there are three major groups of Euro-Turks emerging in 
the migratory process:  
1)  Bridging groups (more than 40%) 
•  those who are equally affiliated with both the homeland and ‘host-land’ – young generations 
with cosmopolitan and syncretic cultural identities (multilingual) fall into this category; 
•  those who are also affiliated with both the homeland and host-land, and who construct a 
dynamic transnational space combining Turkey and Germany/France, such as the Euro-
Muslims (e.g. Cojepiennes in France and MUSIAD in Germany); 
•  those who have hyphenated and multiple identities without essentialising any particular 
political, religious, ethnic or racial definition; 
2)  Breaching groups (around 40%) 
•  those who still have a strong orientation to the homeland, including extreme religious, 
nationalist and laicist persons/groups (the latter comprising less than 40%); 
3)  Assimilated groups (around 20%) 
•  those who have assimilated into the majority societies (who are also usually more prosperous). 
Euro-Turks demonstrate the fact that Europeanness is not a prescribed identity, but an ongoing process 
of being and becoming. Thus, Euro-Turks contribute to the redefinition of the EU and being European 
with their own social, political, cultural and economic identities. Needless to say, these categorisations 
are subject to change in the course of the research.  
This research has revealed that there are quite a number of migrants of Turkish origin in the West who 
do not fit into the category of a stereotypical ‘Turk’. The proportion of Euro-Turks in this category is 
around 40%. But it has also been concluded that the majority of Euro-Turks have become politically, 
socially, economically and culturally integrated and active agents in their countries of settlement. 
Around 20% have actually assimilated into the receiving society. On the other hand, 40% have 
generated a way of life embracing both the homeland and host-land in a manner that forms a bridge 
between the two. Other essential findings of the research include: 
i)  Ethnic/religious/cultural revival among the Euro-Turks can be interpreted as a quest for justice 
and fairness, and not as a security challenge. The research reveals that Euro-Turks do not pose a 
threat to the political and social systems of their countries of settlement, but rather are willing to 
incorporate themselves into the system. It is commonly known that western European states, 
generally speaking, have the tendency to regard Islam as a threat to their national security. Yet the 
research shows that orientation towards Islam among the Euro-Turks could also be regarded as a 
quest for justice and fairness. Accordingly, this work presents some of the relevant qualitative and 
quantitative data gathered on this point during the research, leading in the end to the proposal that 
EU states should set aside the security discourse and become engaged in a justice discourse in 
their responses to minority claims.
1  
                                                 
1 This classification is made by Will Kymlicka (2002) to refer to the ways in which the demands of minority 
groups have been identified in western and Eastern European countries. He claims that western European 
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ii)  The power of fear. Categorising migration together with drug trafficking, human trafficking, 
international criminality and terrorism, countries in the West tend to promote the fear of 
migration and ‘others’. The securitisation of migration has become a vital issue after September 
11
th. States seem to employ the discourse of securitisation as a political technique with a capacity 
to politically integrate a society by staging a credible existential threat in the form of an internal 
or external enemy. The popularity of the claim that the EU will encounter an influx of migration 
from Turkey when it joins the Union illustrates such a politically and socially constructed fear. It 
should not be forgotten that the same fear had also been raised when Spain, Portugal and Greece 
joined the Union. What happened in those cases was reverse migration. It is notable that 30% of 
the Euro-Turks report that they would consider returning to Turkey if it were to join the European 
Union. The rise of the number of the EU citizens buying property in Turkey is another point to 
take into consideration. Turkey has lately become an attractive destination for EU citizens to live 
for good. 
iii)  Germany has a culturalist and differentialist incorporation regime and France has a universalist 
and assimilationist one. German incorporation policies vis-à-vis migrants have so far been 
culturalist and communitarian. Interpretation of culturalist discourse by conservatives (CDU-
CSU) in Germany has brought about segregationist Gastarbeiter policies imprisoning migrants 
into ghettoes or colonies. Yet a reading of the same culturalist discourse by the Social Democrats 
(SPD) and Greens (Grünnen) in the last few years results in a more integrationist and liberal set 
of policies. French universalism and republicanism, on the other hand, has recently been accused 
of being assimilationist by the French-Turks. 
iv)  Communitarianism in contemporary Germany seems to provide the German-Turks with a more 
liberal ground whereby they can politically, socially, culturally and economically integrate into 
mainstream society. The data gathered by the structured interviews indicate that German-Turks, 
generally speaking, are more communitarian, religious and conservative than French-Turks. 
Compared with French-Turks, German-Turks seem to be less in favour of integration, as they are 
content with their ethnic enclaves, religious archipelagos and traditional solidarity networks. 
Other findings in the research, however, indicate the converse. Although when compared with 
German-Turks, French-Turks seem to engage more in the modern way of life, orienting 
themselves towards integration, French language, secularism, laicism and the French media on 
the one hand, they are less engaged in French domestic politics, political parties, the Internet, 
theatres and cinemas. Nevertheless, German-Turks seem to generate more cosmopolitan, hybrid, 
global and reflexive identities in a way that redefines being European, which is actually subject to 
constant change. Thus, the experiences of German-Turks actually seem to indicate that Islam does 
not necessarily contradict being European nor the concepts of cosmopolitanism, modernity or 
globalism. 
v)  Liberal citizenship regimes are more welcome by migrants and their children. Western 
democracies and citizenship regimes seem to fail in treating minority claims as a quest for justice. 
As Kymlicka and Norman stated, “immigrant groups that feel alienated from the larger national 
and [religious] identity are likely to be alienated from the political arena as well” (2000, p. 39). 
Traditional citizenship rhetoric is inclined to advance the interests of the dominant national group 
at the expense of migrants. Hence, it is unlikely that the classical understanding of citizenship can 
resolve issues of the co-existence of ‘culturally discrete’ entities. In order to avoid potential 
conflict and alienation, there is an essential task to be undertaken: citizenship laws must not be 
based on prescribed cultural, religious, linguistic or ethnic qualities. Moderate and democratic 
citizenship laws that are formulated in line with the task stated above can be anticipated to resolve 
the emphasis made on ethnicity, religiosity and nationality by migrant groups.  
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vi)  Hyphenated identities characterise many of the Euro-Turks. The data indicate that a number of 
Euro-Turks identify themselves with hyphenated (multiple) identities such as French-Muslim-
Turkish and German-Muslim-Turkish. What is remarkable here is that political identity comes 
before religious and ethnic identities. 
vii)   Migration, ethnicity, identity, Islam and culture have become embroiled in the politics of security 
in the West. The politics of security have become remarkably salient among majority societies in 
a way that leads to the misjudgement of prevailing problems of unemployment, racism, poverty, 
xenophobia and violence. The politics of security seems to be endorsed by states in order to 
sustain governmentality. Migration issues should be de-securitised.  
viii) Euro-Turks have by and large been misrepresented in the media. The representation of Euro-
Turks in the media has been characterised by strong clichés and stereotypes. Those Euro-Turks 
who do not fit into the stereotypical ‘Turkish’ image are not represented enough in the media. 
Stereotypes reiterate ethnic, cultural and religious boundaries between groups. There are a large 
number of migrants of Turkish origin who challenge such boundaries. 
ix)  Euro-Islam does not contradict the Western way of life. Euro-Islam, as it is practiced among most 
of the Euro-Turks, is essentially separate from the fundamentalist Wahabi version of Islam. Euro-
Islam is closer to the Anatolian Islam, which has always been exposed to external influences. 
Euro-Islam is not essentialist and has the capacity for interaction with Judeo-Christian lifestyles. 
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Annex 
Table A.1 Frequency results of the surveys in Germany and France 
 Questions  Germany  France  Total 
     % %  % 
I.1  In which region is the questionnaire being conducted?         
  1   Ille de France   –  35.3  3.3 
  2   Centre   –  6.7  0.6 
  3   Rhone-Alpes   –  24.8  2.3 
  4   Franche-Comté   –  6.0  0.6 
  5   Alsace   –  17.5  1.7 
  6   Lorraine   –  9.7  0.9 
  7   Niedersachsen-Bremen  7.7  –  7.0 
  8   Nordrhein–Westfalen  35.8   –  32.4 
  9   Hessen  11.4   –  10.3 
  10 Baden–Württemberg  21.9   –  19.8 
  11 Bayern  17.3   –  15.6 
  12 Berlin  6.0   –  5.4 
 Total  100  100  100 
       
I.2.D.4  Sex of the respondent?            
 1    Female  45.2  47.2  45.4 
  2  Male  54.8  52.8  54.6 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
I.3.D.5 Age?         
 1)    15-19  12.2  10.8  12.1 
 2)    20-29  27.9  26.3  27.7 
 3)    30-39  24.8  28.2  25.1 
 4)    40-49  11.2  15.2  11.6 
 5)    50+  23.9  19.5  23.5 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
I.4.a  Country/countries of education?         
  1    Turkey  65.4  72.2  66.1 
  2    Germany  54.2  0.3  49.1 
  3    France  0.1  43.0  4.1 
  4    Others  1.2  0.8  1.2 
 96    Illiterate  2.7  2.5  2.7 
 Total  100  100  100 
         
I.4.b  In which country did you complete your education last?         
  1    Turkey  43.2  54.3  44.2 
  2    Germany  53.5  0.2  48.5 
  3    France  –  42.3  4.0 
  4    Others  0.6  0.8  0.6 
 96    Illiterate  2.7  2.5  2.7 
 Total  100  100  100 
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I.5  What schools have you completed?        
  1    Illiterate  1.7  2.5  1.8 
  2    Never completed a school  2.2  3.0  2.2 
  3    Primary school (TR)  60.3  36.3  58.0 
  4    Secondary school (TR)  32.9  14.5  31.1 
  5    High school (TR)  16.4  10.7  15.9 
  6    Occupational school (TR)  4.3  2.3  4.1 
  7    University-level (TR)  4.2  6.0  4.4 
  8    Master/doctorate (TR)  –  0.2  0.0 
  9    Kein Schulabschluss/no diploma (GER)  0.4  –  0.3 
  10  Grundschule (GER)  36.9  –  33.4 
  11  Hauptschule (GER)  27.9  –  25.3 
  12  Realschule-Mittlere Reife (GER)  16.8  –  15.2 
  13  Fachoberschule-Berufskolleg (GER)  3.8  –  3.5 
  14  Fachabitur (GER)  4.3  –  3.9 
  15  Abitur (GER)  7.4  –  6.7 
  16  Anderer Abschluss (GER)  1.8  –  1.6 
  17  Abgeschlossene Berufsausbildung (GER)  8.1  –  7.3 
  18  Fachhochschule (GER)  1.5  –  1.4 
  19  Universität (GER)  3.7  –  3.3 
  20  Postgraduierten-Abschluss (GER)  0.3  –  0.3 
  21  Ecole primaire (FR)  –  1.3  0.1 
  22  Collège (FR)  –  8.7  0.8 
  23  Lycée general (FR)  –  4.3  0.4 
  24  Lycée technique (FR)  –  3.5  0.3 
  25  Lycée professional (FR)  –  17.3  1.6 
  26  Deug (FR)  –  4.3  0.4 
  27  Licence (FR)  –  1.5  0.1 
  28  Maitrise (FR)  –  1.0  0.1 
  29  DEA or higher (FR)  –  1.5  0.1 
  30  Primary school (another country, AC)  0.4  0.2  0.4 
  31  Secondary school (AC)  0.3  0.3  0.3 
  32  High school (AC)  0.2  –  0.2 
  33  Occupational school (AC)  0.2   –  0.2 
  34  University-level (AC)  0.5  0.3  0.5 
  35  Master/doctorate (AC)  –   0.2  0.0 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
I.6.D.10 Present  job  status?         
  1  Regular salaried worker   32.8  35.8  33.1 
  2  Temporarily waged worker  2.0  8.5  2.6 
  3  Self-employed   4.2  10.3  4.8 
  4  Presently unemployed, receiving unemployment benefit   10.7  5.0  10.2 
  5  Presently unemployed, not receiving unemployment benefit 11.5  2.5  10.7 
  6  Political asylum, receiving state benefit   0.2  –  0.2 
  7  Retired, not working   9.0  4.5  8.6 
 8    Student  6.5  7.5  6.6 
 9    Housewife  23.1  25.8  23.4 
 Total  100  100  100 
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D.11  (If he/she works) Occupational status? (If he/she doesn’t work) What was 
the latest job you were doing? 
       
  1    Never worked before  1.5  12.0  2.5 
  2    Student  5.0  7.2  5.2 
  3    Housewife  8.5  3.7  8.1 
  4    Foreman  16.1  21.8  16.6 
  5    Tradesman, craftsman  3.1  1.2  2.9 
  6    Worker (uncertain)  1.5  3.2  1.7 
  7    Civil servant (non-managerial)  2.0  0.5  1.8 
  8    Teacher/academic  1.1  0.8  1.1 
  9    Cook, waiter, worker in bakery/restaurant (barman, barmaid)  2.9  1.8  2.8 
  10  Clerk, master-builder, cashier, delivery worker, florist  3.2  2.7  3.1 
  11  Cleaning worker, gatekeeper, watchman, doorman, gardener, day worker  4.9  2.8  4.7 
  12  Waged driver  2.1  1.0  2.0 
  13  Accounting director, accounting chief, accounting staff (waged) 0.6  0.7  0.6 
  14  Street-seller  0.3  0.3  0.3 
  15  Contractor, owner of factory/atelier, employer  0.1  2.5  0.3 
  16  Nurse, health-sector employees  2.3  1.0  2.2 
  17  Worker in the repair shops (auto-repair, carpenter, installer)  1.4  0.2  1.3 
  18  Freelance driver (taxi, truck, pickup)  0.5  0.2  0.4 
  19  Mid-rank manager in public sector/municipality (director/assist. director)  0.2  0.2  0.2 
  20  Waged professional  1.9  –  1.7 
  21  Farmer   –  1.8  0.2 
  23  Family work  1.5  0.2  1.4 
  24  Waged craftsmen such as a barber, hairdresser, tailor   2.8  2.7  2.8 
  25  Building or road worker, seasonal worker  2.5  20.3  4.2 
  26  Bodyguard, security workers  0.4   –  0.3 
  19  Mid-level manager in the private sector (director/assist. director)  1.0  0.2  1.0 
  28  Merchant  0.5  0.5  0.5 
  29  Employee in a private company (without managerial skills)  2.8  2.3  2.8 
  30  Secretary, receptionist 1.6 1.2  1.6 
  31  Sales and marketing employee  2.6  –   2.4 
  32  Technician  2.6  0.5  2.4 
  33  Manufacturer, employer in textile sector  0.3  1.0  0.3 
  34  Operator, printer  0.8  0.3  0.7 
  36  Professional   1.0  0.2  1.0 
  37  Freelance accountant, financial consultant  0.2   –  0.2 
  39  Musician (opera), actor (theatre)  0.1  0.5  0.1 
  40  Electrician  0.3  0.7  0.3 
  41  Real estate agent  0.5  0.2  0.4 
 42    Architect  –  0.5  0.0 
  43  Fashion designer  –  0.5  0.0 
  44  Ironing work in a home  –  0.3  0.0 
  45  Repairman  –  0.3  0.0 
  46  Imam (prayer)  –  0.2  0.0 
  47  Chemist  0.5  –  0.4 
  48  Owner of a taxi/taxi rank   0.1  –  0.1 
  49  Conductor  0.2  0.2  0.2 
  50  Restaurant owner  –  0.8  0.1 
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 53    Volunteer  0.2  0.3  0.2 
  54  Forester   –  0.2  0.0 
  55  Translator  0.1  –  0.1 
  56  Railway worker  0.1  –  0.1 
 57    Advertising  0.1  –  0.1 
  58  Welder  0.5  –   0.4 
  97  No answer  17.7  0.2  16.1 
 Total  100  100  100 
       
D.12  Place of birth?      
  1  Born in Turkey  72.5  80.8  73.3 
  2  Born in Germany  27.1  1.0  24.7 
  3  Born in France   –  18.2  1.7 
  4  Born in another European country   0.2  –   0.2 
  5  Born in another country outside Europe  0.2   –  0.2 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.13  The place of birth in Turkey?         
 1.  Kayseri 6.3  8.0  6.5 
 2.  Ankara 5.4  4.5  5.3 
 3.  Trabzon 5.7  1.0  5.2 
 4.  Sivas 5.3  2.3  5.0 
 5.  İstanbul 4.5  6.4  4.7 
 6.  Konya 3.5  6.0  3.8 
 7.  Yozgat 3.6  5.2  3.8 
 8.  Aksaray 4.0  1.4  3.7 
 9.  Samsun 2.8  1.4  2.7 
 10.  Çorum 2.6  0.8  2.4 
 11.  Bayburt 2.5  1.0  2.3 
 12.  İzmir 2.3  1.6  2.3 
 13.  Nevşehir 2.2  3.3  2.3 
 14.  Kütahya 2.3  0.2  2.1 
 15.  Ordu 1.9  2.5  2.0 
 16.  Kırşehir 1.6  3.5  1.8 
 17.  Malatya 1.9  1.0  1.8 
 18.  Erzurum 1.8  1.0  1.7 
 19.  Kahramanmaraş 1.3  4.9  1.7 
 20.  Adana 1.7  0.4  1.6 
 21.  Adapazarı 1.8  0.2  1.6 
 22.  Afyon 1.4  2.1  1.5 
 23.  Karaman 1.2  3.9  1.5 
 24.  Denizli 1.3  2.5  1.4 
 25.  Gümüşhane 1.4  0.8  1.4 
 26.  Kars 1.3  1.9  1.4 
 27.  Bursa 1.4  0.6  1.3 
 28.  Gaziantep 1.3  1.4  1.3 
 29.  Eskişehir 1.2  0.8  1.1 
 30.  Uşak 1.2  0.8  1.1 
 31.  Tunceli 0.9  1.4  1.0 
 32.  Artvin 0.9  0.8  0.9 80 | KAYA & KENTEL 
 
 33.  Niğde 1.0  0.2  0.9 
 34.  Şanlıurfa 0.9  0.8  0.9 
 35.  Tokat 1.0  0.2  0.9 
 36.  Kastamonu 0.8  0.8  0.8 
 37.  Bolu 0.8  –  0.7 
 38.  Mersin 0.8  0.2  0.7 
 39.  Muş, 0.6  0.8  0.7 
 40.  Rize 0.8  –    0.7 
 41.  Sinop 0.6  1.2  0.7 
 42.  Amasya 0.6  0.4  0.6 
 43.  Elazığ 0.1  4.9  0.6 
 44.  Erzincan 0.5  1.0  0.6 
 45.  Giresun 0.6  0.2  0.6 
 46.  Isparta 0.4  2.3  0.6 
 47.  Zonguldak 0.6  0.4  0.6 
 48.  Ağrı 0.5  –  0.5 
 49.  Antalya 0.4  1.4  0.5 
 50.  Ardahan 0.5  0.2  0.5 
 51.  Aydın 0.4  1.4  0.5 
 52.  Diyarbakır 0.5    –  0.5 
 53.  Edirne 0.5  0.4  0.5 
 54.  Kocaeli 0.5  0.2  0.5 
 55.  Manisa 0.5    –  0.5 
 56.  Mardin 0.5    –  0.5 
 57.  Balikesir 0.4  0.4  0.4 
 58.  Karabük 0.3  1.4  0.4 
 59.  Adıyaman 0.3  0.4  0.3 
 60.  Bartın 0.3  0.2  0.3 
 61.  Batman 0.4  –    0.3 
 62.  Bingöl 0.3  0.2  0.3 
 63.  Burdur     0.3  0.6  0.3 
 64.  Çanakkale 0.3  0.4  0.3 
 65.  Iğdır 0.3  0.2  0.3 
 66.  Kırıkkale 0.3  0.6  0.3 
 67.  Çankırı   –  2.3  0.2 
 68.  Hatay 0.1  1.0  0.2 
 69.  Muğla 0.3  –  0.2 
 70.  Van 0.3  –  0.2 
 71.  Yalova 0.3  –  0.2 
 72.  Bilecik 0.1  –  0.1 
 73.  Hakkari 0.1  –  0.1 
 74.  Kırklareli 0.1  –  0.1 
 75.  Şırnak 0.1  –  0.1 
 76.  Tekirdağ 0.1  0.2  0.1 
 77.  Osmaniye –    0.2  0.0 
 No  answer  2.1  0.4  1.9 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.14  The place of birth in Turkey?         
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  2    District/town  40.3  32.8  39.5 
  3    Village  28.1  31.5  28.5 
  97  No answer  5.4   –  4.9 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
I.8.D.15  (If she/he was born in Turkey) At what age did you leave Turkey?       
 0-9  15.4 18.2  16.7 
 10-19  32.6  26.8  30.9 
 20-29  41.7  40.4  41.6 
 30-39  8.8  11.2  9.1 
 40-49  1.0  2.6  1.1 
 50+  0.4 0.2  0.4 
  97  No answer  0.1  0.6  0.2 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.16  How many years have you been living outside Turkey?         
 0-9  13.2 16.8  13.5 
 10-19  27.8  28.9  28.0 
 20-29  36.1  36.7  36.1 
 30-39  22.6  14.7  22.0 
 50+  0.2 0.2    0.2 
  97  No answer  0.1  2.7  0.2 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.17  How many years have you been living in this country?         
 0-9  13.6 16.8  13.8 
 10-19  25.8  29.2  26.2 
 20-29  35.4  36.7  35.5 
 30-39  23.4  13.9  22.6 
 40-  above  1.7  1.1  1.6 
  97  No answer  0.1  2.3  0.3 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
I.9.D.18  Is there anybody in your family who preceded your coming here?       
  1  No, I am the first to come   17.1  24.5  17.8 
 2    Yes  82.9  75.2  82.2 
  9  No answer   –  0.3  0.0 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.19  Who was the first person to come in your family?         
 1    Grandparents  9.1  4.4  8.7 
 2    Parents  60.7  49.7  59.7 
  3  Partner          19.5  23.3  19.8 
  4  Other relatives  17.7  22.6  18.1 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
I.10.D.20  What were the reasons for coming here?         
  1  Came to work  21.1  28.5  21.8 
  2  Came for education  6.2  3.0  5.9 
  3  Born and raised here  26.2  16.5  25.3 82 | KAYA & KENTEL 
 
  4  Came to marry (my partner was living here)  23.2  27.5  23.6 
  5  Came for political reasons  1.6  3.5  1.8 
  6  Came for family-unification  20.9  22.5  21.1 
  7  Tourist trip  1.6  1.5  1.6 
  8  Problems in Turkey  –  0.7  0.0 
  9  No answer  –  0.2  0.0 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
I.11 Marital  status?         
  1  Married  67.1  70.0  67.4 
  2  Cohabitating  0.8  2.5  1.0 
 3    Single  27.1  22.2  26.7 
  4  Widow, divorced  4.9  5.3  4.9 
 Total  100 100  100 
          
I.12  (If married or cohabitating) Is your partner Turkish?          
 1    Turkish  93.9  92.4  93.8 
 2    German  5.7  0.2  5.1 
 3    French  0.1  6.2  0.7 
  4  From other European countries       –   0.9  0.1 
  5  From somewhere outside Europe    0.3  0.2  0.3 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
I.13  Do you have children? If so, how many?         
 0    No  35.3  32.5  35.0 
 1  10.9 9.2  10.7 
 2  18.3 15.8  18.1 
 3  17.4 18.8  17.5 
 4  10.3 13.8  10.7 
  5 and more  7.9  9.9  8.1 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
I.14  How many persons are living in your household (including you)?         
 1  5.7 9.3  6.1 
 2  16.4 15.5  16.3 
 3  21.6 15.5  21.0 
 4  26.0 22.7  25.7 
 5  18.2 23.2  18.7 
 6  8.0 9.3  8.1 
  7 and more  4.0  4.3  4.1 
  99  No answer  –   0.2  0.0 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
I.15  Do you own the house you live in?         
  1  Yes, it is my property  12.4  24.7  13.6 
  2  It is rented property  84.5  68.7  83.0 
  3  It belongs to the family, paying no rent   2.9  4.8  3.1 
 4    Lodging  0.2  1.8  0.3 
 Total  100  100  100 
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I.16.D.27  How many m
2 is your house?         
  1  Smaller than 50 m
2   10.1  14.8  10.6 
  2  50-74 m
2 36.2  25.8  35.3 
  3  75-99 m
2 35.7  35.8  35.7 
  4  100-124 m
2 11.9  13.8  12.1 
  5  125-150 m
2 4.3  5.7  4.4 
  6  Larger than 150 m
2 1.7  3.8  1.9 
  9  No answer   –  0.2  0.0 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
I.17.D.28  Do you own property in Turkey?         
 1    No  34.3  20.8  33.0 
 2    Yes  65.7  79.2  67.0 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
E.29  What kind of property do you own in Turkey?         
  1   Apartment flat or house   87.9  83.8  87.4 
  2   Summer cottage   11.0  13.5  11.3 
  3   Store  9.2  9.3  9.2 
  4   Field  45.9  46.7  46.0 
  99 No answer   –  0.4  0.0 
          
I.18.D.30  Do you have a car?         
 1    Yes  100  100  100 
 2    No  60.6  68.5  61.3 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
I.19A) D.31  Level of language skills in speaking/understanding Turkish?       
 1    Little  0.9  0.2  0.9 
  2  Middle  10.1  6.5  9.8 
 3    Good  40.4  24.3  38.9 
  4  Very good  48.5  67.8  50.4 
  5  Not at all  –   1.2  0.1 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.32  Level of language skills in reading/writing Turkish?         
 1    Little  4.0  3.3  4.0 
  2  Middle  12.5  10.0  12.3 
 3    Good  39.0  22.5  37.4 
  4  Very good  43.8  60.5  45.3 
  5  Not at all  0.8  3.7  1.0 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
B)D.33  Level of language skills in speaking/understanding German/French?         
 1    Little  15.9  18.8  16.1 
  2  Middle  24.8  24.2  24.7 
 3    Good  29.5  20.3  28.6 
  4  Very good  29.8  34.2  30.2 
  5  Not at all  0.1  2.5  0.3 
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D.34  Level of language skills in reading/writing German/French?         
 1    Little  19.4  26.8  20.1 
  2  Middle  23.2  18.3  22.7 
 3    Good  27.8  15.5  26.6 
  4  Very good  28.7  31.5  29.0 
  5  Not at all  0.8  7.8  1.5 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
C)D.35  What is the other language you know best?         
  0    None  57.0  61.0  57.4 
  1    English  35.7  23.5  34.6 
  2    German   –  6.7  0.6 
  3    French  1.2   –  1.1 
  4    Kurdish  2.6  3.5  2.7 
  5    Others  3.5  5.3  3.6 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.36  What is your skill level in the other language in speaking/understanding?         
  1   Little  24.7  23.9  24.6 
  2   Middle  41.3  42.7  41.4 
  3   Good  27.1  20.1  26.5 
  4   Very good  6.8  13.2  7.3 
  99 No answer  0.2   –  0.2 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.37  What is your skill level in the other language in reading/writing?         
  1   Little  24.9  26.1  25.0 
  2   Middle  39.1  35.0  38.7 
  3   Good  27.1  22.6  26.7 
  4   Very good  7.4  10.3  7.7 
  5   Not at all   –  6.0  0.5 
  99 No answer  1.5   –  1.4 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
I.20.D.38  How are your socio-economic conditions compared to your parents?       
  1  Much worse  3.2  1.8  3.1 
 2    Worse  17.1  10.3  16.5 
  3  The same  19.8  16.8  19.5 
  4  Better  46.4  54.3  47.1 
  5  Much better  13.5  16.7  13.8 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
I.21.D.39  How are your recent socio-econ. conditions compared to the last decade?      
  1   Much worse  5.4  2.8  5.2 
  2   Worse  31.7  15.8  30.2 
  3   The same  18.9  15.3  18.5 
  4   Better  35.0  46.2  36.1 
  5   Much better  8.9  19.7  9.9 
  99 No answer  –   0.2  0.0 
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I.22.D.40  Monthly income of the household?         
  1   Less than €1000  20.8  15.2  20.2 
  2   €1001–1500   28.7  30.7  28.9 
  3   €1501–2000  27.8  26.0  27.6 
  4   €2001–3000  16.2  19.7  16.6 
  5   More than €3001  6.3  8.2  6.5 
  99 No answer  0.2  0.3  0.2 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
II.1.D.42  Do you feel more affiliated with this country (here) or with Turkey?         
 1    Turkey  48.5  35.5  47.2 
 2    Here  22.0  25.5  22.3 
  3  Equally close with both   26.9  35.8  27.8 
  4  Equally far with both   2.6  3.2  2.7 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
II.2.D.43  How often do you visit Turkey?         
  1  More than once a year   12.4  8.5  12.0 
  2  Once a year   53.7  36.5  52.1 
  3  Once in every two to three years  26.1  39.7  27.4 
  4  Rarely  4.3  7.8  4.7 
  5  Nearly not at all  3.5  7.5  3.9 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
E.44  What are your reasons for not to going to Turkey?         
  1   For political reasons  40.5  35.6  39.6 
  2   I do not have time  18.9  8.9  17.1 
  3   For economic reasons  29.7  35.6  30.8 
  4   I do not have any ties with Turkey  10.8  11.1  10.9 
  5   Because of military constraints  8.1 –    6.6 
  7   I do not have an ID  –   11.1  2.0 
  8   Family  2.7   –  2.2 
  97 No answer  2.7  2.2  2.6 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
II.3.E.45  What is the purpose of your visits to Turkey?          
  1   Holiday, seaside, sun   46.8  56.2  47.6 
  2   Visiting relatives, homeland  93.9  86.7  93.2 
  3   Professional  4.0  2.8  3.9 
  4   Internship  0.2  –  0.2 
  5   To bring our children closer to Turkish culture  0.2  –  0.2 
  6   Community trips  0.1  –  0.1 
  7   Sport  0.2  –  0.2 
  97 No answer  1.5  7.3  2.1 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
II.4.D.46  To what extent are you interested in politics in Turkey?          
  1  Not at all  26.3  36.3  27.2 
  2  Not really  15.6  14.7  15.5 
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  4  As much as I can  25.5  22.7  25.3 
  5  Very much so  12.4  9.3  12.1 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
II.5.D.47  Which institution in Turkey do you trust most?          
 1    Government  33.0  27.8  32.5 
  2  Religious institutions   19.7  10.2  18.8 
  3   Fellowship associations   2.4  1.5  2.4 
  4   Presidency   6.2  7.8  6.4 
  5   Labour unions  1.4  2.3  1.5 
  6   Courts  1.6  1.8  1.6 
  7   Parliament (TBMM)  3.9  3.7  3.9 
  8   Police  3.7  2.3  3.5 
  9   Political parties  1.3  1.0  1.3 
  10 Educational institutions   3.5  5.2  3.6 
 11  Army  14.2  24.0  15.1 
  12 Health care and social security institutions   0.7  0.5  0.6 
 13  Media  0.3  1.5  0.4 
  97 No answer  5.8  –  5.3 
  98 I don't know  0.5  –   0.4 
 99  None  1.9  10.3  2.7 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
II.5.D.48  Which is the institution in Turkey that you trust second-most?       
  1    Government  11.5  15.3  11.8 
  2    Religious institutions  14.2  10.7  13.8 
  3    Fellowship associations   3.2  3.2  3.2 
  4    Presidency  7.4  9.3  7.6 
  5    Labour unions  1.8  1.3  1.7 
  6    Courts  4.4  3.3  4.3 
  7    Parliament (TBMM)  9.8  5.0  9.3 
  8    Police  8.2  6.8  8.0 
  9    Political parties  3.8  1.7  3.6 
  10  Educational institutions  7.1  7.3  7.2 
 11    Army  11.0  15.8  11.4 
  12  Health care and social security institutions   2.6  2.5  2.6 
  13  Media  2.0  2.5  2.0 
  97  No answer  10.5  4.8  10.0 
  98  I don't know  0.5  –   0.4 
 99    None  2.1  10.3  2.8 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
II.6.D.50  Which institution in Turkey do you trust least?          
  1    Government  8.8  8.3  8.8 
  2    Religious institutions   3.1  7.0  3.5 
  3    Fellowship associations   1.8  1.7  1.8 
  4    Presidency  7.3  3.5  7.0 
  5    Labour unions  2.3  2.7  2.4 
  6    Courts  6.4  6.2  6.4 
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  8    Police  7.0  9.7  7.3 
  9    Political parties  7.0  8.2  7.1 
  10  Educational institutions  1.4  0.5  1.3 
 11    Army  9.1  2.8  8.5 
  12  Health care and social security institutions  11.4  22.7  12.4 
  13  Media  28.9  22.7  28.3 
  97  No answer  1.8  –   1.6 
  98  I don't know  0.3  –   0.3 
 99    None  0.5  2.3  0.6 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
II.6.D.51  Which is institution in Turkey that you trust the second-least?          
  1    Government  3.7  5.8  3.9 
  2    Religious institutions   2.1  4.7  2.3 
  3    Fellowship associations   2.0  2.0  2.0 
  4    Presidency  4.3  3.0  4.2 
  5    Labour unions  2.9  4.0  3.0 
  6    Courts  7.5  7.0  7.5 
  7    Parliament (TBMM)  1.7  3.5  1.9 
  8    Police  8.9  8.0  8.8 
  9    Political parties  12.0  15.2  12.3 
  10  Educational institutions  4.2  0.7  3.9 
 11    Army  9.1  3.5  8.6 
  12  Health care and social security institutions  15.4  17.3  15.6 
  13  Media  22.7  21.8  22.6 
  97  No answer  2.6  1.2  2.5 
  98  I don't know  0.3   –  0.3 
 99    None  0.6  2.3  0.7 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
II.7.D.52  With which political party in Turkey are you more affiliated?        
  1    AKP (Justice and Development Party)  31.8  35.5  32.2 
  2    ANAP  (Motherland Party)  4.3  3.2  4.2 
  3    CHP  (Republican People’s Party)  7.1  8.8  7.3 
  4    DEHAP (People’s Democratic Party)  2.4  5.3  2.7 
  5    DYP (True Path Party)  3.4  1.3  3.2 
  6    GP (Young Party)  1.7  1.5  1.7 
  7    MHP (Nationalist Action Party)  8.2  7.8  8.1 
  8    SP (Felicity Party)  10.4  0.7  9.5 
  9    ÖDP (Party for Freedom and Support)   –  1.2  0.1 
  10  DSP (Democratic Leftist Party)  0.6  0.5  0.6 
  11  LDP (Liberal Democrat Party)  0.1   –  0.1 
  12  BBP (Great Unity Party)  0.2  0.3  0.2 
 98    None  29.8  33.0  30.1 
  99  Doesn't want to answer   –  0.8  0.1 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
II.8.D.53  Have you voted in general elections in Turkey at all after settling in 
Germany/France? 
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 2    No  75.0  92.2  76.6 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
II.9.D.54  Did you vote in the November 2002 elections in Turkey?          
 1    Yes  10.7  3.2  10.0 
 2    No  89.3  96.8  90.0 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
II.10.D.55  (If she/he voted in November 2002 elections) Which party did you vote 
for? 
    
  1    AKP (Justice and Development Party)  36.8  31.6  36.7 
  2    ANAP  (Motherland Party)  5.3  5.3  5.3 
  3    CHP  (Republican People’s Party)  12.3  15.8  12.4 
  4    DEHAP (People’s Democratic Party)  4.4  10.5  4.6 
  5    DYP (True Path Party)  7.0  –   6.8 
  6    GP (Young Party)  1.8   –  1.7 
  7    MHP (Nationalist Action Party)  3.5  15.8  3.9 
  8    SP (Felicity Party)  23.7  5.3  23.1 
  9    ÖDP (Party for Freedom and Support)  –   10.5  0.3 
  10  DSP (Democratic Leftist Party)  1.8  –   1.7 
  11  LDP (Liberal Democrat Party)  2.6  5.3  2.7 
  12  BBP (Great Unity Party)  0.9  –   0.9 
 98    None  100 100  100 
          
II.11.D.56  What is the most important problem in Turkey?          
  1  Democracy, human rights   23.4  14.2  22.5 
  2  Corruption, nepotism, bribery    19.8  21.5  20.0 
  3  Pressure on religiosity in the name of laicism   11.9  7.0  11.5 
  4  Inflation, poverty   11.5  19.3  12.2 
  5  Separatism, terror   5.5  3.2  5.3 
  6  Unemployment   10.4  12.3  10.6 
  7  The Kurdish question   1.7  3.8  1.9 
  8  Threatening laicism, religious fundamentalism   0.7  1.5  0.7 
  9  Administrative problems   1.7  1.8  1.7 
  10 Diminishing ethical values   3.0  1.0  2.8 
  11 Lack of education   4.7  4.5  4.7 
 12  Violence  0.4  0.5  0.4 
 13  Traffic  1.3  1.2  1.3 
  14 Health care and social security problems   3.6  7.8  4.0 
  97 No answer  0.4  0.2  0.4 
 99  None  0.1  0.2  0.1 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
II.11.D.57  What is the second-most important problem in Turkey?          
  1   Democracy, human rights   8.7  6.2  8.5 
  2   Corruption, nepotism, bribery    13.4  10.3  13.1 
  3    Pressure on religiosity in the name of laicism   8.1  3.7  7.7 
  4    Inflation, poverty   11.1  14.2  11.4 
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  6    Unemployment   11.3  14.0  11.5 
  7    The Kurdish question   3.2  4.8  3.3 
  8    Threatening laicism, religious fundamentalism   2.2  2.5  2.2 
  9    Administrative problems   3.8  2.8  3.8 
  10  Diminishing ethical values   6.7  3.0  6.3 
  11 Lack of education   9.1  8.0  9.0 
 12    Violence  2.1  3.0  2.2 
  13  Traffic  3.1  6.0  3.4 
  14  Health care and social security problems   8.5  14.3  9.0 
  97  No answer  0.9  0.2  0.9 
 99    None  0.1  0.2  0.1 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
II.12.D.58  Which country is better in terms of democracy and human rights?       
 1    Turkey  2.6  4.0  2.8 
 2    Here  86.4  79.0  85.7 
  3  Both of them are good  4.0  10.8  4.7 
  4  Both of them are bad  4.4  3.7  4.3 
  5  No idea  2.5  2.5  2.5 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.59  Which country is better in terms of the health care and social security 
systems it offers? 
    
 1    Turkey  1.3  0.7  1.3 
 2    Here  96.0  96.0  96.0 
  3  Both of them are good  1.4  2.5  1.5 
  4  Both of them are bad  0.7  0.2  0.6 
  5  No idea  0.7  0.7  0.7 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.60  Which country is better in terms of educational systems?         
 1    Turkey  7.4  9.3  7.6 
 2    Here  77.3  71.3  76.7 
  3  Both of them are good  9.3  16.0  9.9 
  4  Both of them are bad  2.7  0.3  2.5 
  5  No idea  3.3  3.0  3.3 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.61  Which country is better in terms of job opportunities?         
 1    Turkey  3.3  2.5  3.2 
 2    Here  77.4  85.7  78.2 
  3  Both of them are good  2.9  7.0  3.3 
  4  Both of them are bad  14.0  3.5  13.0 
  5  No idea  2.4  1.3  2.3 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.62  Which country is better in terms of the efficiency of judiciary system?       
 1    Turkey  2.5  5.2  2.8 
 2    Here  77.3  61.5  75.8 
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  4  Both of them are bad  3.8  7.8  4.2 
  5  No idea  11.9  15.7  12.3 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.63  Which country is better in terms of mutual tolerance?         
 1    Turkey  42.9  41.7  42.8 
 2    Here  37.2  32.8  36.8 
  3  Both of them are good  11.5  18.7  12.1 
  4  Both of them are bad  4.9  4.2  4.8 
  5  No idea  3.6  2.7  3.5 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.64  Which country is better in terms of respecting rules?         
 1    Turkey  3.5  10.5  4.1 
 2    Here  88.2  70.3  86.5 
  3  Both of them are good  3.7  12.0  4.4 
  4  Both of them are bad  2.4  4.7  2.7 
  5  No idea  2.3  2.5  2.3 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.66  Which country is better in terms of a comfortable and easy life?       
 1    Turkey  28.3  24.5  27.9 
 2    Here  51.6  48.8  51.4 
  3  Both of them are good  13.3  22.7  14.2 
  4  Both of them are bad  3.4  2.2  3.3 
  5  No idea  3.4  1.8  3.2 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.67  Which country is better in terms of valuing human capital?         
 1    Turkey  7.4  6.3  7.3 
 2    Here  74.8  77.7  75.1 
  3  Both of them are good  6.1  8.5  6.3 
  4  Both of them are bad  7.1  4.2  6.9 
  5  No idea  4.5  3.3  4.4 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.68  Which country is better in terms of social/moral values?         
 1    Turkey  56.0  42.3  54.7 
 2    Here  19.9  33.7  21.2 
  3  Both of them are good  5.0  13.0  5.7 
  4  Both of them are bad  13.4  3.8  12.5 
  5  No idea  5.7  7.2  5.9 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.69  Which country do you find is better in terms of respecting cultures and 
religions? 
    
 1    Turkey  25.6  34.0  26.4 
 2    Here  48.5  33.8  47.1 
  3  Both of them are good  14.9  21.7  15.6 
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  5  No idea  3.8  2.8  3.7 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.70  Which country is better in terms of the attitudes of police?         
 1    Turkey  6.0  10.3  6.4 
 2    Here  66.3  50.8  64.8 
  3  Both of them are good  7.8  16.0  8.6 
  4  Both of them are bad  11.5  15.8  12.0 
  5  No idea  8.4  7.0  8.2 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.71  Which country is better in terms of equal treatment for all?         
 1    Turkey  3.6  7.2  3.9 
 2    Here  71.8  60.3  70.7 
  3  Both of them are good  5.2  13.5  6.0 
  4  Both of them are bad  11.6  14.7  11.9 
  5  No idea  7.8  4.3  7.5 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.72   Which country is better in terms of seeking rights?         
 1    Turkey  1.8  3.0  1.9 
 2    Here  87.1  79.5  86.4 
  3  Both of them are good  2.1  8.8  2.7 
  4  Both of them are bad  4.0  4.2  4.0 
  5  No idea  5.0  4.5  4.9 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
II.13.E.74  What kind of positive impacts do the Turks have on the host society?        
  1   Cultural diversity and richness  53.3  42.5  52.3 
  2   Labour force   64.6  73.0  65.4 
  3   Creating new job opportunities  38.0  39.5  38.2 
  4   Bringing new familial and ethical values   32.0  21.3  31.0 
  5   Bringing humanitarian quality   26.9  19.0  26.1 
  6    Unity and solidarity  0.2  –   0.2 
  7    Tax  0.3  0.3  0.3 
  8    Population problems  –   0.2  0.0 
  9    Contribution to the new generation  0.1  0.2  0.1 
  10  Religious beliefs  0.2  –   0.2 
  97  No answer  0.3  –   0.3 
  98  I don’t think they have a positive impact   3.8  4.7  3.9 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
II.14.E.75  What kind of negative impacts do the Turks have on the host society?        
  1    Abusing the social security system   25.2  17.8  24.5 
  2    Not adapting to local values   26.9  32.5  27.5 
  3    Constructing their own closed communities   26.5  32.0  27.0 
  4    Being lazy   23.7  14.8  22.8 
  5    Not obeying rules   36.3  22.7  35.0 
  6    Conflicts because of disintegration 0.4  –    0.3 
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  8    Language  –   0.3  0.0 
  9    Immorality  0.1  –   0.1 
  10  Corruption  0.1  –   0.1 
  11  Egoism and jealousy  –   0.3  0.0 
  12  Turkish men following women of the host society  –   0.2  0.0 
  97  No answer  1.1  1.0  1.1 
  98  I don’t think they have a negative impact  24.6  32.8  25.4 
  99  None  0.1  –   0.1 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
II.15.D.76 Which  institution  is the most influential in Turkish politics?        
  1    Government  16.1  23.3  16.7 
  2    Army  40.7  34.7  40.1 
  3    National Security Board  6.1  4.5  6.0 
  4    Media  11.7  4.0  11.0 
  5    Business elites  2.7  3.5  2.8 
  6    The US  12.8  11.3  12.6 
  7    The European Union   2.5  6.5  2.9 
  8    Religious elites  1.4  1.8  1.4 
  9    Parliament (TBMM)  1.8  4.2  2.0 
  10  Presidency  2.2  2.7  2.2 
  97  No answer  1.4  2.3  1.5 
  98  No idea  0.6  0.7  0.6 
 99    None  0.1  0.5  0.1 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.77  Which is the second-most influential institution in Turkish politics?         
  1    Government  9.8  12.5  10.0 
  2    Army  16.8  17.3  16.9 
  3    National Security Board  9.3  6.0  9.0 
  4    Media  19.2  7.5  18.1 
  5    Business elites  4.5  9.0  4.9 
  6    The US  18.0  10.8  17.3 
  7    The European Union   5.6  9.7  6.0 
  8    Religious elites  1.7  5.5  2.1 
  9    Parliament (TBMM)  6.0  6.7  6.1 
  10  Presidency  5.2  9.8  5.6 
  97  No answer  3.2  4.0  3.3 
  98  No idea  0.6  0.7  0.6 
 99    None  0.1  0.5  0.1 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
II.16.D.78  How do you find Turkey’s recent situation compared to recent years?        
  1  Much worse  3.8  5.5  4.0 
 2    Worse  15.4  15.5  15.4 
  3  The same  18.5  14.2  18.1 
  4  Better  53.2  51.3  53.1 
  5  Much better  9.0  13.5  9.4 
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II.17.D.79  Are you optimistic or pessimistic about Turkey’s future?          
  1  Very pessimistic  2.4  3.8  2.6 
 2    Pessimistic  10.3  10.5  10.3 
  3  Neither pessimistic nor optimistic  28.5  24.0  28.0 
 4    Optimistic  48.5  51.0  48.7 
  5  Very optimistic  10.3  10.5  10.3 
  9  No answer  –   0.2  0.0 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
III.1.D.81  What is the primary problem that you face in the host-country as a 
Turkish person? 
    
  1    Contradictory moral values  25.8  17.5  25.0 
  2    Unemployment  15.0  10.5  14.6 
  3    Discrimination  22.6  16.8  22.1 
  4    Religious intolerance  5.1  2.2  4.8 
  5    Intolerance to our Turkishness  3.6  4.0  3.6 
  6    Loneliness and miscommunication  3.4  6.8  3.7 
  7    Drug use  4.1  3.3  4.1 
  8    Exploitation of our labour  1.8  3.0  1.9 
  9    Racism  4.8  6.3  4.9 
  10  Poverty  0.5  0.3  0.5 
  11  Cultural and linguistic assimilation  5.3  6.2  5.3 
  12  Lack of German/French language  7.2  18.3  8.3 
  97  No answer  0.6  –   0.5 
 99    None  0.3  4.7  0.7 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
III.1.D.82  What is the secondary problem that you face here as a Turkish person?        
  1   Contradictory moral values  8.8  9.8  8.9 
  2   Unemployment  8.7  6.8  8.6 
  3   Discrimination  17.7  12.2  17.2 
  4   Religious intolerance  5.4  4.2  5.3 
  5   Intolerance to our Turkishness  7.0  3.7  6.7 
  6   Loneliness and miscommunication  6.7  10.0  7.0 
  7   Drug use  6.8  6.8  6.8 
  8   Exploitation of labour  4.0  5.0  4.1 
  9   Racism  10.0  10.5  10.1 
 10  Poverty  2.4  1.8  2.4 
  11 Cultural and linguistic assimilation  11.2  8.0  10.9 
  12 Lack of German/French language  9.5  12.2  9.7 
  97 No answer  1.3  4.3  1.6 
 99  None  0.3  4.7  0.7 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
III.2.83  Which institution do you trust most?         
  1   Turkish official institutions (embassies, consulates)  9.6  21.0  10.7 
  2   Turkish associations  4.1  4.0  4.1 
  3   Mosques  18.6  7.0  17.5 
  4   Fellowship organisations  1.1  0.8  1.1 94 | KAYA & KENTEL 
 
  5   French government  9.3  12.7  9.6 
  6   Labour unions and chambers  2.3  3.5  2.5 
  7   Courts  16.8  5.5  15.7 
  8   Parliament  1.5  1.2  1.5 
  9   Police  6.9  3.2  6.5 
  10 Political parties  0.5  –   0.4 
  11 Educational institutions  5.8  6.5  5.9 
  12 Social security and health care institutions  20.4  29.2  21.2 
 13  European  Parliament  1.9  3.0  2.0 
 14  Media  0.6  0.8  0.6 
  97 No answer  0.6   –  0.5 
 99  None  0.1  1.7  0.2 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
III.2.D.84  Which institution do you trust second-most?          
  1   Turkish official institutions (embassies, consulates)  4.9  7.2  5.1 
  2   Turkish associations  6.3  7.5  6.4 
  3   Mosques  9.1  8.7  9.1 
  4   Fellowship organisations  1.2  1.2  1.2 
  5   French government  8.5  8.7  8.6 
  6   Labour unions and chambers  2.2  6.2  2.5 
  7   Courts  15.6  5.3  14.6 
  8   Parliament  2.7  1.3  2.6 
  9   Police  11.6  7.7  11.3 
  10 Political parties  0.3  0.8  0.3 
  11 Educational institutions  9.7  12.2  9.9 
  12 Social security and health care institutions  21.4  22.3  21.5 
 13  European  Parliament  2.2  5.3  2.5 
 14  Media  2.2  1.7  2.1 
  97 No answer  2.1  2.3  2.1 
 99  None  0.1  1.7  0.2 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
III.3.D.85  Which the institution do you trust least?         
  1   Turkish official institutions (embassies, consulates)  25.7  7.7  24.0 
  2   Turkish associations  7.2  8.2  7.3 
  3   Mosques  5.0  7.3  5.2 
  4   Fellowship associations  3.8  5.3  4.0 
  5   French government  6.9  8.3  7.0 
  6   Labour unions and chambers  4.2  4.0  4.2 
  7   Courts  1.7  3.8  1.9 
  8   Parliament  1.9  2.7  2.0 
  9   Police  5.3  10.5  5.8 
  10 Political parties  12.2  15.3  12.5 
  11 Educational institutions  1.2  1.7  1.3 
  12 Social security and health care institutions  0.5  0.5  0.5 
 13  European  Parliament  3.8  2.3  3.6 
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  97 No answer  1.8  –   1.6 
  98 I don't know  0.2  –   0.2 
 99  None  0.1  4.0  0.5 
 Total  100 100  100 
          
III.3.D.86  Which institution do you trust second-least?          
  1 Turkish official institutions (embassies, consulates)  5.7  2.0  5.4 
  2 Turkish associations  9.0  6.5  8.8 
 3  Mosques  2.8  6.7  3.2 
  4 Fellowship associations  6.1  5.8  6.1 
  5 French government  6.1  5.0  6.0 
  5 Labour unions and chambers  5.7  6.5  5.8 
 6  Courts  3.0  5.3  3.2 
 7  Parliament  3.0  4.0  3.1 
 8    Police  6.2  9.3  6.5 
  9  Political parties  15.1  17.3  15.3 
  10 Educational institutions  2.9  1.2  2.7 
  11 Social security and health care institutions  0.6  0.8  0.6 
 12  European  Parliament  7.1  6.7  7.1 
 13  Media  22.8  16.3  22.2 
  97 No answer  3.4  2.5  3.3 
  98 I don't know  0.2  –   0.2 
 99  None  0.2  4.0  0.5 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
III.4.D.87  Do you have German/French citizenship?         
  1  Yes, I do  26.2  36.2  27.1 
  2  I have already applied and am waiting for it   6.9  7.5  7.0 
  3  I am planning to apply  26.0  30.5  26.4 
  4  I am not planning to apply  40.8  25.7  39.4 
  9  No answer   –  0.2  0.0 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
III.5.D.88  Is there any organisation here in which you are a member or you are 
involved?  
       
 1    No  61.2  71.2  62.2 
 2    Yes  38.8  28.8  37.8 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
E.89  What kind of organisation are you involved in or are you a member of?          
  1    Labour union   11.6  11.6  11.6 
  2    Chamber of occupation  2.7  5.2  2.8 
  3    Political party  8.2  2.9  7.8 
  4    Ethnic association   5.1  4.6  5.1 
  5    Turkish/French friendship association   7.5  30.6  9.2 
  6    Cultural centre   20.6  31.8  21.4 
  7    Fellowship solidarity association   3.1  4.6  3.3 
  8    Alumni organisation   2.4  4.0  2.5 
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  10  Religious association   44.8  15.6  42.7 
  11  Aid organisations  2.2  0.6  2.1 
  12  Social Democratic Party  0.2  –   0.2 
  13  Funeral fund  0.2   –  0.2 
  14  Social Democrats (SPD)  0.2   –  0.2 
  15  Students clubs  0.7  1.2  0.8 
  16  Meditation  –   0.6  0.0 
  17  Political associations  0.5  1.2  0.5 
  18  Amnesty organisation   –  0.6  0.0 
  19  Mosque  –   0.6  0.0 
  20  Greenpeace  –   0.6  0.0 
  21  General environment  –   0.6  0.0 
  22  Handcraft associations  –   0.6  0.0 
 23    Insurance  0.2  –  0.2 
  24  Kadek-PKK Köln   0.2  –  0.2 
  25  Folklore group  0.2  –  0.2 
  26  Foreigners’ representatives, inter-religious dialogue  0.2  –  0.2 
  27  Guardians’ associations  0.2  –  0.2 
  28  Foreigners’ associations  0.2  –  0.2 
  97  No answer  1.5  0.6  1.4 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
III.6.D.90  To what extent are you interested in politics?         
  1  Not at all  37.1  46.3  38.0 
  2  Not really  22.2  13.3  21.3 
  3  So-so   17.6  19.0  17.7 
  4  As much as I can  17.6  18.2  17.6 
  5  Very much so  5.6  3.2  5.4 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
III.7.D.91  Do you have the right to vote in local or general elections?         
 1    Yes  24.7  30.2  25.2 
 2    No  72.8  68.5  72.4 
  3  No idea  2.5  1.3  2.4 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
III.8.D.92  (If she/he has the right to vote) Did you ever vote?         
 1    Yes  73.8  44.5  70.3 
 2    No  26.2  55.5  29.7 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
III.9.D.93 Regarding  your  all  conditions, rights and opportunities, where do you feel 
in your own society on the scale below?  
       
 1  2.3 1.3  2.2 
 2  1.2 1.3  1.2 
 3  4.1 4.0  4.1 
 4  6.6 5.5  6.5 
 5  10.9 8.7  10.7 
 6  19.5 20.5  19.6 
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 8  14.6 13.7  14.6 
 9  9.7 10.5  9.7 
 10  7.9 9.0  8.0 
 11  2.2 3.3  2.3 
 12  3.7 4.0  3.7 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
III.10.D.94  With which political party are you more affiliated?            
  1  Liberal parties  3.3  1.3  3.1 
  2  Conservative parties  2.6  0.7  2.4 
  3  Social-democratic parties  27.0  27.7  27.1 
  4  Greens and environmentalist parties   8.5  5.0  8.2 
  5  Radical right, nationalist parties  0.8  1.7  0.9 
  6  Radical left, communist parties  1.2  3.8  1.5 
  7  In equal distance to all   4.1  5.2  4.2 
  8  None of the above   52.3  54.7  52.5 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
III.11.D.95  Do you think that this country has become better or worse compared with 
previous years?  
       
  1  Much worse  18.6  6.0  17.4 
 2    Worse  71.5  40.5  68.5 
  3  The same  6.0  27.0  8.0 
  4  Better  3.2  24.3  5.2 
  5  Much better  0.8  2.2  0.9 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
III.12.D.96  Are you optimistic or pessimistic about this country's future?            
  1  Very pessimistic  7.4  1.3  6.8 
 2    Pessimistic  43.9  21.8  41.9 
  3  Neither pessimistic nor optimistic      33.6  32.8  33.5 
 4    Optimistic  14.1  39.7  16.5 
  5  Very optimistic  0.9  4.0  1.2 
  9  No answer  –   0.3  0.0 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
III.13.D.97 Would  you  recommend immigrating to Germany/France to those from 
Turkey? 
     
  1  I would recommend it  20.7  37.8  22.3 
  2  I wouldn't recommend it  79.3  60.5  77.6 
  3  It depends  –   1.7  0.2 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
IV.1.D.99  What does the European Union mean to you?         
  1  An economic integration   48.2  63.7  49.6 
  2  A common cultural policy   5.7  5.7  5.7 
  3  A democracy project  6.5  6.3  6.5 
  4  A Christian club   21.3  11.2  20.4 
  5  Exploitation, imperialism   6.9  3.7  6.6 
  6  A political and military superpower   4.8  7.7  5.1 98 | KAYA & KENTEL 
 
  7  A bureaucratic community that is detached from the public   6.6  1.8  6.1 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
IV.2.D.100  To what extent you are either positive or negative about the EU?          
  1  Very negative  5.5  4.3  5.4 
 2    Negative  22.3  12.2  21.3 
  3  Both positive and negative   29.3  23.2  28.7 
 4    Positive  29.4  47.3  31.1 
  5  Very positive  2.7  6.3  3.1 
  6  No idea  10.8  6.7  10.4 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
IV.3.D.101  To what extent you are positive or negative about the euro?          
  1  Very negative  50.4  26.8  48.2 
 2    Negative  34.8  28.5  34.2 
  3  Both positive and negative  6.7  17.7  7.7 
 4    Positive  4.3  21.0  5.9 
  5  Very positive  1.6  4.3  1.9 
  6  No idea  2.2  1.7  2.1 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
IV.4.D.102  Which of these identifications suits you most?          
  1   I am Turkish   36.6  24.2  35.4 
  2   First Turkish and then European    49.9  58.5  50.7 
  3   First European and then Turkish    9.2  11.5  9.4 
  4   Only European   3.8  3.5  3.7 
  5   Foreigner in both  0.1  0.2  0.1 
  6   World citizen  0.1  0.2  0.1 
  7   Human being   –  0.2  0.0 
  8   Both French and Turkish  –   0.2  0.0 
  97 No answer  0.4  0.7  0.4 
  99 None  –   1.0  0.1 
 Total  100  100  100 
       
IV.5.  What does it mean to participate in the EU for Turkey?         
D.103 More  democracy         
 1    Yes  62.7  65.8  63.0 
 2    No  21.1  21.7  21.2 
  3  No idea  16.2  12.5  15.8 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.104  More job opportunities         
 1    Yes  61.4  83.2  63.5 
 2    No  26.9  13.2  25.6 
  3  No idea  11.7  3.7  11.0 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.105 More  human  rights         
 1  Yes  69.3  78.5  70.2 
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 3  No  idea  13.1  6.0  12.5 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.106 Separation         
 1    Yes  23.8  22.8  23.8 
 2    No  53.3  57.0  53.7 
  3  No idea  22.8  20.2  22.6 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.107  The end of independence         
 1    Yes  23.9  24.2  24.0 
 2    No  52.1  57.5  52.6 
  3  No idea  23.9  18.3  23.4 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.108 Moral  breakdown         
 1    Yes  52.0  35.8  50.5 
 2    No  29.8  45.5  31.3 
  3  No idea  18.2  18.7  18.3 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.109 Exploitation         
 1    Yes  37.2  34.7  36.9 
 2    No  39.4  46.7  40.1 
  3  No idea  23.4  18.7  22.9 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.110  The migration of more people from Turkey to Europe         
 1    Yes  71.2  68.2  70.9 
 2    No  16.9  21.0  17.3 
  3  No idea  11.9  10.8  11.8 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
IV.6.D.112  To what extent are you either positive or negative about the Turkey 
joining the EU?  
       
  1 It definitely should   29.4  36.8  30.1 
  2 It had better   10.3  19.7  11.2 
  3 It definitely should not  14.7  8.2  14.1 
  4 It had better not   15.5  12.3  15.2 
  5 It doesn’t matter   23.6  19.8  23.2 
 6  No  idea  6.5  3.2  6.2 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
IV.7.D.113 What  is  your  prediction about whether Turkey will join the EU?          
  1 It probably could join  37.1  43.7  37.7 
  2 It definitely should join  4.3  11.0  5.0 
  3 It definitely should not join  15.6  9.7  15.0 
  4 I do not believe that it could join   33.8  29.0  33.3 
 5  No  idea  9.2  6.7  9.0 
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IV.8.D.114  Would you consider returning back to Turkey if Turkey joins the 
European Union?  
       
  1  Yes, I would certainly return    8.5  9.7  8.7 
  2  Yes, I would                               19.2  21.3  19.4 
  3  I don't know  38.0  28.5  37.1 
  4  No, I wouldn’t  23.8  27.8  24.1 
  5  No, I wouldn’t certainly return   10.5  12.7  10.7 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
IV.9.D.115 Why do you think the European Union supports Turkey’s membership to 
the Union?  
       
  1  Because it is an important economic market  24.7  27.2  24.9 
  2  Because it has strategic importance  26.9  21.0  26.4 
  3  To increase cultural diversity in Europe  0.9  2.7  1.1 
  4  Because it bridges the European Union between Central Asia and the 
Middle 
    East  
16.6 17.3  16.7 
  5  Because it has rich underground resources  12.9  12.2  12.8 
  6  Because it has a cheap labour force  9.0  12.5  9.3 
  7  Because of its young population   6.4  5.8  6.3 
  8  For no reason  0.5  0.3  0.5 
  9  The European Union does not have any interest  0.1  –   0.1 
  10b To incorporate a moderate Islamic country into their Union  –   0.2  0.0 
  11 Because it is a part of Europe  0.1 –    0.1 
  12 Because the European Union needs Turkey 0.2  0.2  0.2 
  97 No answer  1.3  0.7  1.3 
  98 I don't know  0.1  –   0.1 
  99 None  0.3  –   0.3 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
IV.10.D.116 Why  do  you think the European Union is against Turkey’s membership to 
the Union?  
       
  1   Because of its underdeveloped economy  15.3  13.3  15.1 
  2   Because of its bad record regarding democracy and human rights   12.3  13.7  12.4 
  3   Because it is a Muslim nation  47.3  48.5  47.4 
  4   Because of historical hostility  7.5  3.7  7.1 
  5   To avoid the destruction of the cultural structure in Europe   2.7  2.2  2.7 
  6   Because of the fear of immigrant flows   11.7  13.8  11.9 
  7   To avoid being neighbour to the problematic Middle-Eastern region  1.1  2.7  1.3 
  8   Turkey will have the right to comment about the European Union  0.5  0.2  0.4 
  9   Because Turkey will be powerful  0.1  0.3  0.1 
  10 The Cyprus and Kurdish problems  –   0.2  0.0 
  11 Immorality  0.2   –  0.2 
  12 The Cyprus problem  0.1  –   0.1 
  14 Population potential of Turkey   –  0.2  0.0 
  15 Proximity to Iraq  0.1  –   0.1 
  16  Fear of unification  –   0.2  0.0 
  97  No answer  0.8  1.2  0.8 
  98  I don't know  0.1  –   0.1 
 99    None  0.2  –  0.2 
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IV.11  Which of the features below do you think has changed with Turkey’s 
efforts to enter the EU? 
       
D.117 Increasing  democratic rights and freedoms         
 1    Yes  55.2  60.2  55.7 
 2    No  26.6  26.5  26.6 
  3  No idea  18.2  13.3  17.8 
  Total 100  100  100 
          
D.118  It has been a positive development towards the solution of the Kurdish 
problem 
       
 1    Yes  40.3  46.2  40.8 
 2    No  32.7  32.7  32.7 
  3  No idea  27.0  21.2  26.5 
  Total 100  100  100 
          
D.119  Development in terms of human rights          
 1    Yes  54.2  63.0  55.0 
 2    No  29.0  25.2  28.7 
  3  No idea  16.8  11.8  16.3 
  Total 100  100  100 
          
D.120  Development in economic activities         
 1    Yes  45.4  47.0  45.6 
 2    No  37.3  43.2  37.8 
  3  No idea  17.3  9.8  16.6 
  Total 100  100  100 
          
D.121  Breakdown in cultural values         
 1    Yes  39.5  32.5  38.9 
 2    No  38.3  52.8  39.7 
  3  No idea  22.2  14.7  21.5 
  Total 100  100  100 
          
D.122  Our national independence has been damaged         
 1    Yes  24.2  20.2  23.8 
 2    No  49.6  62.3  50.8 
  3  No idea  26.2  17.5  25.4 
  Total 100  100  100 
        
D.123  By the introduction of the Custom’s Union, investments have decreased 
while unemployment has increased 
    
 1    Yes  32.7  32.8  32.7 
 2    No  26.9  36.8  27.9 
  3  No idea  40.4  30.3  39.4 
 Total  100 100  100 
          
V.1.E.125  Which identity among those below defines you most?          
  1    Turkish citizen  24.0  34.8  25.1 
  2    Turkish  22.5  24.0  22.7 
  3    Kurdish  4.2  3.8  4.2 
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  5    Muslim-Turk  39.8  41.3  40.0 
  6    Alevi  3.3  3.5  3.3 
  7    German/French citizen  6.9  9.5  7.2 
  8    German/French Turk  7.2  17.2  8.2 
  9    Euro-Turk  5.6  6.3  5.7 
  10  World citizen  5.3  10.2  5.7 
  11  EU citizen  2.1  4.3  2.3 
  12  Muslim-Kurdish  0.2  –   0.2 
  13  Human being  0.3  0.3  0.3 
  14  Euro-Muslim  0.1  –   0.1 
  97  No answer  0.3  –   0.3 
  99  None  0.1  –   0.1 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
V.2.E.126  How do you define yourself with regard to the identifications below?          
  1   Nationalist  17.7  25.7  18.4 
  2   Leftist  3.5  5.7  3.7 
  3   Democrat  17.2  15.8  17.1 
  4   Religious  32.8  21.7  31.7 
  5   Conservative  16.9  4.5  15.7 
  6   Rightist  3.4  2.2  3.3 
  7   Ataturkist  8.7  21.5  9.9 
  8   Laicist  3.7  20.3  5.2 
  9   Laicist  7.9  6.3  7.7 
 10  Ülkücü  (ultra-nationalist)  3.9  8.0  4.3 
 11  Revolutionary  0.9  2.8  1.1 
 12  Patriot  22.3  18.8  22.0 
 13  Islamist  13.7  8.3  13.2 
  97 No answer  0.3  0.5  0.3 
  98 I don't know  0.1  –   0.1 
 99  None  0.2  0.7  0.2 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
V.3.D.127  Which one of the categories below identifies you most in terms of your 
religious affiliation? 
       
  1    Sunni Muslim  49.9  46.3  49.5 
  2    Alevi Muslim  3.8  5.0  4.0 
  3    Muslim  43.7  40.7  43.4 
  4    Christian  0.1  0.5  0.1 
  5    Jewish  –   0.5  0.0 
  6    Atheist  0.5  5.3  0.9 
  7    Turkish  0.4  0.2  0.4 
  8    Faithful to God  0.1  0.3  0.1 
  9    Agnostic  0.1  0.2  0.1 
  10  Materialist   –  0.2  0.0 
  11  Humanist/mortal  0.1  –   0.1 
  12  Modern Muslim  –   0.5  0.0 
  13  Shia  0.2  –   0.2 
  14  Kurdish Muslim  0.1  –   0.1 
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  97  No answer  0.7  0.3  0.6 
  99  None  0.4  –   0.3 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
V.4.D.128  How do you see yourself with regard to the following statements about 
your faith?  
       
  1  Quite a religious person fulfilling all the requirements of my faith   7.5  9.5  7.7 
  2  Someone trying to fulfil religious requirements   53.6  47.3  53.0 
  3  Faithful, but not fulfilling the religious requirements   35.4  32.8  35.2 
  4  Someone who doesn’t really believe in faith   2.4  4.5  2.6 
  5  Someone who does not have faith   1.0  5.3  1.4 
  9  No answer  –   0.5  0.0 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
V.5.D.129  Has your religious faith become stronger or weaker than before?          
  1  Become stronger  48.5  37.3  47.4 
  2  Become weaker  12.3  11.3  12.2 
  3  No difference  39.2  51.3  40.4 
 Total  100  100  100 
       
V.6  Could you tell us if you agree or disagree with the following statements?         
D.131  Religious and world affairs should be separate from each other.      
 1    Agree  43.4  71.5  46.0 
 2    Disagree  41.5  18.8  39.4 
  3  No idea  15.1  9.7  14.6 
 Total  100  100  100 
       
D.132  Religious and state affairs should be separate from each other.         
 1    Agree  45.4  77.0  48.3 
 2    Disagree  39.8  16.0  37.6 
  3  No idea  14.8  7.0  14.1 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.133  Western people should adapt to Islamic people.         
 1    Agree  31.5  25.8  30.9 
 2    Disagree  42.2  53.2  43.2 
  3  No idea  26.4  21.0  25.9 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.134  Islamic people should adapt to Western people.         
 1    Agree  11.5  22.2  12.5 
 2    Disagree  66.8  60.7  66.2 
  3  No idea  21.8  17.2  21.3 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.135  No one should adapt to others; everyone should have his/her way.      
 1    Agree  64.8  79.5  66.2 
 2    Disagree  26.6  16.5  25.6 
  3  No idea  8.6  4.0  8.2 
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D.136  Both groups should interact with each other in order to find their 
similarities 
       
 1    Agree  85.9  89.7  86.3 
 2    Disagree  8.0  4.7  7.7 
  3  No idea  6.1  5.7  6.1 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.137  Turks have no friends but other Turks         
 1    Agree  32.4  42.5  33.3 
 2    Disagree  57.1  52.5  56.7 
  3  No idea  10.5  5.0  10.0 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.138  Freedom of expression, religion and faith is good but the security of the 
state is a priority above all 
       
 1    Agree  35.3  50.2  36.7 
 2    Disagree  46.5  36.0  45.5 
  3  No idea  18.2  13.8  17.8 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.139 Military  intervention  in political life is good         
 1    Agree  15.1  38.8  17.4 
 2    Disagree  63.6  41.5  61.5 
  3  No idea  21.3  19.7  21.2 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.140  I hope my grave will be in Turkey         
 1    Yes  81.6  81.7  81.6 
 2    No  3.2  3.0  3.2 
  3  It doesn't matter  15.2  15.3  15.2 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.141  Turkish children should be sent to Turkish schools         
 1    Yes  33.2  55.2  35.3 
 2    No  49.6  24.3  47.2 
  3  It doesn't matter  17.2  20.5  17.5 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.142  Female students should have the right to wear a headscarf         
 1    Yes  80.0  48.3  77.0 
 2    No  6.6  29.0  8.7 
  3  It doesn't matter  13.4  22.7  14.3 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.143  There should be Islamic education in German/French schools         
 1    Yes  81.4  49.0  78.3 
 2    No  4.5  32.5  7.2 
  3  It doesn't matter  14.1  18.5  14.5 
 Total  100  100  100 
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V.8  Do you believe that you are discriminated or pressured by the Turks 
living in Germany/France? 
    
D.148  Because of my religious sect          
 1    Yes  11.7  6.3  11.2 
  2  No   88.3  93.2  88.7 
  9  No answer  –   0.5  0.0 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.149  Because of my religion         
 1    Yes  24.0  11.5  22.9 
  2  No   76.0  88.2  77.1 
  9  No answer  –   0.3  0.0 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.150  Because of my clothes or turban         
 1    Yes  21.2  13.7  20.5 
  2  No   78.8  86.0  79.5 
  9  No answer  –   0.3  0.0 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.151  Because of my ethnic identity          
 1    Yes  16.7  8.2  15.9 
  2  No   83.3  91.2  84.0 
  9  No answer  –   0.7  0.1 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.152  Because of my city or region in Turkey         
 1    Yes  6.2  4.7  6.1 
  2  No   93.8  94.7  93.9 
  9  No answer  –   0.7  0.1 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.154  Because of my dialect         
 1    Yes  10.9  8.3  10.7 
  2  No   89.1  91.3  89.3 
  9  No answer   –  0.3  0.0 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.155  Because of my district         
 1    Yes  3.7  4.0  3.7 
  2  No   96.3  95.7  96.3 
  9  No answer  –   0.3  0.0 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.156  Because of my age          
 1    Yes  3.6  0.8  3.3 
  2  No   96.4  98.8  96.7 
  9  No answer   –  0.3  0.0 
 Total  100  100  100 
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D.157  Because of my gender         
 1    Yes  3.0  2.5  3.0 
  2  No   97.0  97.0  97.0 
  9  No answer  –   0.5  0.0 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.158  Because of my job          
 1    Yes  4.4  3.8  4.4 
  2  No   95.6  95.8  95.6 
  9  No answer   –  0.3  0.0 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
V.9.D.159  Which of the following statements identifies your relationship with the 
German/French people?   
       
  1  I have close German/French friends   45.0  56.8  46.1 
  2  I have German/French friends with whom we visit as families  13.1  20.3  13.8 
  3  There are German/French people whom I see because it is necessary  33.9  15.8  32.2 
  4   I do not have friendships with German/French people  9.9  6.7  9.6 
  9  No answer  –   0.7  0.1 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
V.10.D.161  How do you find the fact that people are punished because of their 
opinions? 
       
  1  I find it right  5.5  8.5  5.8 
  2  I find it wrong  52.9  44.0  52.0 
  3  It depends  33.9  40.3  34.5 
  4  No idea  7.7  7.2  7.6 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
V.11.D.162  How do you find the abolition of a political party because of the opinions 
it holds? 
       
  1  I find it right  6.3  14.5  7.1 
  2  I find it wrong  46.4  34.8  45.3 
  3  It depends  37.7  39.2  37.8 
  4  No idea  9.7  11.5  9.8 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
V.12.D.163  Would you consider returning back to Turkey in the future?      
  1  Absolutely yes  25.9  22.2  25.6 
  2  Maybe  57.1  59.3  57.3 
  3  Absolutely not  17.0  18.3  17.1 
  4  No idea  –   0.2  0.0 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
V.13.D.164  Do you think laws should be enacted for the security of citizens or of the 
state? 
       
  1  They should give priority to the security of the state  23.7  26.3  23.9 
  2  They should give priority to the security of the citizen  76.3  73.2  76.0 
  9  No answer  –   0.5  0.0 
 Total  100  100  100 
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V.14.D.165  Democracy, freedom of religion and faith, nationalism and livelihood are 
important concepts for everybody; which of these concepts comes first for 
you?  
       
  1  Freedom of religion and faith  53.6  31.2  51.5 
 2    Livelihood  24.9  43.0  26.6 
 3    Democracy  17.9  20.7  18.2 
 4    Nationalism  3.6  4.5  3.7 
  9  No answer  –   0.7  0.1 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.166  Do you find it right that people are punished because of their opinions 
about the Kurdish problem? 
       
 1    Yes  8.9  18.7  9.8 
 2    No  45.3  38.7  44.6 
  3  It depends  35.4  32.2  35.1 
  4  No idea  10.4  10.5  10.4 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.167  Do you agree with the abolition of a political party because of its opinions 
about the Kurdish problem? 
       
 1    Yes  14.6  24.0  15.4 
 2    No  41.8  37.3  41.4 
  3  It depends  32.7  27.5  32.2 
  4  No idea  11.0  11.2  11.0 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.168  Do you agree with the punishment of people because of their Islamic 
opinions? 
       
 1    Yes  3.3  8.7  3.8 
 2    No  69.2  61.2  68.4 
  3  It depends  21.4  24.7  21.7 
  4  No idea  6.1  5.5  6.0 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.169  Do you agree with the abolition of a political party because of its Islamic 
opinions? 
       
 1    Yes  4.6  13.8  5.5 
 2    No  63.4  52.5  62.4 
  3  It depends  24.8  25.5  24.9 
  4  No idea  7.2  8.2  7.3 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
V.16  Could you tell us if you agree or disagree with the following statements?      
D.171  Women want a happy family life         
  1  I agree  88.2  86.8  88.0 
  2  I don't agree  6.1  7.8  6.3 
  3  No idea  5.7  5.3  5.7 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.172  Women should work in order to be independent         
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  2  I don't agree  50.4  27.5  48.3 
  3  No idea  15.5  9.3  14.9 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.173  Both husband and wife should assist the family budget together       
  1  I agree  61.8  83.3  63.8 
  2  I don't agree  26.0  10.3  24.5 
  3  No idea  12.2  6.3  11.7 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
V.17.D.175  I could say that I am a happy person         
  1  Absolutely suits me  25.2  24.5  25.1 
  2  Suits me  53.8  54.5  53.9 
  3  It doesn’t matter   14.0  14.2  14.0 
  4  It doesn’t suit me  6.6  5.0  6.4 
  5  Absolutely doesn’t suit me  0.5  1.8  0.6 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.176  I live as my heart desires since you cannot know what tomorrow will 
bring 
       
  1  Absolutely suits me  8.2  13.7  8.7 
  2  Suits me  23.2  34.3  24.2 
  3  It doesn’t matter   22.0  21.5  21.9 
  4  It doesn’t suit me  36.2  21.7  34.9 
  5  Absolutely doesn’t suit  10.4  8.8  10.3 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.177  I do not expect anything from life anymore         
  1  Absolutely suits me  3.1  2.7  3.1 
  2  Suits me  6.9  6.7  6.9 
  3  It doesn’t matter   9.6  8.3  9.5 
  4  It doesn’t suit me  46.0  40.0  45.4 
  5  Absolutely doesn’t suit me  34.4  42.3  35.1 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.178  I will be rich in the future         
  1  Absolutely suits me  6.4  8.3  6.6 
  2  Suits me  10.5  16.2  11.1 
  3  It doesn’t matter   32.3  28.7  32.0 
  4  It doesn’t suit me  38.2  32.3  37.7 
  5  Absolutely doesn’t suit me  12.6  14.5  12.8 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D179  I could even commit an ‘honour’ crime         
  1  Absolutely suits me  20.1  19.0  20.0 
  2  Suits me  20.7  22.2  20.8 
  3  It doesn’t matter   20.8  12.8  20.0 
  4  It doesn’t suit me  22.7  22.7  22.7 
  5  Absolutely doesn’t suit me  15.8  23.3  16.5 
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D.180  I think that the degree of sexual freedom is immoral in my country of 
residence 
       
  1  Absolutely suits me  37.2  20.5  35.6 
  2  Suits me  34.6  31.7  34.3 
  3  It doesn’t matter   14.2  19.3  14.7 
  4  It doesn’t suit me  9.3  19.0  10.2 
  5  Absolutely doesn’t suit ma  4.8  9.5  5.2 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.181  Homosexuality is one of the most significant dangers to social morality         
  1  Absolutely suits me  47.6  31.5  46.1 
  2  Suits me  31.8  29.3  31.6 
  3  It doesn’t matter   9.9  16.2  10.5 
  4  It doesn’t suit me  6.1  14.7  6.9 
  5  Absolutely doesn’t suit me  4.6  8.3  5.0 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
V.18.D.183 Family  pressure         
  1  Quite often  3.1  3.3  3.1 
 2    Partially  22.3  18.2  21.9 
 3    Never  74.6  78.5  75.0 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.184 Intra-family  conflict         
  1  Quite often  3.6  3.0  3.5 
 2    Partially  30.2  31.3  30.3 
 3    Never  66.2  65.7  66.1 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.185  Anxiety caused by gossip         
  1  Quite often  8.8  8.5  8.8 
 2    Partially  25.0  27.5  25.2 
 3    Never  66.2  64.0  66.0 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
V.19  Could you tell us if you find the following acceptable?      
D.186  Flirting by girls          
 1    Agree  20.6  27.8  21.3 
  2  It doesn’t matter  23.3  26.7  23.6 
 3    Disagree  56.2  45.5  55.1 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.187 Flirting  by  boys         
 1    Agree  24.0  36.3  25.2 
  2  It doesn’t matter  25.1  26.7  25.2 
 3    Disagree  50.9  37.0  49.6 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.188  Women engaging in sexual intercourse before marriage          
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  2  It doesn’t matter  9.7  9.0  9.6 
 3    Disagree  86.2  80.5  85.7 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.189  Men engaging in sexual intercourse before marriage         
 1    Agree  9.6  22.0  10.8 
  2  It doesn’t matter  14.9  21.3  15.5 
 3    Disagree  75.5  56.7  73.7 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.190 Arranged  marriages         
 1    Agree  25.7  15.7  24.8 
  2  It doesn’t matter  30.0  20.5  29.1 
 3    Disagree  44.3  63.8  46.2 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.191  Marriage of Turkish women to German/French men         
 1    Agree  15.7  22.2  16.3 
  2  It doesn’t matter  27.2  27.7  27.3 
 3    Disagree  57.1  50.2  56.4 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.193  Marriage of Turkish men to German/French women         
 1    Agree  26.2  31.3  26.7 
  2  It doesn’t matter  34.3  28.7  33.7 
 3    Disagree  39.5  40.0  39.6 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.194  Bringing brides from Turkey         
 1    Agree  40.2  48.8  41.0 
  2  It doesn’t matter  40.2  33.8  39.6 
 3    Disagree  19.6  17.3  19.4 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.195  Bringing bridegrooms from Turkey         
 1    Agree  38.4  48.5  39.4 
  2  It doesn’t matter  40.2  33.7  39.6 
 3    Disagree  21.4  17.8  21.1 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.196  Women going to male doctors         
 1    Agree  47.4  70.0  49.6 
  2  It doesn’t matter  29.1  21.3  28.4 
 3    Disagree  23.5  8.7  22.1 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.197  Marriage of Turkish women to non-Muslim men         
 1    Agree  10.0  24.8  11.4 
  2  It doesn’t matter  20.8  20.0  20.7 
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  97  No answer  0.1  –   0.1 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.198  Marriage of Turkish males to non-Muslim women         
 1    Agree  20.0  30.0  20.9 
  2  It doesn’t matter  27.7  23.5  27.3 
 3    Disagree  52.2  46.5  51.7 
  97  No answer  0.1  –   0.1 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
V.20  How often do you do the following activities?      
D.200  Go to the cinema         
  1  Quite often  16.3  18.7  16.6 
 2    Partially  47.0  39.5  46.3 
 3    Never  36.6  41.8  37.1 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.201  Go to the theatre         
  1  Quite often  2.8  3.7  2.9 
 2    Partially  24.6  20.2  24.2 
 3    Never  72.6  76.2  72.9 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.202  Go to Western music concerts (rock, classical, jazz)         
  1  Quite often  1.9  2.7  2.0 
 2    Partially  14.2  22.0  14.9 
 3    Never  83.9  75.3  83.1 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.203  Go to Turkish folk or pop music concerts         
  1  Quite often  7.1  14.0  7.8 
 2    Partially  39.6  45.5  40.2 
 3    Never  53.2  40.5  52.0 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.204  Go to Turkish restaurants         
  1  Quite often  35.6  46.3  36.6 
 2    Partially  51.6  42.5  50.8 
 3    Never  12.8  11.2  12.6 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.205  Go to fast-food restaurants         
  1  Quite often  19.3  32.0  20.5 
 2    Partially  39.2  37.0  39.0 
 3    Never  41.4  31.0  40.4 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.206  Go to German/French restaurants         
  1  Quite often  3.9  17.0  5.2 
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 3    Never  69.1  41.7  66.5 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.207  Cook German/French foods at home         
  1  Quite often  3.6  16.2  4.8 
 2    Partially  25.6  32.8  26.3 
 3    Never  70.8  51.0  68.9 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.209  Go for a picnic/BBQ         
  1  Quite often  49.5  53.0  49.8 
 2    Partially  44.9  35.5  44.0 
 3    Never  5.6  11.5  6.2 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.210  Go to Italian, Chinese or Mexican restaurants         
  1  Quite often  6.3  9.5  6.6 
 2    Partially  28.1  20.3  27.3 
 3    Never  65.6  70.2  66.1 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.211 Go  to  cafés         
  1  Quite often  17.5  31.7  18.8 
 2    Partially  26.6  20.8  26.0 
 3    Never  56.0  47.5  55.2 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.212 Visit  friends         
  1  Quite often  82.7  85.7  83.0 
 2    Partially  16.4  13.3  16.1 
 3    Never  0.8  1.0  0.9 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.213 Visit  kin         
  1  Quite often  63.1  68.5  63.6 
 2    Partially  32.9  23.0  31.9 
 3    Never  4.0  8.5  4.5 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.214  Go to a mosque         
  1  Quite often  46.9  30.5  45.3 
 2    Partially  41.6  37.8  41.2 
 3    Never  11.5  31.7  13.4 
 Total  100  100  100 
          
D.215 Go  out         
  1  Quite often  62.2  82.8  64.1 
 2    Partially  36.0  15.7  34.0 
 3    Never  1.9  1.5  1.8 
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V.21.D.217  How often do you watch German/French television channels?      
  1  Almost every day  45.3  55.5  46.2 
  2  3-5 days a week  14.6  11.7  14.3 
  3  1-2 days a week  11.8  15.5  12.2 
  4  Rarely  15.9  10.3  15.3 
 5    Never  12.5  7.0  12.0 
 Total  100  100  100 
V.22.D.218  How often do you watch Turkish television channels?         
  1  Almost every day  69.7  71.7  69.9 
  2  3-5 days a week  14.4  7.3  13.7 
  3  1-2 days a week  5.3  7.7  5.5 
  4  Rarely  4.9  4.5  4.8 
 5    Never  5.8  8.8  6.1 
 Total  100  100  100 
V.23.D.219  How often do you listen to German/French radio stations?      
  1  Almost every day  14.3  26.8  15.5 
  2  3-5 days a week  6.3  8.7  6.5 
  3  1-2 days a week  9.2  11.3  9.4 
  4  Rarely  18.9  12.8  18.3 
 5    Never  51.4  40.3  50.3 
 Total  100  100  100 
V.24.D.220  How often do you listen to Turkish radio stations?         
  1  Almost every day  9.2  10.7  9.3 
  2  3-5 days a week  5.7  6.3  5.8 
  3  1-2 days a week  9.5  13.2  9.8 
  4  Rarely  21.2  21.3  21.2 
 5    Never  54.4  48.5  53.8 
 Total  100  100  100 
V.25.D.221  How often do you read German/French newspapers?         
  1  Almost every day  17.2  13.2  16.8 
  2  3-5 days a week  12.5  11.2  12.4 
  3  1-2 days a week  16.6  15.3  16.5 
  4  Rarely  21.5  20.5  21.4 
 5    Never  32.2  39.8  32.9 
 Total  100  100  100 
V.26.D.222  How often do you read Turkish newspapers?         
  1  Almost every day  32.8  21.0  31.7 
  2  3-5 days a week  14.0  12.0  13.8 
  3  1-2 days a week  16.9  15.8  16.8 
  4  Rarely  17.7  24.5  18.3 
 5    Never  18.7  26.7  19.4 
 Total  100  100  100 
V.27.D.223  How often do you use the Internet?         
  1  Almost every day  24.3  13.8  23.3 
  2  3-5 days a week  8.5  4.3  8.1 
  3  1-2 days a week  8.1  7.0  8.0 
  4  Rarely  12.7  9.7  12.4 
 5    Never  46.4  65.2  48.2 
 Total  100  100  100 
 